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### Viewing cable 09THEHAGUE399, NETHERLANDS: LEAD TOPICS FOR PRESIDENT'S JULY 14

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09THEHAGUE399 | 2009-07-06 15:03 | 2011-01-17 00:12 | SECRET | Embassy The Hague

`

    VZCZCXRO8226
    PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTC #0399/01 1871530
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 061530Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2984
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 000399

    SIPDIS

    STATE PLEASE PASS TO NSC

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
    TAGS: ECON EFIN MOPS OVIP PINR PREL NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: LEAD TOPICS FOR PRESIDENT'S JULY 14
    MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MI...

    215294,7/6/2009 15:30,09THEHAGUE399,"Embassy The
    Hague",SECRET,09THEHAGUE395,"VZCZCXRO8226
    PP RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTC #0399/01 1871530
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 061530Z JUL 09
    FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2984
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY","S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04
    THE HAGUE 000399
    SIPDIS
    STATE PLEASE PASS TO NSC
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
    TAGS: ECON EFIN MOPS OVIP PINR PREL NL
    SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: LEAD TOPICS FOR PRESIDENT'S JULY 14
    MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER BALKENENDE - SECOND OF
    THREE CABLES
    REF: THE HAGUE 395
    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael F. Gallagher for reasons 1.4
    (
    b) and (d).
    Mr. President:
    ¶1. (C) As indicated in our overview cable, Dutch Prime
    Minister Balkenende hopes to limit discussion to four major
    topics during his meeting with the President:
    Afghanistan/Pakistan; the economic crisis/G20; Middle East
    Peace Process/Iran; and climate change. He will also mention
    the New York 400 celebration, hoping you will agree to see
    the Crown Prince at the White House in September. These are
    discussed discussed below. Other possible topics are
    discussed in a separate cable.
    --------------------
    Afghanistan/Pakistan
    --------------------
    ¶2. (C) Balkenende will share his expectations on what the
    Dutch can contribute in Afghanistan post-2010. We have
    recently asked the Dutch to remain in Uruzgan after 2010 to
    run the PRT in Tarin Kowt but not, necessarily, to remain as
    lead nation in Uruzgan. We also want them to continue to
    supply enablers and trainers for the ISAF mission as well as
    providing financial assistance for ISAF initiatives.
    ¶3. (U) The Netherlands, past and current efforts put them at
    the forefront of our Allies. The Dutch have been in
    Afghanistan since December 2001. They are the lead nation in
    Uruzgan with PRT Tarin Kowt and combat elements. They are
    also mid-way through their second one-year command of
    Regional Command South (RC-South) at Kandahar. Their
    commitment includes 1,800 personnel and such critical
    enablers as F-16s, helicopters, intelligence assets, special
    forces, and medical units. In addition, they have devoted
    more than 220 million euro (USD 305 million) in aid to
    Afghanistan since 2006. On short notice, they hosted the
    March 2009 UN Conference on Afghanistan which gained
    international acceptance of our strategic review. They are
    also proud of their growing international reputation for
    their implementation of a 3-D approach (defense, development
    and diplomacy) in Uruzgan.
    ¶4. (S) We understand Balkenende, Foreign Minister Verhagen,
    and Defense Minister van Middelkoop have been drumming up
    support in the Cabinet for continued deployment in Uruzgan
    beyond 2010, scaling back to about 500 troops (providing
    force protection for PRT operations in effect), relinquishing
    lead nation status but still providing enablers and
    development assistance. The stumbling block so far has been
    the Labor Party leader, Wouter Bos, Deputy Prime Minister and
    Finance Minister. Several factors make an extension a
    difficult decision for Bos. A majority of the Dutch public
    does not strongly support the military deployment, and
    several politicians have pledged to pull Dutch troops out of
    Uruzgan in 2010. Many MPs are also concerned about the
    effect the deployment has on military readiness and
    recruitment -- Dutch forces have a shortfall of approximately
    7,000 personnel (out of a total of 43,000, a 16% shortfall).
    The Dutch media report that the ISAF mission is not
    successful in bringing security to the region and that Dutch
    aid is ineffective (the Labor Party holds the development
    portfolio in the Cabinet as well). There is also a growing
    sentiment that the Dutch have done enough and it is time for
    other countries, such as Germany and France, to do more.
    Qother countries, such as Germany and France, to do more.
    ¶5. (S) FM Verhagen recently told us, as well as U.S.
    Ambassador to NATO Daalder, that the Labor Party could
    probably support staying in Afghanistan in some role, just
    not in Uruzgan (a step that makes no sense given the depth of
    Dutch experience in Uruzgan). Labor Party staff indicated a
    willingness to continue some sort of mission in Afghanistan
    (even in Uruzgan) if the issue were framed in terms of
    continuing Dutch development and stability efforts.
    Balkenende, the Foreign Minister and others expressed to us
    their frustrations caused by their Labor partners, and have
    asked our help in bringing Labor around.
    ¶6. (S) In the President's discussions with Balkenende and
    with the press (at the end of the meeting), the President may
    THE HAGUE 00000399 002 OF 004
    want to stress:
    - our appreciation for the long-standing and significant
    Dutch contribution in Afghanistan, specifically in Uruzgan;
    - we see the Dutch as a valued partner in Allied efforts to
    address a common threat in a dangerous region;
    - while it is an internal decision by the Dutch whether they
    stay in Afghanistan, we hope they will continue with other
    Allies in ISAF as it implements its new strategy; and
    - (perhaps most importantly), we hope they will continue
    their stability and development efforts in Uruzgan to build
    upon the Dutch achievements there.
    ¶7. (C) The Dutch welcomed the new U.S. strategic link between
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, but they keep a low profile on
    their generous aid programs in Pakistan. They have pledged
    86.7 million euro (USD 120 million) in development aid over
    the next three years, as well as 3.5 million euro (USD 4.9
    million) in immediate aid for Pakistan,s internally
    displaced persons. The Dutch are perplexed, however, by
    Pakistan,s weak democratic credentials and disorganized aid
    programs. Nonetheless, Foreign Ministry contacts have
    indicated Balkenende may be prepared in the meeting to
    announce additional aid to Pakistan.
    ----------
    Guantanamo
    ----------
    ¶8. (S) In the President's private meeting, he may want to ask
    Balkenende to accept Guantanamo detainees, but recognize
    Balkenende and other Cabinet members have already said
    publicly the Netherlands will not/not accept detainees. In a
    July 5 radio interview, Balkenende said he expected the
    President to ask the Netherlands to consider taking some
    Guantanamo detainees, ""We have already said no to this
    request, but we will discuss the issue. There are legal
    obstacles to taking in these prisoners. Still, he left the
    door open, saying it was a complex issue and he is willing to
    discuss it, possibly in a European context. On June 30, FM
    Verhagen told us privately the Netherlands ""will accept
    detainees if that,s what it takes to close Guantanamo.""
    Taking detainees would be difficult and could cause the
    government to fall because the decision would strengthen the
    Dutch turn to the right, giving Wilders ammunition to feed
    the flames of Dutch anti-immigrant fears. Given these
    constraints, the Dutch have looked for other ways to be
    helpful. FM Verhagen is funding a two-year study of the
    nexus of human rights, humanitarian law, and use of force,
    with an eye toward resolving the knotty legal issues
    surrounding Guantanamo. The Dutch may also be willing to
    support funding to transfer of detainees
    to third countries.
    -------------------
    Economic Crisis/G20
    -------------------
    ¶9. (SBU) The Dutch financial sector was hit hard by the
    global financial crisis, due in part to exposure to U.S.
    mortgage-backed securities and other toxic assets. The
    government responded assertively with several measures to
    assist banks and their customers, most dramatically by
    nationalizing the Dutch operations of Fortis Bank and
    spending a controversial USD 36 billion to bail out the new
    Fortis/ABN AMRO entity, the Netherlands, largest bank. The
    contagion in the financial sector has spread throughout the
    Dutch economy, now in recession since the first quarter of
    ¶2009. After four consecutive years of GDP growth, the
    Q2009. After four consecutive years of GDP growth, the
    economy is expected to shrink by 4.75 percent in 2009.
    Exports are expected to decline 16.75 percent this year - a
    precipitous drop for the Netherlands, small, open economy
    which depends on foreign trade. Unemployment is rising and
    likely will reach 9.5 percent by 2010. Balkenende,s
    government introduced three economic stimulus packages
    between November 2008 and March 2009, including subsidies for
    clean energy projects, corporate tax breaks, expanded export
    credit insurance facilities, and accelerated infrastructure
    projects. The Cabinet remains committed to an incremental,
    cautious approach of giving these stimulus measures time to
    work before embarking on new ones. Meanwhile, the budget
    surplus that the Netherlands enjoyed in recent years has
    disappeared as a result of the stimulus programs, with a
    THE HAGUE 00000399 003 OF 004
    deficit of 6.7 percent of GDP expected by 2010. Balkenende
    now faces the difficult question of how to promote economic
    recovery while keeping the deficit in check.
    ¶10. (SBU) Balkenende remains a staunch believer in
    international cooperation as the only means of bringing about
    economic recovery at home and abroad. In keeping with the
    Dutch tradition of multilateralism, Balkenende supports the
    work of the G20 and expanded roles for the IMF and World
    Bank. The Dutch champion much broader financial regulation -
    and standards for corporate responsibility. They are keenly
    interested in the plight of developing countries in the
    economic crisis and continue to push the EU, UN, and
    international financial institutions to develop programs to
    address this issue. This focus is in keeping with the strong
    Dutch tradition of assistance to the developing world. The
    Dutch provide a fixed 0.8 percent of GDP - over USD 7 billion
    - in development aid annually, making the Netherlands the
    world's fourth largest aid donor as a percentage of GDP and
    the sixth largest in absolute terms. Balkenende will seek
    the President's views on the pace of economic recovery and
    how the Netherlands can play a constructive role,
    particularly to assist developing countries.
    ¶11. (C) Balkenende considers participation in the G20 a
    critical measure of the Netherlands, international stature
    and will push hard for an invitation to the Pittsburgh
    summit. This is THE key deliverable he hopes to secure from
    this meeting. (Note: Finance Minister Bos asked Treasury
    Secretary Geithner for a G20 invitation during their June 29
    meeting in Washington; the Secretary indicated the White
    House would make a decision after the July 8-10 G8 summit.
    End note.) Dutch participation in the Washington and London
    summits were major wins for the Netherlands; Balkenende will
    argue that the Dutch deserved those invitations, and that the
    practice should continue. The Dutch point out the
    Netherlands is the 5th largest economy in the EU, the 16th
    largest in the world, and has the world,s 11th largest
    financial center. The Dutch are particularly supportive of
    the G20,s calls for anti-protectionist trade and investment
    policies, reform of financial supervisory structures,
    including a prominent role for the new Financial Stability
    Board, increased supervision of hedge funds, and more
    restrictive remuneration policies. Balkenende will argue
    that the Netherlands, open financial sector has been
    significantly damaged by the crisis; the Dutch have the
    knowledge and experience to play a constructive role in G20
    efforts to reform the international financial architecture
    and spur economic recovery; the precedent for their G20
    participation has already been set; and they, therefore,
    deserve a seat in Pittsburgh.
    --------------
    Climate Change
    --------------
    ¶12. (C) Balkenende is keenly interested in climate change and
    pushes the Netherlands to address the issue through
    ambitious, coordinated, global action. We expect him to
    praise renewed U.S. leadership on climate but he probably
    will not stray from the common EU position -- still hoping
    for a more aggressive medium-term U.S. mitigation target.
    The GONL has committed to a 30 percent reduction in
    greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 relative to 1990.
    Qgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2020 relative to 1990.
    They want other top emitters to display a ""comparable effort""
    in mitigating climate change, but they privately acknowledge
    that even a 20 percent U.S. cut by 2020 is unrealistic. We
    share much common ground with the Dutch on this issue. They
    see an international carbon market, heavy private sector
    involvement, and broad access to clean technologies as key
    parts of the solution. They support robust financing for
    developing countries that undertake
    serious mitigation commitments, and will insist such aid be
    allocated efficiently, accountably and transparently.
    ¶13. (C) Balkenende will likely explain how tackling climate
    change is vital to the Netherlands, as over 60 percent of its
    population and economic activity is located below sea-level.
    The devastation of Hurricane Katrina was a wake-up call for
    the Dutch. Yet despite their best intentions, Dutch rhetoric
    far outstrips their deeds. Yale,s 2008 Environmental
    Protection Index ranked the Netherlands 55th worldwide,
    placing it in the bottom fifth of EU countries. (Note: The
    THE HAGUE 00000399 004 OF 004
    United States ranked 39th. End note.) The latest UN figures
    reveal the Netherlands reduced its total GHG emissions by
    only 2 percent between 1990 and 2006, leaving it a steep hill
    to climb to achieve its ambitious 30 percent target by 2020.
    Local energy experts admit the Netherlands has no chance of
    achieving the EU,s 20 percent renewable energy target by
    ¶2020. ----------------
    Middle East/Iran
    ----------------
    ¶14. (C) The Dutch are eager to play a constructive role in
    the Middle East Peace Process. The Dutch participate in the
    Gaza maritime interdiction initiative to stop arms smuggling.
    Along with the Danish, the Dutch have proposed resurrecting
    the EU Gaza-Egypt border monitoring mission. At the same
    time, the Dutch push for greater access for humanitarian aid
    in Gaza, and they are substantial donors to Gaza economic
    development and governance initiatives, providing 72 million
    euro (USD 100 million) in 2008. FM Verhagen makes regular
    trips to the region (he was last in Israel at the end of
    June) and is considering hosting a 2010 conference in support
    of peace efforts. They will be anxious to find ways to
    support our efforts in the region. They also welcome the
    U.S. decision to engage Syria and have been holding off
    expanding their ties with Syria until there is greater human
    rights progress.
    ¶15. (S) On Iran, the Dutch are tough-minded and have pushed
    the EU to prepare a coordinated response to Iran,s crackdown
    on protestors and the media. On the nuclear issue, the Dutch
    strongly support the UN sanctions regime and quickly follow
    up on efforts to curtail proliferation activities. Before
    the election crisis, the Dutch embassy in Tehran reported
    that sanctions were starting to work. The embassy also noted
    that acquiring nuclear capacity enjoyed wide support
    throughout Iranian society. The Dutch are willing to deepen
    U.S.-Netherlands cooperation on information sharing on Iran.
    ---------------------------------
    New York 400 - Crown Prince Visit
    ---------------------------------
    ¶16. (SBU) The Dutch government is spending almost $10 million
    this year to highlight four hundred years of Dutch-American
    friendship. This commemorates the 400th anniversary of the
    exploration of Manhattan and its river system by Henry
    Hudson, an English seaman working for a Dutch company. The
    quadricentennial (known as ""NY400""), with programs in New
    York and Amsterdam, weaves our shared history into what will
    be our shared future, expanding awareness of our
    similarities: our pioneering spirit and the values of
    freedom, democracy, openness, creativity, entrepreneurship,
    diversity and tolerance. In September, Crown Prince
    Willem-Alexander and his wife, Princess Maxima, will visit
    New York to participate in NY400 activities. The Prime
    Minister will ask if you can receive their Royal Highnesses
    at the White House. The Dutch stress the Crown Prince will
    likely be king soon (it is widely anticipated Queen Beatrix
    will abdicate within a year) and this would be an opportunity
    for the President to meet the Crown Prince in the context of
    the NY400 festivities. The Crown Prince is a champion around
    the world for clean water and sanitation as a public health
    initiative.
    ¶17. (U) A cable with brief discussion of other potential
    Q17. (U) A cable with brief discussion of other potential
    topics is being sent septel.
    GALLAGHER

`