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Reference ID | Subject | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08TRIPOLI819 | SELF-DESCRIBED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED RELEASED | 2008-10-14 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI827 |  | 2008-10-17 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI829 | AL-QADHAFI: TO RUSSIA, WITH LOVE? | 2008-10-17 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI833 | COLONEL AL-QADHAFI'S SUMMER READING LIST | 2008-10-20 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08LONDON2673 | PAN AM 103 BOMBER HAS INCURABLE CANCER; LIBYANS | 2008-10-24 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy London
08TRIPOLI851 | LIBYAN-SWISS CONTRETEMPS DRAGS ON | 2008-10-27 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI868 | U.K. DENIES LICENSE FOR EXPORT OF KALASHNIKOVS TO LIBYA; GOL POTENTIALLY SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SELLERS REF: A) TRIPOLI 650, B) STATE 95271 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) U.K. Embassy PolOff told P/E Chief on October 30 that HMG had decided not/not to approve a license for U.K. company York Guns to export to Libya 130,000 Kashnikov automatic rifles. Per ref A, York Guns was to have acted as intermediary between an unidentified Ukrainian party and procurement officials at Libya's Temporary People's Committee for Defense (MOD-equivalent). Based on the intervention reported ref B and on concerns expressed by the U.K.'s Embassy in Tripoli that the Government of Libya (GOL) might have intended to re-export the weapons to either the governments or armed rebel factions in Chad and Sudan, the U.K.'s Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended about one month ago against approving the export license. After conducting a review of the case, Whitehall concurred on October 30 with the decision to not/not approve the export license. 2. (C) Separately, Muhammad el-Obeidi, a Libyan businessman with ties to some quarters of Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime, told P/E Chief on October 23 that he had signed a contract with a Romanian company (NFI) for the export from Romania to Libya of 100,000 AK-47S automatic rifles. (Note: El-Obeidi's older brother was Libya's Minister of Defense from 1954-1969; his nephew is a former Prime Minister and the current MFA Secretary (U/S-equivalent) for European Affairs. End note.) El-Obeidi signed the contract in late September in Paris during a business trip there. El-Obeidi said he had been tapped to help facilitate procurement for the Jafl al-Khamis ("Khamis Brigade"), a special forces unit headed by Khamis al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. He said Captain Ahmed Ben Shraga'a, head of procurement for the unit, has instructions to work through el-Obeidi on a number of "special procurement issues". El-Obeidi was open about the contract, but avoided the question as to whether the rifles were to be used in Libya or re-exported to another destination. STEVENS | 2008-11-06 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI870 | AL-QADHAFI'S RUSSIA TRIP SIGNALS DESIRE FOR FOREIGN POLICY | 2008-11-06 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI874 | LIBYAN LEADER AL-QADHAFI'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO THE | 2008-11-10 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI882 | UPDATE ON RELEASED REGIME CRITIC DR. IDRISS BOUFAYED AND PLANNED MEDICAL TRAVEL REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY EMAIL 10/27/2008, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 819, D) TRIPOLI 851 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) has reportedly obtained a passport and is finalizing travel permission for self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who was recently released on humanitarian grounds from a 25 year prison term in light of his advanced lung cancer. The QDF will coordinate and pay for Boufayed's travel, and will facilitate (and possibly also underwrite) medical treatment abroad. The QDF is anxious that Boufayed travel quickly - perhaps in part out of concern that delays in granting his humanitarian release contributed to the seriousness of his medical condition - and is waiting for a decision from him on where he wishes to go for medical treatment and when. Boufayed is reportedly feeling better and is receiving visitors and paying social calls to neighbors. Reports that the QDF helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate his travel abroad for medical treatment represent a welcome development; however, we've been here before with respect to the QDF claiming positive intervention that later proved to be untrue, particularly in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi. End summary. 2. (C) Pef ref A, P/E Chief met with xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect) on November 10 to follow up on the case of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment earlier this year in connection with planning a peaceful demonstration (ref B). Boufayed was released on humanitarian grounds on October 8 from the Sabratha Hospital, where he was undergoing treatment for advanced lung cancer (ref C), and returned to his family home in Gharyan. 3. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx visited Gharyan on November 6 and met with Idriss Boufayed's brother, Juma'a Boufayed. (Note: Juma'a Boufayed himself was arrested in February 2007, shortly after his brother and eleven other individuals were arrested on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square. As reported ref B, Juma'a Boufayed was released on/about May 27, shortly before a state security court convicted his brother and 10 others of planning to overthrow the government and conducting unauthorized meetings with representatives of a foreign government. End note.) xxxxxxxxxxxx said the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), which had helped facilitate Idriss Boufayed's release on humanitarian grounds, had secured a passport for Boufayed (who is not yet in possession of it) and was in the process of obtaining permission from Libyan security organizations for him to travel abroad for medical treatment. xxxxxxxxxxxx did not anticipate problems with respect to exit permissions; Boufayed's name was removed from airport and land border crossing watchlists when he was granted humanitarian release. The QDF will coordinate entry visas for the (presumably European) country in which Boufayed decides to seek treatment, and will also facilitate travel arrangements and medical appointments. Tarnish said the QDF was still discussing whether to pay for Boufayed's medical treatment (it has already agreed to defray his travel expenses), and said he thought it would. 4. (C) Noting that the QDF's Human Rights Committee Director, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, was personally involved in the case, Tarnish said the QDF was anxious that Boufayed travel quickly and was only waiting for a decision from him as to where he wanted to travel for medical treatment and when. (Comment: Boufayed's medical condition is reportedly grave and we've heard reports that the GOL would prefer that he not die in Libya to minimize potential public discontent. The QDF may be anxious to expedite his travel to mitigate charges that the GOL's failure to grant humanitarian release earlier contributed to his decline. End comment.) Addressing rumors that Boufayed might be discouraged from traveling to Switzerland (where he resided for a number of years) in light of ongoing Libyan-Swiss contretemps (ref D) , xxxxxxxxxxxx said the QDF would do all it could if that was where Boufayed decided he wanted to go. 5. (C) Citing Juma'a Boufayed, xxxxxxxxxxxx said Idriss Boufayed's medical condition and mental health had improved since his release. Visits to him were initially limited after his return home because his health was fragile and his family did not want large numbers of visitors in their home; however, Boufayed is currently able to receive visitors at will and has begun paying TRIPOLI 00000882 002 OF 002 social visits to neighbors' homes as well. xxxxxxxxxxxx said a number of regime critics, journalists and members of Libya's nascent civil society have quietly made the trip to Gharyan in recent weeks to see him. xxxxxxxxxxxx is scheduled to visit Boufayed next week and will give us a readout. xxxxxxxxxxxx has not received a response to the petition it submitted in October to the QDF asking that it urge the GOL to release the other 10 individuals convicted in the Boufayed case, who remain in prison. Separately, U.K. Poloff David Clay told us on November 9 that not all EU capitals had weighed in yet on whether to agree to a joint demarche to the GOL requesting access to Jamal al-Hajj, a Danish-Libyan dual citizen who was among the individuals arrested with Boufayed. 6. (C) Comment: The news that the QDF has helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate and perhaps underwrite his travel abroad for medical treatment is a welcome development; however, we've been here before with respect to the QDF claiming positive intervention that later proved to be untrue, particularly in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi. xxxxxxxxxxxx's planned visit to Idriss Boufayed next week should afford another point of reference from which to gauge the likelihood that medical travel will in fact be facilitated. End comment. STEVENS | 2008-11-13 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI889 | TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA | 2008-11-16 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI896 | AL-QADHAFI AND THE REFORM "VISION THING" REF: A) TRIPOLI 227, B) TRIPOLI 842, C) TRIPOLI 699 TRIPOLI 00000896 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: In a meeting broadcast on state-owned television, senior Government of Libya (GOL) officials disagreed with Muammar al-Qadhafi about plans to implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he proposed last March. Al-Qadhafi blasted the officials, accusing them of wanting to maintain the status quo to continue profiting from corruption, and insisted that plans to restructure the government and directly distribute shares of oil revenues to the Libyan people be implemented. International media have touted the show as a rare glimpse into the opaque Jamahiriya system; however, local observers believe the meeting was a staged piece of political theater designed to give public cover to an expected scaling back of the proposed reforms. Senior GOL officials have told us privately that serious risks (inflation, currency devaluation, etc.) posed by Leader's vision, together with a lack of consensus about how to implement it, mean the project will be delayed until at least the second quarter of 2009. The personal, albeit unpublicized, involvement of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in implementing the initiative has thrown into stark relief disagreements between the regime's old guard and would-be reformers. More cynical contacts have speculated that al-Qadhafi's intent all along was to raise the specter of privatization and government restructuring to make the increasingly creaky Jamahiriya system seem favorable by comparison and temper calls for more sweeping change. End summary. GOL LEADERS DISPUTE REFORM PLAN 2. (SBU) In a development picked up by Reuters, AFP and the Financial Times, Libya's state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA) televised a meeting between Muammar al-Qadhafi and senior government officials on November 11 in which several GPC secretaries (minister-equivalents) openly disagreed with the Leader about plans to implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he first proposed in an address to the General People's Congress in March (ref A). In the meeting, Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengadara warned that implementing plans to directly disburse monthly shares of Libya's oil revenues to the Libyan people would fuel undisciplined consumption (an idea al-Qadhafi specifically refuted in March), spark inflation, precipitate devaluation of the dinar, create a balance of payments deficit and cause a decline in real incomes. Minister of Economy and Trade Ali Essawi cautioned that the combination of direct cash payments and dismantling much of the government structure would not prompt greater production or investment, and would adversely impact long-term economic growth and social development. Instead of direct cash payments, Secretary of the General People's Committee (Prime Minister-equivalent) al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi advocated an ill-defined scheme to give Libyans shares in banks and companies through portfolios that would be managed by financial institutions. Pointing to the recent decline in oil prices, several senior GOL officials noted that plan would be more tenable with higher oil prices, but was too risky given the dramatic fluctuations recently seen. AL-QADHAFI (PUBLICLY) INSISTS ON GOING FORWARD 3. (SBU) Striking a populist note, al-Qadhafi blasted the officials, insisting that they wanted to maintain the status quo to keep their positions and continue profiting from corruption. (Note: Al-Qadhafi criticized PM al-Mahmoudi by name in his Revolution Day speech and accused him of being corrupt; his exchange with him in the televised meeting has reinforced widespread expectation that al-Mahmoudi will be sacked in connection with an expected Cabinet shuffle during the March 2009 General People's Congress. End note.) Reprising themes he touched on in March, he said that since multiple efforts to address corruption and mismanagement in the popular committees (ministry-equivalents) had failed, Libyans should instead receive a direct share of oil revenues from which to underwrite health care, education, utilities and investments. Responding to concerns about implementation of the reforms, he stressed that " ... the decision to distribute oil revenues, their sole source of wealth, directly to the people is not negotiable". He conceded that it was "bad luck" that the wealth distribution proposal coincided with declining oil prices, but stressed that the result of the regime's 40-year effort to manage Libya's resources on behalf of its people had been "very bad". He reiterated the argument made in March that once oil revenues were directly distributed, it would no longer be necessary to maintain subsidies or government services (to include health care and education), since people could afford to buy whatever TRIPOLI 00000896 002.2 OF 003 they needed directly. MEDIA BREATHLESS ABOUT OSTENSIBLE VIEW INTO JAMAHIRIYA POLICY DEBATE ... 4. (SBU) International media reaction - JANA broadcast the show, but state-owned media has otherwise not dwelled on it - has largely focused on the unusual spectacle of the ostensible policy debate that took place. Libya watcher and Dartmouth University professor Dirk Vandewalle opined that the meeting reflected the fact that top-down decision-making in Libya was being increasingly questioned and that the power of technocrats had increased. Reuters characterized it as "a rare glimpse into decision-making in the North African country". ... BUT LOCAL OBSERVERS REMAIN UNCONVINCED 5. (C) Observers closer to the scene have been less sanguine, and several senior GOL officials - including those involved in the meeting - had previewed for us in earlier meeetings that lack of agreement about how to implement government restructuring and privatization meant that implementation would be delayed and the scope likely reduced. As reported ref B, CB Governor Bengadara told a visiting U.S. trade specialist in October that while he favored a more aggressive "shock therapy" approach to economic reform than many other senior GOL leaders, he expected the wealth distribution program to take several years to implement and was frankly skeptical about the extent of government restructuring. Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, who heads the Economic Development Board (EDB) and National Planning Council and also leads the five committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's vision, told visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams on November 5 that nothing had been firmly decided with respect to government restructuring or privatization of education and healthcare (further details on the Williams-Jibril meeting septel). Conceding that the implementing committees had made little progress in agreeing on a plan, he suggested that change would be unlikely until after the first quarter of 2009. (Note: The General People's Congress typically meets in March; we've been told that they would have to formally bless any restructuring or privatization plans before they could be implemented. End note.) Similarly, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Employment and Training (minister-equivalent) Matuq Matuq told us on November 13 that GOL leaders had encountered difficulty in trying to develop plans to implement al-Qadhafi's vision, and flatly told us that privatization and government restructuring would be delayed considerably. SAIF AL-ISLAM'S BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE A MIXED BLESSING 6. (C) Part of the issue appears to be that the restructuring and privatization initiatives have become lightning rods for the struggle between the old guard and would-be reformers. Over the summer, contacts told us the five implementing committees had been unable to achieve consensus on whether and how to implement the reforms. A supra-committee under Dr. Jibril was formed to coordinate the implementing committees' work; however, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi - who had formed shadow committees composed of staff from his Qadhafi Development Foundation - has played a powerful and at times leading role in shaping implementation plans. A contact at the EDB told us that Saif al-Islam's involvement was a blessing and a curse. His personal status allowed him to advocate more forcefully than most GOL officials; however, the fact that he is at odds with influential members of the regime's old guard raised the stakes in the debate about restructuring and privatization. 7. (SBU) Implementation of the Leader's vision has already been delayed. When he outlined his vision in March, al-Qadhafi called for the five committees to submit plans for implementing the project by September 1, with the idea that he would detail the plan in his annual Revolution Day speech on/about September 1 and that the changes would be initiated before year's end. He disappointed those hopes, instead shifting the goalposts in his Revolution Day speech by saying the committees would submit implementation plans by year's end, and that changes would begin early in the new year (ref C). 8. (C) Comment: While the televised meeting was noteworthy for the fact that it offered the unusual spectacle of ostensible dissent in the sterile Libyan political environment, the fact that a number of the participants raised their hands to publicly dispute the reforms, together with al-Qadhafi's strident insistence on implementing the original plan, smacks of staged TRIPOLI 00000896 003.2 OF 003 political theater. Local observers have expected for some time that al-Qadhafi would in the end - as he's done before - significantly scale back the scope of the reform agenda he announced in March. By explicitly linking the reforms to the populist issue of anti-corruption, al-Qadhafi has seized the moral high ground on an issue of genuine public concern, which would allow him to blame venal GOL officials for failing to execute his vision if the original plan is modified. Doing so would allow him to limit real reform, and would mitigate to a certain extent criticism of the Jamahiriya system that is his brainchild. More cynical contacts have speculated that al-Qadhafi's intent all along was to raise the specter of privatization - particularly of education and healthcare - and government restructuring to make the increasingly creaky Jamahiriya system seem favorable by comparison in the eyes of a largely conservative, risk-averse Libyan public. According to that line of thinking, al-Qadhafi - concerned that Libya's economic opening was creating pressure for political reform - floated the privatization and government restructuring policy balloon largely as a means by which to muddy the waters and create an atmosphere of "constructive chaos" in which to effect limited (vice sweeping) change. It's a tactic he has used before: Libyan contacts are fond of telling the fable of a race in which participants have to carry a sack of rats a certain distance before they chew through the bag. Al-Qadhafi wins because he figures out that by constantly shaking the bag, the rats are too disoriented to make their way out. End comment. GODFREY | 2008-11-18 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI917 | HEAD OF LIBYA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD: U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS NOT JUST ABOUT OIL REF: TRIPOLI 227 | 2008-11-26 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI919 | NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION REF: A) TRIPOLI 819, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 280, D) TRIPOLI 577 | 2008-11-26 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI921 | LIBYA SEEKS TO DOWNPLAY TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA | 2008-11-30 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI923 | GOL SEEKS TO TURN THE PAGE ON LINGERING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES | 2008-12-01 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI925 | RELEASED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED TO TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT REF: A) TRIPOLI 472, B) TRIPOLI 819, C) NEA/MAG OI 12/01/2008 | 2008-12-02 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI926 | SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER MAY VISIT TRIPOLI IN "LAST GASP" | 2008-12-02 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI936 | MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI QUIETLY INVOLVED IN PROCESS TO ADOPT A LIBYAN CONSTITUTION REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 759, B) TRIPOLI 679 TRIPOLI 00000936 001.2 OF 003 | 2008-12-05 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI942 | OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. FIRMS AS LIBYA INVESTS BILLIONS IN NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT TRIPOLI 00000942 001.2 OF 002 | 2008-12-12 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI943 | DEVELOPMENTS IN EL-JAHMI AND BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASES | 2008-12-12 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI960 | QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION FACILITATES VISIT TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI | 2008-12-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI969 | REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED IN SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT REF: A) TRIPOLI 960, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 819 | 2008-12-18 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08STATE135048 | SHIELD S04B-08: SYRIA ARRANGING TO ACQUIRE CW | 2008-12-30 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Secretary of State
08TRIPOLI987 | THINGS FALL APART: LIBYA TELLS SWISS COMPANIES TO CEASE | 2008-12-30 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI991 | READOUT OF U.S.-UK-LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, NOVEMBER 24-26 REF: 06 TRIPOLI 498 CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Acting DCM, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) | 2008-12-31 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI992 | LIBYA INTERESTED IN U.S. WEAPONS, MORE AMBIVALENT ON OTHER MILITARY COOPERATION | 2008-12-31 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI994 | THINGS FALL APART: LIBYA TELLS SWISS COMPANIES TO CEASE | 2008-12-31 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI2 | ORTEGA GETS NEITHER DINARS NOR PESOS FROM AL-QADHAFI | 2009-01-04 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI5 | LIBYAN REACTIONS TO GAZA: PUBLIC OUTRAGE, PRIVATE PRAGMATISM REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988, B) TRIPOLI 984 | 2009-01-05 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI14 | AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS | 2009-01-11 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI17 | AL-QADHAFI SUGGESTS LIBYAN ELECTIONS MAY BE IN THE OFFING | 2009-01-12 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI22 | REGIME-ORCHESTRATED ATTACKS AGAINST BERBERS IN YEFREN | 2009-01-13 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI30 | LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988, B) 08 TRIPOLI 984, C) TRIPOLI 005 TRIPOLI 00000030 001.2 OF 003 | 2009-01-14 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI31 | SENIOR REGIME FIGURES AMBIVALENT ABOUT U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS | 2009-01-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI32 | LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT CONFIRMS DESIRE TO SELL URANIUM YELLOWCAKE | 2009-01-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI37 | UGANDA: QADHAFI'S CROWN TARNISHED IN COUNCIL OF KINGS | 2009-01-21 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09RIGA45 | LATVIA SEEKS MEMBERSHIP IN MTCR | 2009-01-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Riga
09TRIPOLI40 | LIBYA POSTPONES GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, WALKS BACK FROM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND PRIVATIZATION PLANS | 2009-01-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI47 | FATHI EL-JAHMI AND FAMILY DECIDE HE SHOULD TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT | 2009-01-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI49 | GOL PROTESTS AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS | 2009-01-23 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI57 | LIBYA REITERATES REQUEST FOR RETURN OF LIBYAN DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY REF: A) TRIPOLI 47, B) STATE 6516 | 2009-01-26 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI59 | SWISS AMBASSADOR: OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA IS DEAD | 2009-01-27 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI63 |  | 2009-01-28 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI64 | AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN | 2009-01-28 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI65 | PAN AM BOMBER AL-MEGRAHI: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI | 2009-01-28 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI70 | LIBYA EXPECTS TO WIN CHAIRMANSHIP OF AU ASSEMBLY | 2009-01-29 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09USNATO30 | READOUT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING JANUARY 28, | 2009-01-29 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Mission USNATO
09TRIPOLI71 | AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 474, B) 08 TRIPOLI 498, C) 08 TRIPOLI 563, D) 08 TRIPOLI 597, E) TRIPOLI 40 TRIPOLI 00000071 001.2 OF 003 | 2009-01-30 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI73 | A KING IN AL-QADHAFI'S COURT: SPAIN'S JUAN CARLOS VISITS | 2009-02-01 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli

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