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### Viewing cable 09RANGOON539, BURMA: SENIOR GENERALS START A CONVERSATION; HOW

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09RANGOON539 | 2009-08-18 10:10 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Rangoon

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHGO #0539/01 2301059
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 181059Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9364
    INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

` `

    S E C R E T RANGOON 000539

    SENSITIVE
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
    SUBJECT: BURMA: SENIOR GENERALS START A CONVERSATION; HOW
    WILL WE RESPOND?

    REF: A. RANGOON 535
    ¶B. RANGOON 536

    ¶C. RANGOON 527
    ¶D. RANGOON 534

    Classified By: P/E Chief Jennifer Harhigh for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

    Summary
    --------

    ¶1. (S) Burma's senior generals used Senator Webb's visit to
    deliver an unequivocal message: the GOB wants better
    relations with the United States. They want direct
    communication with Washington and have identified an envoy --
    regime insider and former Ambassador to the United States U
    Thaung. It is certain Than Shwe believes he has unclenched
    its fist -- granting a first-ever meeting with a U.S.
    official, arranging a session for Senator Webb with Aung San
    Suu Kyi, and deporting an American prisoner as a sign of
    "friendship." The generals will look for a response. We
    should allow Burmese Foreign Minister Nyan Win to visit the
    Embassy in Washington following UNGA. We should undertake
    immediate discourse with U Thaung, including soon at the
    Washington level, to sketch out mutual expectations.
    Meanwhile, we should renew efforts publicly and privately to
    encourage dialogue between the regime and a "pragmatic"
    National League for Democracy, while seeking to consult with
    ASSK throughout the process. End summary.

    A Fist Unclenched?
    ------------------

    ¶2. (S) The first U.S. official meeting with Than Shwe was
    decidedly more upbeat than expected. He was clearly in
    listening mode. He did not appear angry or hostile, even
    upon mention of ASSK. He smiled and greeted Senator Webb and
    Charge warmly. He peppered the conversation with mentions of
    "friends" and friendship."

    ¶3. (S) Than Shwe and Prime Minister Thein Sein worked from
    the same script during their separate meetings with Senator
    Webb (Refs A and B). Both cited an earlier, more positive
    era in U.S.-Burma relations while stressing that the current
    relationship could be better. The generals left no doubt
    they are reaching out, requesting "direct" bilateral
    relations, appointing U Thaung as an envoy with a direct line
    to Nay Pyi Taw, and suggesting an upgrade to Ambassador on
    both sides.

    ¶4. (S) Than Shwe and his top brass clearly heard Senator
    Webb's message that ASSK's fate is critical to the USG and an
    obstacle that must be addressed for meaningful improvement in
    relations. When the Senator raised the matter of ASSK's
    release with Than Shwe, his reply was brief and
    non-committal, perhaps because the Senator broke in to give
    the conversation took a different turn (the Senator told us
    later he preferred to leave ASSK's status open rather than
    elicit a negative reply). Nonetheless, Than Shwe could have
    taken any opportunity to launch into a tirade against ASSK.
    He did not. ASSK's own National League for Democracy (NLD)
    leaders told us (Ref C) and repeated to Senator Webb they
    perceive a possible shift in Than Shwe's attitude and are
    hopeful he is prepared for dialogue.

    Expectations are High
    ---------------------

    ¶5. (S) In another indication of the regime's intentions,
    the government mouthpiece New Light of Myanmar, in both
    Burmese and English editions, hailed Senator Webb's visit as
    a success under the headline "The first step of a long
    journey." The article explained that Burma enthusiastically
    cooperated with Senator Webb because of "its stance to deepen
    bilateral relations and relieve the disagreements between the
    two countries. In conclusion, the article said the Senator's
    visit is the "first step to promotion of the relations
    between the two countries...the first step towards marching
    to a 1000-mile destination."

    ¶6. (S) Meanwhile, expectations here are high among both
    government officials and ordinary citizens, with nearly all
    hoping the Senator's meetings will lead to a more positive
    bilateral relationship. Embassy officials were inundated by
    well-wishers, many of whom expressed their satisfaction that
    positive progress had been made toward improving relations,
    at a national day reception following the visit. The trip is
    dominating tea shop talk throughout Rangoon, with many
    curious about the possible longer-term implications.

    ¶7. XXXXXXXXXXXX

    Extending Our Hand...
    ---------------------

    ¶8. (S) The generals no doubt believe they have taken an
    important and conciliatory step. Than Shwe agreed to meet
    with a U.S. official for the first time ever -- which has
    particular resonance here since the regime uses access to
    signal where countries stand in its pecking order (China gets
    SPDC members at its national day event; we get MOFA
    bureaucrats). The regime allowed Senator Webb to meet with
    ASSK, after turning down UNSYG Ban. (Note: To our
    knowledge, Senator Webb did not insist on an ASSK meeting
    prior to the visit, rather the regime previewed the
    possibility, asking if the Senator would be interested. End
    note.) On a note we perceive as less significant but still
    important, they deported an American prisoner as a sign of
    goodwill.

    ¶9. (S) The senior generals will expect a U.S. response,
    likely soon. We do not for a moment believe the U.S. should
    entertain a major shift in Burma policy based on the CODEL,s
    outcome. However, we do believe the U.S. should take steps
    to acknowledge the GOB's invitation for direct communication
    and to explore what might be possible over time. In that
    context, we offer the following recommendations for
    Washington consideration.

    Let the Foreign Minister go to Washington
    -----------------------------------------

    ¶10. (S) MOFA officials have indicated Foreign Minister Nyan
    Win wants to visit a renovation project at the Burmese
    Embassy in Washington following UNGA. The regime likely
    views this as an equivalent goodwill gesture by the U.S. We
    have no indication the FM will request Administration
    meetings. We understand the political implications of the
    recent ASSK verdict and the significance of September 2007
    anniversaries. However, Post strongly supports granting a
    visit to Washington, even if certain conditions limiting
    duration or interaction are imposed.

    Seek a Meeting with U Thaung
    ----------------------------

    ¶11. (S) We should seek a meeting in the near future with U
    Thaung to establish initial contact, explore his role and
    mandate, and ascertain his level of access to senior
    generals. Following an initial meeting at the Charge level,
    a meeting with a Washington-based official, perhaps at the
    DAS level and in a third country, would be an appropriate
    next step. Messages to U Thaung could include reiterating
    USG support for resolution of ASSK's status, following up on
    discussions in Phuket, including on North Korea, and
    exploring perceived win/win issues for future cooperation,
    such as POW/MIA remains recovery, raised by the Prime
    Minister.

    Advocate for Dialogue between Regime and ASSK
    ---------------------------------------------

    ¶12. (S) ASSK could not have been clearer. Her top priority
    is commencing, without pre-conditions, direct dialogue with
    the regime. ASSK also emphasized the party's pragmatic and
    flexible approach and a willingness to cooperate with the
    regime to find common ground, including on sanctions (Ref D).
    XXXXXXXXXXXX. We propose a letter to Aung  Ky
     from the Charge on these points. It would be useful to
    explore, perhaps in coordination with Senator Webb,
    publicizing some of her remarks to clarify to the world her
    position and combat the regime's argument that she is rigid
    and uncompromising. We should also let it be known she
    supports outsiders visiting Burma, and even meeting with the
    SPDC, so long as they seek a balanced impression of the
    country's situation.

    Request Meeting with ASSK
    -------------------------

    ¶13. (S) The terms of ASSK's current house arrest are less
    restrictive on paper, though its remains uncertain how they
    will be implemented in practice. As we maintain our
    insistence on ASSK's release (along with other political
    prisoners), we should also encourage -- certainly in private
    and perhaps also publicly -- interim steps by the regime to
    allow her interaction with members of her party and outside
    visitors. She herself never raised the topic of her own
    release in meetings with Senator Webb. She did, however,
    emphasize the necessity of consulting with the NLD, including
    to discuss the party's position on the 2010 elections.
    Taking cues from her, we should urge the regime to allow her
    regular, unsupervised access to visitors. We should also
    consider how we might respond if, in fact, the regime eases
    the conditions of her house arrests and enters into
    meaningful dialogue with her. Even CEC members acknowledge
    the possibility of dialogue and progress with regime while
    ASSK remains in detention (Ref C).

    ¶14. (S) We propose to seek a meeting with ASSK at the
    Embassy level to follow up on Senator Webb's visit, and to
    inquire how the U.S. can best promote an internal dialogue
    between the NLD and the regime. If our efforts are
    successful, we could pursue a meeting with a Washington-based
    official, perhaps in conjunction with a routine visit to
    post. We note that other diplomatic missions are seeking our
    coordination as they contemplate similar requests to meet
    ASSK.

    We Must Be Practical, Keep Talking
    ----------------------------------

    ¶15. (S) Throughout her meeting with Senator Webb, Aung San
    Suu Kyi emphasized her practicality: "We have a dream list.
    We have a wish list. But we're practical. We want a
    solution." She also stressed her willingness to talk to the
    regime without preconditions. As related to Senator Webb,
    ASSK told Aung Kyi in 2007, "Let's agree we won't stop
    talking. Let's take things step by step." From our
    perspective, the USG should strive for the same end, seeking
    practical solutions step by step, while always continuing the
    conversation. That process can start, in our view, by
    responding to the regime's recent overtures.
    VAJDA

`