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### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW2701, NEW SARKOZY-MEDVEDEV AGREEMENT: QUESTIONS REMAIN

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW2701 | 2008-09-09 15:03 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Moscow

`

    VZCZCXRO8679
    PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
    DE RUEHMO #2701/01 2531507
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    P 091507Z SEP 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9907
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 002701

    NOFORN
    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2018
    TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
    SUBJECT: NEW SARKOZY-MEDVEDEV AGREEMENT: QUESTIONS REMAIN

    Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons
    1.4(b) and (d)

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: While achieving some key concessions
    from Russia on next steps in the Georgia conflict, the
    Sarkozy-Medvedev agreement from September 8 still leaves open
    questions about the nature and size of Russian troops, role
    of EU observers, and the format of October security talks.
    After contentious talks lasting four hours, the two sides
    reached agreement on the timing of the withdrawal of Russian
    forces from Georgia, international observer mechanisms, and
    the convening of an international conference on security and
    refugees for October 15 in Geneva. FM Lavrov called for
    South Ossetia and Abkhazia to participate in the security
    conference, and announced Russian troops would remain in
    those areas. Medvedev made clear that Russia would not
    reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
    Medvedev and especially Putin remain defiant toward the U.S.,
    with Deputy Chief of General Staff General Nogovitsyn
    alleging U.S. "complicity" in the armed conflict. Pundits
    claim the September 8 Sarkozy visit a victory for Russia,
    with the Sarkozy follow-on agreement likely to produce the
    Cyprus scenario the Russians say they are comfortable with.
    End Summary

    ------------------
    Tense negotiations
    ------------------

    ¶2. (U) In their meeting September 8, Presidents Sarkozy and
    Medvedev discussed their August 12 six-point ceasefire
    agreement and agreed upon additional points in three areas.

    -- Withdrawal of troops. Within seven days, Russia will
    withdraw its troops from the observation posts between Poti
    and Senaki, while Russia will within 10 days following the
    deployment of "international mechanisms" withdraw its
    peacekeepers from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and
    Abkhazia to pre-war positions. The document also calls for
    the complete return of Georgian armed forces to their bases
    by October 1, 2008.

    -- International observation mechanisms. Both the existing
    UN and OSCE observer missions will remain, while "at least
    200" EU monitors will be deployed by October 1, 2008 in the
    zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

    -- International discussions. An international conference on
    Caucasus security will begin on October 15, 2008 in Geneva,
    devoted principally to security, refugees and internally
    displaced persons (IDPs). The GOR considers that this
    conference fulfills the requirements of point six of the
    Medvedev-Sarkozy plan of August 12, 2008, which calls for
    international discussions on security and stability
    arrangements.

    ¶3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX  told DCM that the  atmosphere
    during the negotiations was quite charged and at  times became
    openly hostile. Sarkozy at one point grabbed FM Lavrov by
    the lapels and called him a liar in very strong  terms, reacting
    to Lavrov's denial that Russia had failed to comply with its
    previous withdrawal commitments.XXXXXXXXXX said that
    Sarkozy had arrived with a "take it or leave it attitude, very
    American in style and very confrontational,"  and the Russians
    Had responded icily. Levitte played a central role in negotiating
    the text with Prikhodko, who seemed to be under a lot of pressure
    and in fairly bad  spirits.

    ¶4. (S/NF) In the end, the French believe they got the best
    agreement that could be hoped for. XXXXXXXXXXXX said they
    attribute their success primarily to the Russians being ready
    to reach such a deal -- and in fact anxious to have it as a
    way of withdrawing their forces. EU unity and harmony
    between the U.S. and the EU also played a role;
    XXXXXXXXXXXX  observed that the Russians were
    clearly conscious that they  were facing a united front.
    Sarkozy reportedly warned  Medvedev that Russia's standing
    as a "serious power" had been  severely harmed and failure
    to meet the obligations Russia is  assuming under this agreement
    could do a great deal of  further damage.

    ¶5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX added that the Russians
    treated Barroso  harshly and condescendingly, and tried to exclude
     him from  many of the sessions. The French attributed this to the
    Russian view that Barroso is basically a glorified  international
    civil servant "not worthy to be in the Czar's  XXXXXXXXXXXX
    confirmed that Putin was nowhere to be seen during the visit.

    MOSCOW 00002701 002 OF 004

    ¶6. (SBU) In their joint press conference after the meeting,
    Medvedev contrasted the EU and U.S. roles, calling the EU
    "our natural partner, our key partner," and welcoming the EU
    approach as "balanced," while contrasting it to "exotic or
    extremist" positions calling for sanctions. He again accused
    the U.S. of blessing Georgia's desire to use force in the
    conflict, whether by "direct order or silent approval," and
    used this purported U.S. behavior as a reason to call for a
    new world order. Medvedev made clear that Russia would not
    reverse its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

    ¶7. (SBU) Sarkozy in turn renewed the EU's rejection of
    Russia's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian
    independence, and at times seemed amused when he thanked
    Medvedev for speaking as the "representative of the European
    position" on Georgia, and again later when he questioned
    Russia's right to "determine Georgia's borders."

    ------------------
    Ambiguities remain
    ------------------

    ¶8. (C) By fixing a timeline for withdrawal, the agreement
    succeeds in rendering obsolete Sarkozy's August 14
    clarifications to the August 12 points, to which the GOR
    maintained it had never agreed. However, the September 8
    agreement leaves open several points that are unclear or
    contentious. The number and nature of Russian troops
    remaining in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not specified.
    Late September 9, Medvedev declared that Russia would keep
    7,600 troops in the two zones; 3,800 in each area. The
    Sarkozy agreement appears to accept Russian conditionality
    that EU observers be limited to the areas "adjacent" to the
    conflict zones. The nature of the international discussions
    leaves the precise format of the talks open, not clarifying
    if Russia will participate as a mediator or as one of the
    conflict parties, whether and in what capacity Abkhazia and
    South Ossetia will participate, and what the precise goals of
    the talks are. Finally, while Sarkozy gave Medvedev a
    non-use of force statement signed by Saakashvili, the
    document has no legally binding effect, and it is unclear
    whether there will be an effort to make it legally binding.

    ¶9. (C) Following Sarkozy's departure, FM Lavrov used a press
    conference on September 9 to clarify that Russian troops (not
    peacekeepers) would remain in South Ossetia "for a long
    time," ostensibly to protect the residents there from
    Georgian aggression. On the EU observers, he said their role
    would be to guarantee that Georgia would not use force
    against South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the international
    discussions, he demanded that South Ossetia and Abkhazia be
    given a seat at the table as full-fledged participants.

    ¶10. (U) Ambassadors and Defense Attaches were invited to a
    briefing by Ministry of Defense spokesman General Anatoliy
    Nogovitsyn September 9. Despite a standing-room only
    attendance Nogovitsyn disappointed the diplomatic corps by
    simply rehashing Russian arguments used to justify Russia's
    actions in Georgia, highlighting the history of the
    agreements authorizing Russian peacekeeping forces and the
    chronology of events from August 6-10. He noted that in
    response to a Georgian request, the U.S. had quickly helped
    withdraw Georgian troops from Iraq and transported them to
    Georgia. By helping Georgia, the U.S. had "set a precedent
    of complicity" in the armed conflict, he claimed. Nogovitsyn
    also showed alleged Georgian plans of attack for Abkhazia
    which Russian forces had "recovered," arguing that they
    showed that Georgia had planned to occupy all of Abkhazia,
    target hospitals and civilian infrastructure, prevent
    refugees from fleeing, etc. He claimed they showed an
    "explicit manifestation of genocide." He said that as of
    September 9, Russia had 2452 peacekeepers in the conflict
    zone. He summarized the plan agreed by Sarkozy and Medvedev
    September 8, only noting that Russia expected the EU to send
    "at least 250" observers.

    ----------------------------------
    Russia defiant; Tandemocracy watch
    ----------------------------------

    ¶11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX claimed  that the EU observer mission,
    limited to Georgia proper, was  a diplomatic success for Russia,
    even though the GOR on the  eve of the Sarkozy-Medvedev meeting
    had categorically refused to allow EU observers to participate in the
    post-crisis  management. XXXXXXXXXXXX considered the
    Sarkozy-Medvedev deal the most likely  compromise, and the
    maximum that either side could expect. He  called the agreement
    on Russian troop withdrawal something

    MOSCOW 00002701 003 OF 004

    that Moscow needed, in order to escape continued
    international pressure for not honoring its commitments.

    ¶12. (C) Well-connected editors tell us that the mood within
    the ruling circles remains defiant. XXXXXXXXXXXX both
    XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX separately
    told us September 8 that  they had seen Putin "at his toughest."
    Putin brushed aside  the significance of any Western backlash
    to Georgia: on the  Sochi Olympics, "let them cancel it: we'll
    build one stadium  instead of two;" on energy, "we'll sell Central
    Asian gas to  those who want it, including Asia;" on estrangement
    with  Europe, "don't worry, European leaders tell me that
    everything will be normal." If the West did not want Russia,
    Russia did not need the West, Putin repeated. "They cannot
    intimidate us." At the same time, XXXXXXXXXXXX stressed
    that  Putin did not advocate a preemptively punitive response
    and  specifically demurred from pulling Russian investments from
    Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, arguing that the markets needed
    more, not less, predictability. Putin maintained that
    Russia wanted to be like China -- to "sit under the roots of
    the tree" and build its power quietly -- but that immediate
    global responsibilities forced it to act. "When Russia is
    challenged, it must respond: we cannot just concede."
    XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that the leadership continued to
    brush  aside the market's punishment of Russian policies,
    arguing  that they believe the public line that America's
    downturn --  and not Georgia -- has precipitated Russia's beating.

    ¶13. (C) The public allegations made by Medvedev and Putin
    that the U.S. turned a blind eye to, or encouraged, Georgia's
    August 7 attack on Tskhinvali continue to be reinforced in
    private. Putin told the editors that the U.S. was engaged in
    cynical electoral politics and needed to create an "enemy" to
    combat, and received no push back in his description of a
    one-sided U.S. policy aimed at shoring up the "puppet,"
    Saakashvili. There was also no argument with Putin's
    assessment that the Georgian leader was politically "dead,"
    likely insane, and irrelevant to Russia's decision to
    recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia. XXXXXXXXXXXX
     marveled at  Putin's posture, noting the Prime Minister was
    "convinced that right was on his side," and authoritarian in tone.
    XXXXXXXXXXXX,  warned us that Russian actions were
    animated by a wave of  patriotism and anti-American sentiment.
    "Never have Russians been so united behind Putin and Medvedev"
    a stance made easier, he noted, by the public revulsion towards
    Saakashvili, which he shared.

    ¶14. (C) In assessing the ruling tandem, XXXXXXXXXXXX
     stressed that "Putin had proved himself" in the crisis; while
    discounting  the theory that the Prime Minister intended to return
    to the  Kremlin soon, XXXXXXXXXXXX said the war in Georgia
    made it  absolutely clear that Putin did not intend to leave
    Medvedev  alone. While XXXXXXXXXXXX downplayed the
    demise of Medvedev's  reform agenda, he agreed that it had been
    put to the side. XXXXXXXXXXXX struck a more pessimistic
    note, arguing that the war played to the strengths of the anti-war
    camp. Russians looked at U.S. statements and concluded that
    America was uncomfortable with Russian independence and
    hostile to  Russian strategic interests. XXXXXXXXXXXX
     argued that having "surrounded" Russia, the U.S. should
    understand the backlash  that it produced.

    ¶15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told us on  September 9 that
    the President had emerged stronger because  of the
    Georgian crisis. Whereas Putin appeared to take the
    lead during the fight, Medvedev showed his mettle by
    arranging the terms to stop the conflict. The decision to
    recognize the separatist regions was "unavoidable" after the
    leadership had decided to go beyond the borders of South
    Ossetia (a decision that XXXXXXXXXXXX linked to Putin's
    personal  enmity for Saakashvilli) and underscored that
    Moscow could  not backtrack on that decision. Medvedev was
    apparently  comfortable with the state of affairs
    XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Medvedev looked "relaxed"
    during a private dinner at Sochi on  September 2. For the time being,
    XXXXXXXXXXXX sawMedvedev as  somewhat boxed in and
    forced to take a more aggressive,  "emotional" public stance than his
    usual lawyerly approach to policy. In the current Russian political
    environment, any effort at taking a "softer approach" would only
    make him  appear weak.

    -------
    Comment
    -------

    ¶16. (C) The September 8 Sarkozy-Medvedev document is a step

    MOSCOW 00002701 004 OF 004

    forward in setting clear deadlines for Russian troop
    withdrawal. However, the limits on the EU observer mission,
    as well as questions about the October 15 security
    conference, and Medvedev's insistence that Russia will not
    reverse its decision on recognition, presage the likelihood
    of a new "Cyprus-like" frozen conflict in the Caucasus.
    BEYRLE

`