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### Viewing cable 07BEIJING1448, DAS JOHN DISCUSSES BURMA, SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH AFM

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
07BEIJING1448 | 2007-03-05 12:12 | 2010-12-12 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Beijing

`

    VZCZCXRO5263
    OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHGH RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHVC
    DE RUEHBJ #1448/01 0641208
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    O 051208Z MAR 07
    FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5300
    INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
    RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
    RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI
    RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0386
    RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1647

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 001448

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/32
    TAGS: PREL UNSC CH XC BM ID TH RP TT
    SUBJECT: DAS JOHN DISCUSSES BURMA, SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH AFM
    CUI TIANKAI AND DG HU ZHENGYUE

    REF: BEIJING 1269

    BEIJING 00001448 001.2 OF 004

    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David S. Sedney. Reasons 1.4 (b
    /d).

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (S) If the United States wants to make a difference on
    Burma, it should engage directly with General Than Shwe,
    Assistant Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai told EAP DAS Eric John
    on March 5. In a separate meeting, MFA Director General for
    Asian Affairs Hu Zhengyue stressed that State Councilor Tang
    "really worked on" the Burmese during his recent visit to
    Burma, delivering the message that Burma needs to respond to
    the concerns of the international community. DAS John
    underlined that the United States is worried that Burma is
    headed at high speed in the wrong direction. If it adopts a
    constitution excluding certain parties from the political
    process, the United States and China could be locked into a
    cycle of confrontation over Burma at the United Nations. DAS
    John and AFM Cui also discussed the United States' and
    China's overlapping interests in Southeast Asia. With DG Hu,
    DAS John emphasized the importance of Indonesia and discussed
    instability in East Timor, positive progress in the
    Philippines and the situation in post-coup Thailand. EAP DAS
    Thomas Christensen joined DAS John at the meetings. End
    Summary.

    Burma: United States-China Cooperation Vital
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶2. (S) DAS John told AFM Cui that while the United States
    and China agree that Burma is a problem, we differ on what
    venue and tools we should use to resolve it. We want to find
    a creative way forward that produces tangible results. The
    United States and China concur on the message we need to send
    Burma's generals; that is, that they should accept UN
    engagement, release political prisoners, permit NGOs to
    operate in-country and settle differences peacefully with
    ethnic minorities. To advance the process, the United States
    would like to work in parallel with China.

    ¶3. (S) AFM Cui responded that if the United States wants to
    make a difference on Burma, it should engage directly with
    General Than Shwe. For China, the situation in Burma is a
    question of national security. China and Burma share a long
    border and considerable historical and cultural ties. In
    this context, China is very concerned about the potential for
    unrest or political change in Burma. Over the past
    half-century, Beijing and Rangoon have enjoyed good relations
    and China has never interfered in its neighbor's internal
    affairs. The Government can solve its own problems, AFM Cui
    judged. Nonetheless, China is aware that fighting between
    Government forces and ethnic minorities has been a constant
    over the years. While the Government has reached a
    settlement with 17 of the 18 ethnic groups, it should
    continue to work toward national reconciliation. Many of the
    minorities live in border areas, AFM Cui observed, adding
    that such conflicts risk harming China's own security.

    AFM Cui: Why China Vetoed
    -------------------------

    ¶4. (S) AFM Cui contended that China is doing its part on
    Burma. He related that during State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan's
    February 25-27 visit to the country (reftel), Tang met with
    Than Shwe and other top generals. Tang conveyed a "very
    clear" message to the leadership, specifically that 1) it
    should speed up the political reform and reconciliation
    process and 2) it should respond more constructively to the
    concerns of the international community. At the same time,
    China is encouraging ASEAN to exert positive pressure and to
    continue to cooperate with the United States and China to
    bring about "the kinds of changes in Burma we all want to
    see." The Burmese people are known for their patience, AFM
    Cui maintained, so we must take a long-term approach.
    Applying too much pressure on the leadership will likely
    produce more resistance to outside appeals. However we
    proceed, our main objective should be to maintain stability.
    Governance in Burma may be bad, but a situation where there
    is no governance would be much worse, AFM Cui said.

    ¶5. (S) Such concerns about stability prompted China to veto
    the UN Security Council resolution on Burma in January, AFM
    Cui remarked. China believes passing the resolution would

    BEIJING 00001448 002.2 OF 004

    have been counterproductive, although "we understand the
    United States' interests" in the matter. Despite the veto at
    the UN, China wants to enhance its cooperation and
    coordination with the United States on Burma issues.
    Confrontation between Washington and Beijing serves no one's
    interests. As part of this, China favors the idea of the
    United States opening some form of communication with General
    Than Shwe. "We will see what we can do," AFM Cui said,
    adding that such a dialogue could help the United States and
    China avoid future disputes at the UN. In China's view,
    international mechanisms other than the Security Council are
    the proper venues for dealing with problems Burma faces
    regarding human rights, drugs and other issues.

    ASEAN's Role on Burma
    ---------------------

    ¶6. (S) AFM Cui said ASEAN is growing "frustrated" with
    Burma. After Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid's poor
    treatment during his 2006 visit to the country, ASEAN lost
    its appetite to pursue new efforts. Nonetheless, China
    continues to encourage ASEAN to do more and to coordinate its
    efforts with those of China and the United States.
    Meanwhile, China hopes UN SYG Ban Ki-moon will name a new
    Special Envoy.

    ¶7. (S) DAS John underscored the importance of ASEAN's
    reaching out to the Burmese regime, especially as a way to
    counter the generals' paranoid belief that the United States'
    is actively seeking to overthrow the regime. While agreeing
    that taking a long-term view of Burma issues is useful, DAS
    John emphasized that lack of good governance has been a
    persistent problem for the country. In this context, he
    cautioned that the Burmese leadership's adoption of a new
    constitution that serves to lock out certain parties from
    political participation would be a step backward and could
    harm United States-China cooperation. DAS Christensen
    reaffirmed these views, adding that Burma's making the wrong
    decision on the constitution could result in antagonism
    between the United States and China in the Security Council.
    He stressed that the United States wants cooperation with
    China on Burma.

    ¶8. (S) AFM Cui expressed confidence that positive change
    will come to Burma, but it will take time. He predicted that
    the change would be in line with the overall trend in
    Southeast Asia, that is, that a number of nations in the
    region have moved away from military rule toward a more open
    system, including Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.
    Indonesia's President Yudhonoyo is no longer a general, AFM
    Cui stressed. Thailand's current military leadership will
    not remain in power over the long haul. While there are
    persistent rumors about military coups in the Philippines,
    they rarely happen.

    ¶9. (S) AFM Cui acknowledged that the United States and China
    should "take action before things get worse." China's role
    as facilitator of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea could
    serve as a model for bringing about an exchange between the
    United States and Burma. As for next steps, AFM Cui and DAS
    John agreed that Embassy Beijing and MFA Asia Division
    officials would remain in contact on the matter.

    DG Hu: Burma Likely Open to Dialogue
    ------------------------------------

    ¶10. (S) In an earlier meeting with MFA DG for Asian Affairs
    Hu Zhengyue, DAS John stressed our concerns over Burma's
    National Convention process producing a constitution that
    excludes groups from participating in the country's political
    life. Such a step could hamper the ability of the United
    States and China to cooperate and could cause quarrels
    between us over Burma at the United Nations. Noting that
    China has been in contact with the Burma's SPDC leadership,
    DAS John asked DG Hu for his views on how to stop Burma from
    moving at high speed in the wrong direction.

    ¶11. (S) DG Hu said that in his personal view, a United
    States-Burma dialogue would be productive and that Burma
    would likely be open to conducting such a dialogue, with
    Chinese facilitation. There are misunderstandings between
    the United States and Burmese sides, DG Hu said, adding that
    opening the door to direct communication is the best way to
    achieve positive results. DAS John noted that the United
    States has an Embassy in Rangoon but that the Burmese to date
    have appeared uninterested in talking with us. Washington,

    BEIJING 00001448 003.2 OF 004

    however, remains committed to finding a diplomatic solution
    to the problems in Burma. DG Hu promised to look into the
    matter and respond soon.

    DG Hu on State Councilor Tang's Burma Visit
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶12. (S) DG Hu also outlined the highlights of State
    Councilor Tang's recent visit to Burma, relating that Tang
    delivered a strong, clear message to General Than and Burma's
    other leaders. The main meeting lasted nearly three hours.
    "We worked on them this time," said DG Hu, who accompanied
    Tang on the trip. According to DG Hu, Tang urged Burma to
    take actions to address international concerns. The generals
    said they would welcome a visit from any new UN Special Envoy
    and that they are open to communication with National League
    for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, which they have
    initiated via written correspondence. DG Hu related that
    Burma's leaders said National Conventions will convene during
    the coming year and a new constitution will be completed by
    the end of 2007. The generals are considering establishment
    of political parties, eventually allowing these groups to
    fully enter the political arena. They envision transferring
    power to "a government that represents the will of the people
    of Burma
    at an appropriate time," DG Hu quoted the generals as saying.

    ¶13. (S) The generals currently have three priorities, DG Hu
    continued, 1) domestic stability, particularly with regard to
    ending armed ethnic opposition, 2) economic growth, which DG
    Hu described as "okay" but not great in Burma, and 3)
    education and training. On economic growth, Burma is paying
    close attention to China's experience and wants to enhance
    exchanges in this realm.

    Mutual Interests in Southeast Asia
    ----------------------------------

    ¶14. (S) On regional issues, in his meeting ith AFM Cui, DAS
    John stressed that Washington and Beijing should capitalize
    on their mutual interest in promoting stability and
    prosperity in Southeast Asia to dispel the perception that
    the two are competing in a zero-sum game. The United States
    hopes that China's expanding trade relations in the region
    will complement our long-standing efforts to promote
    democracy and development. AFM Cui said Beijing's interest
    in Southeast Asia is not a threat, but a logical result of
    geography, including China's 2,500 mile land border with
    Southeast Asian nations and sharing of the South China Sea.
    Besides being China's neighbor, Southeast Asia is also home
    to millions of "overseas Chinese." (Note: Beijing defines
    any person of Chinese ancestry, regardless of citizenship, as
    "overseas Chinese." End note.) The United States and China
    must discourage the Cold War mentality that cooperating with
    one of us is an inherent rejection of the other, AFM Cui
    said. Starting with peace efforts in Cambodia and continuing
    through extensive cooperation in the Asian Regional Form
    (ARF) and responding to the Asian Financial Crisis, the
    United States and China have demonstrated the benefits of
    working together.

    ¶15. (S) With DG Hu, DAS John noted that this year marks the
    30th anniversary of United States-ASEAN relations, which we
    look forward to commemorating with a presidential summit in
    the second half of the year. Remarking that China celebrated
    15 years of relations with ASEAN at 2006 summit, DG Hu
    stressed the importance of the United States and China
    supporting one another in maintaining a strong relationship
    with ASEAN. The United States and China should seek joint
    regional projects to demonstrate to ASEAN nations that they
    need not choose between the two. DG Hu suggested that our
    ambassadors in the region find joint opportunities to
    highlight our engagement with ASEAN.

    Indonesia
    ---------

    ¶16. (S) The United States and China must work together to
    promote democratization, economic growth and
    counter-terrorism in Indonesia, DAS John stressed to DG Hu.
    While President Susilo Yudhoyono has taken positive steps, we
    must encourage further transparency, accountability and
    military reform. Beijing should join Washington in pressing
    for better governance and accountability in the military, the
    Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). Transparency in the TNI
    would reinforce and encourage transparency in Indonesia's

    BEIJING 00001448 004.2 OF 004

    government and public affairs in general, essential to
    attracting much-needed foreign investment. We must also
    press for reforms in labor and investment laws, as well as
    judicious enforcement of those laws, DAS John urged DG Hu.

    ¶17. (S) Accepting that China can influence "the general
    direction" of development in Indonesia, DG Hu cautioned that
    Beijing must be sensitive to the political reality of a
    significant ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia. Beijing
    was "not impressed" with the presidents who led Indonesia the
    aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s,
    but has been pleased with President Yudhoyono's progress
    since taking power in 2004, DG Hu said. Jakarta faces the
    challenge of decreasing the influence of the military and
    promoting democracy, while simultaneously responding to
    growing ethnic and religious tension. Beijing seeks to
    promote secular Islam in Indonesia by encouraging interaction
    with China's 20 million Muslims. In recent years, the United
    States and China have coordinated in providing assistance to
    Indonesia following natural disasters. Beijing sees such
    cooperation as a model for further such regional cooperation,
    DG Hu said.

    Desperately Seeking Stability in East Timor
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶18. (S) Beijing looks forward to cooperating with Washington
    to promote stability in East Timor, DG Hu said, noting that
    he would instruct China's Ambassador to call on the new
    United States Ambassador when he arrives in Dili. Beijing's
    primary concerns in East Timor are alleviating poverty and
    avoiding a power struggle among large countries for influence
    there. DAS John stressed Washington's desire for East
    Timor's government to succeed and highlighted our cooperation
    with Portugal and Australia towards achieving this goal. Hu
    and John agreed that the United States and PRC embassies in
    Dili should enhance their coordination.

    Progress in the Philippines, but More Needed
    --------------------------------------------

    ¶19. (S) Seeing poverty as the key challenge facing the
    Philippines, China has invested in its agricultural
    development and transportation infrastructure, DG Hu
    underlined. Beijing recognizes corruption as the second
    significant problem facing the Philippines, but believes it
    "cannot do much about that," DG Hu said. Beijing sees
    President Gloria Arroyo as a good leader because she has
    shown that "she is in control." DAS John agreed President
    Arroyo has stabilized Philippine leadership and enacted
    strong fiscal and economic policy, but stressed that Beijing
    and Washington must encourage Manila to continue working hard
    to promote transparency and good governance. John also
    outlined the extremely successful approach to
    counterterrorism the GRP has taken in Mindanao, with the
    support of the United States. DG Hu assessed that, while
    "working from different directions," United States and
    Chinese efforts in the Philippines are complementary.

    Reinforcing Democracy in Post-Coup Thailand
    -------------------------------------------

    ¶20. (S) Thailand has a long history of peaceful democracy,
    which is in China's interest to support, DG Hu said. While
    not an ideal turn of events, the September 2006 coup emanated
    from "very specific circumstances" and did not involve
    violence, DG Hu said. Noting that he had just returned from
    Thailand, DG Hu quipped that, even with the coup, Thailand is
    still more democratic than Singapore, highlighting his belief
    that the coup was an aberration in Thai politics rather than
    a signal of long-term change. Still, given the recent
    resignation of former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
    Finance Pridiyathorn Thewakun and the reality that King
    Phumiphon Adunyadet will not live forever, Beijing is closely
    monitoring the political situation in Bangkok. China has
    invited Thai Prime Minister Surayut Chulanon to visit China
    in late May and hopes to use the visit as an opportunity to
    demonstrate Beijing's support for a stable, peaceful
    transition of power in Thailand, DG Hu said.

    ¶21. (U) DAS John cleared this cable.
    RANDT

`