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### Viewing cable 08MOSCOW1187, MOSCOW'S RUMORMILL ON SUCCESSION

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
08MOSCOW1187 | 2008-04-28 14:02 | 2010-12-01 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de/

`

    VZCZCXRO9808
    PP RUEHBW
    DE RUEHMO #1187/01 1191419
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 281419Z APR 08
    FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7828
    INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001187

    SIPDIS

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2018
    TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI PINR RS
    SUBJECT: MOSCOW'S RUMORMILL ON SUCCESSION

    REF: 2007 MOSCOW 05153

    Classified By: CDA Daniel Russell. Reason: 1.4 (d).

    Summary
    -------

    ¶1. (C) Putin's actions since the March elections have
    heightened political uncertainty about the shape of the
    Medvedev-Putin tandem. Lacking hard information, everything
    from Putin's decision to head United Russia to administrative
    changes at the White House is seen by the chattering class
    through the prism of the "succession question" - Putin's
    dilemma of leaving office without losing influence. Within
    the commentariat, two general lines have emerged. The
    "hand-off scenario" sees Putin marshaling control to protect
    his successor as regent before handing off the torch. The
    second, "Putin triumphant," scenario predicts a power shift
    from the Kremlin to the White House. Between the two are
    many variations, each with expectations of some conflict
    between Medvedev and Putin. In any case, Putin's tactical
    wiles have expanded his political options but have also
    deepened uncertainty about his intentions. End summary.

    A Season of Elite Uncertainty
    -----------------------------

    ¶2. (C) Moscow is simmering with expectation about the coming
    transition as evidenced by the wide range of theories,
    speculation, and rumors (but no hard information) that our
    contacts are circulating. The center of the debate remains:
    how does a healthy, young, and popular politician like Putin
    retain influence after leaving the Kremlin in a system that
    accrues a preponderance of influence to the presidency (ref
    a). His decision to head, but not join, United Russia;
    warnings about the need to clean out that party; and the
    Kremlin's preference for secrecy about cadre changes have
    reinvigorated debate about the Medvedev-Putin tandem and
    deepened the uncertainty among the elite about the shape of
    things to come. Coupled with the natural nervousness about a
    change in administration (with reports that ministers and
    other top officials are afraid to travel out of concern of
    being "out of touch" during cadre selection), the tempo of
    rumor-mongering and speculation has increased exponentially.

    ¶3. (C) Despite their differences on a host of issues, our
    contacts all expected competition within the elite to
    increase. They predicted that struggles could affect the
    development of relations between Medvedev and Putin,
    notwithstanding what appears to be their shared values and
    close personal ties. Already, we have seen evidence that
    some within the elite are taking advantage of perceived
    weakness during the transition to pursue their agendas:
    Mikhail Fridman's moves against TNK-BP and Sergey Chemezov's
    accelerated campaign to draw more state assets into
    Rostekhnologiya.

    ¶4. (C) Elite disquiet stems as well from fears about
    impending changes in government cadres at the central and
    regional level. xxxxx accentuated Putin's call to reform United
    Russia, predicting a personnel shake-up that mysteriously
    would "change everything" yet would not involve the emergence
    of new faces in the leadership ranks. He expressed concern
    that United Russia's "monopoly of the political process"
    could be broken by splits within the party, although he did
    not consider the new "clubs" within the party as posing a
    danger in that regard. xxxxx also told us that a shake-up
    of the regional elite was already under way, with the
    replacement of the Irkutsk governor and the "voluntary"
    resignation of the Starvopol governor. Others have likewise
    predicted changes in the cadre ranks, but envision Putin
    positioning Medvedev to clean house, be it to remove
    Yeltsin-era warhorses like Moscow Mayor Luzhkov or Tatarstan
    President Shaymiyev xxxxx or remove troublesome siloviki hetmen xxxxx.

    ¶5. (C) xxxxx argued that the
    general uncertainty among the political elite flows from
    Putin's own indecisiveness. Rather than following a
    pre-ordained strategy, xxxxx described Putin as following
    a path of tactical decision, from the selection of Medvedev
    as successor to the snap United Russia congress April 21-22
    where Putin agreed to take the helm. Moreover, xxxxx
    posits that because Putin has not ruled out a return to the
    Presidency, he faces the constraints of wanting to preserve
    the power of the presidency, even as he seeks insurance

    Moscow 00001187 002 of 003

    against the possibility that Medvedev could use that power
    against him. xxxxx agreed, speculating that Putin is seeking
    insurance against Medvedev in the coming months. Although
    xxxxx was largely dismissive of Medvedev, considering him
    less a politician than an inexperienced administrator, he
    still sees risk to Putin as he takes over as Premier - an
    institutionally weaker position, with responsibility for
    unpopular decisions.

    ¶6. (C) There are others, however, who describe Putin's
    decisions as creating the foundation for a transition to a
    more institution-based political system. An article in
    xxxxx argued that the creation of a second center of power in the
    White House mitigates the risk of another round of
    re-distributing property or a change in the general course
    for the country. xxxxx told
    us that Medvedev has no recourse but to tap public support
    for his putatively more liberal agenda, much as Mikhail
    Gorbachev did in his struggle with the more conservative
    elements of the then Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In
    the long run, xxxxx sees the potential for an evolution
    away from the inter-clan struggles to a public competition of
    ideas.

    The Party of Putin
    ------------------

    ¶7. (C) Indicative of the uncertainty in Moscow, our
    interlocutors discussed a wide range of theories about
    Putin's decision to accept the United Russia leadership. As
    an advocate of the "Putin Triumphant" scenario,
    xxxxx saw Putin maneuvering the Duma, United
    Russia, and the regional elite to check the predominate
    influence that Medvedev will enjoy thanks to the
    constitution's bias in favor of the presidency. xxxxx
    explained his bid to head United Russia as a means to balance
    Medvedev's authority to appoint governors, by giving Putin
    control over the regional legislatures, whose approval is
    required before a gubernatorial candidate can take office.
    Moreover, xxxxx argued that by heading United Russia, Putin
    will be able to dominate the Duma and Federation Council and
    thus control the passage of legislation.

    ¶8. (C) xxxxx also saw Putin's leadership of the
    party as providing the basis for constraining Medvedev's
    ability to remove him from the premiership. xxxxx alleged that
    PA Head Sergey Sobyanin was working on legislation that would
    constrain the President's ability to dismiss the Premier,
    although she offered no information about how this could be
    done without altering the constitution, which Putin has
    repeatedly stated he will not do. In their xxxxx envisioned a similar motive, but a different
    tactic in Putin's decision. By controlling the majority
    party in the Duma, Putin insures that any move to remove him
    from the Premiership results in a political crisis. (The
    United Russia-controlled Duma could exercise its
    constitutional prerogative and refuse to approve Medvedev's
    choice for a replacement premier, leading to new elections
    and potential stalemate.)

    ¶9. (C) Not all of our contacts shared the view that Putin's
    recent moves represented a shifting of the balance of
    influence. xxxxx dismissed Putin's move to head United
    Russia as sign of his desperation, vice a strong tactical
    move to check Medvedev. xxxxx characterized United Russia as
    an amalgamation of careerists and bureaucrats, which is loyal
    to whoever holds power. Comments by xxxxx that United
    Russia is guided by self-interest, without any common values,
    appear to support xxxxx assertions. xxxxx called Putin's
    decision to take the party lead a mistake, seeing the
    processes underway now, including the sensational article
    about his marriage plans to gymnast-turned-Duma deputy Alina
    Kabayeva, as part of the inevitable "de-mystification" of the
    soon to be former president.

    A New Kind of Premiership
    -------------------------

    ¶10. (C) Against the backdrop of Putin's decision to head
    United Russia, news about the government structural and
    personnel changes have heightened speculation about a
    metamorphosis of the Premiership. Press reports last week
    told of a new paradigm in which virtually all responsibility
    outside of defense, security, and the protection of societal
    order that lay with the government (and ultimately the
    Premier) would be pushed down to the ministries. Initial
    reactions interpreted this as shaping a new order in the
    government, in which the Premier sets the "strategic"

    Moscow 00001187 003 of 003

    direction and holds the expected new stratum of technocratic
    Deputy Premiers to account for the actions of the ministries.
    As such, proponents of this view argued that Putin is hoping
    that he can stand above the fray, blaming his subordinate
    "scapegoats" for any potential government failings or
    missteps. Others, however, see this less as a result of
    grand politics and more of a sensible re-alignment of duties
    - "housecleaning" before Putin takes office.

    ¶11. (SBU) There has also been considerable speculation about
    a reworking of the relationships between the President, the
    Premier, and the governors. The Kremlin and Minister for
    Regional Development Kozak took quick action to squash rumors
    floated in the business newspaper Vedemosti early this month
    that control over the regional plenipotentiaries (polpreds)
    would shift to the government, although Kozak but did not
    rule out future changes in the role and jurisdiction of the
    polpreds. xxxxx noted that changing the polpreds may not
    be necessary, since the government has responsibility for
    assessing the "effectiveness" of regional leaders and thus
    could shape the president's approach to gubernatorial
    appointments.

    Comment
    -------

    ¶12. (C) The "succession question" continues to dominate the
    Russian political scene, despite the remarkable changes that
    have taken place over the past six months. Putin has proven
    his ability to reshape the landscape and create his own
    opportunities by accepting the Premiership under Medvedev as
    well as the mantle of "party leader" for United Russia,
    creating what some see as a potential alternative power
    center in the White House. Nevertheless, his success in
    spinning out alternatives for himself has served to prolong
    the agony of the "succession question" and fostered
    uncertainty among the elite. Uncertainty multiplies the risk
    of conflict between the elite clans over influence. Putin's
    problem can be seen as a Hobbesian security dilemma - the
    greater his personal security, the less security there is for
    the other players, including his chosen successor Medvedev.
    Russell

`