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Reference ID | Subject | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
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08TRIPOLI374 | LIBYA'S NSC SOLICITS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION & LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES REF: A) TRIPOLI 340, B) TRIPOLI 372 | 2008-05-08 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI375 | QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: FATHI EL-JAHMI HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOME | 2008-05-08 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI401 | FATHI EL-JAHMI REMAINS IN HOSPITAL, DESPITE REPORTS OF HIS RELEASE REF: A) JOHNSON-STEVENS EMAIL 05/12/2008, B) TRIPOLI 375, C) TRIPOLI 229, D) TRIPOLI 280 | 2008-05-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI402 | POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM, JAMAHIRIYA-STYLE Q: A) TRIPOLI 199, B) TRIPOLI 227 TRIPOLI 00000402 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: A private sector interlocutor involved in Libya's chambers of commerce described dramatic calls for reform in a recent speech by Colonel al-Qadhafi as "a return to the natural order of things" that existed before the 1969 military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power and inaugurated thirty-plus years of revolutionary governance and economic experimentation. By the 1990's, it was clear that the ill-defined "Jamahiriya" system of governance was incapable of effectively distributing oil wealth or diversifying the economy; U.S.-led sanctions delayed meaningful economic reform for a further decade. Government ministers tasked with effecting al-Qadhafi's plan for radical privatization are ill-suited to the task (they typically carry out orders rather than formulate and implement policy), and are confused and uneasy. The private sector is concerned that overly rapid privatization, in tandem with more direct distribution of oil wealth and proposed restructuring of the government, could prompt significant economic disruptions, including inflation, and has counseled a more gradual approach. There is concern that old guard elements resistant to economic and political change could seize on inflation as a pretext to roll back reforms. Trimming a corrupt, inefficient public sector, defining and protecting property ownership laws, and revising the commercial and tax codes are other key areas of concern for the private sector. Our interlocutor's comments suggest that a shift may be underway towards a healthier balance between a centralized, suspicious government and an increasingly robust, organized and vocal private sector that is willing and - to an extent at least - able to advocate for issues of common concern. End summary. 2. (C) In a meeting with Pol/Econ Chief and EconOff on May 4, xxxxxxxxxxxx(strictly protect)discussed the context of Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech to the General People's Congress, in which he called for radical privatization and restructuring of Libya's government. As discussed in reftels, al-Qadhafi called for the system of General People's Committees (GPC's) that have formed the basis of government since the late 1970's to be completely dismantled by year's end and replaced with an as-yet undetermined structure. He also advocated the direct transfer of oil revenues - he suggested the amount of 5,000 Libyan dinar per month - to Libyan families in tandem with privatization of most public services, to include education and health care. There have been serious concerns in the business community about the capacitQthe GOL to effect simultaneous, broad political and economic reforms. A RETURN TO THE NATURAL (ECONOMIC) ORDER OF THINGS 3. (C) Conceding that al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech had been "surprising" in its scope, xxxxxxxxxxxx described proposed privatization measures as "a return to the natural order of things" that existed before the 1969 military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power and inaugurated thirty-plus years of revolutionary governance and economic experimentation. (Note: The coup is described as a people's revolution that prompted development of the "Jamahiriya", an invented term translated to mean "a state of the masses". End note.) In the period immediately after the revolution, there was a heavy focus on the government as the guarantor of social and economic justice; however, the success of Western capitalism and failure of the former Soviet Union and other statist economies underscored the shortcomings of that approach, according to al-Usta. Referencing xxxxxxxxxxxx political-economic treatise, The Green Book, he noted that state structures were not intended to play a central role in politics or economics. Al-Qadhafi's speech was best understood as representing a shift in philosophy over a period of many years, as opposed to a sudden about-face. JAMAHIRIYA NOT UP TO TASK OF GOVERNING ECONOMY 4. (C) Calling for privatization and government restructuring was a return to the principles of early revolutionary thought, xxxxxxxxxxxx argued. Law Number 9 of 1992, which relaxed strictures against private property ownership and rolled back more pernicious aspects of Jamahiriya thought, represented the key juncture at which the thinking of al-Qadhafi and influential quarters of the regime had changed. Faced with the fact that Jamahiriya thought was ill-suited to diversification and modification of Libya's state-dominated, hydrocarbon dependant economy, the regime realized in the early 1990's that a new approach was needed, but U.S.-led international sanctions against Libya in the 1990's delayed economic reform efforts because the country was "on an emergency footing". TRIPOLI 00000402 002.2 OF 003 CONFUSION & CONCERN AMONG THOSE TASKED WITH IMPLEMENTING AL-QADHAFI'S VISION 5. (C) Al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech "created considerable confusion" within the government and private sector, xxxxxxxxxxxx said. The initial shock had worn off and skittish investors had taken initial comfort in the fact that the existing system of GPC's had not been dismantled overnight; however, chaos continues to reign in the GPC's and in the five committees tasked with recommending how to implement al-Qadhafi's plan. (Note: As reported ref B, contacts at the MFA and Central Bank told us that five committees - responsible for the budget, economy, administrative structure, wealth distribution and legal reform - were constituted after Qadhafi's speech to formulate plans for dismantling the GPC's, standing up alternate structures and implementing direct distribution of oil wealth. Final plans are reportedly due by September 1. End note.) After years of having only to implement plans made by others in Libya's highly centralized power structure, ministries are now being asked to formulate plans and policies that they themselves will have to implement. Unused to planning and possessed of limited human capacity, senior officials in the ministries are "very nervous", he said. GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES MAY LACK CAPACITY TO UNDERTAKE REFORMS 6. (C) Careful to avoid blaming al-Qadhafi - who has historically combined rhetorical calls for decentralization with a practical approach that features monopolization of real decision-making authority - xxxxxxxxxxxx blamed ministers themselves for the government's lack of capacity and current difficulty in implementing al-Qadhafi's vision as expressed in the March 2 speech. The speech represented not just a change in law and structure, but a shift of responsibility for governance. With his "Zuwarah Statement" in 1975, al-Qadhafi suspended then-extant laws and government structures; in 1977 he established the GPC's and the first General People's Congress convened. Now, he was tacitly conceding the failure of the GPC structure he effectively designed and was calling for a new, as-yet undefined substitute. The General People's Congress of 2008 had assessed the failure of the GPC's to distribute and manage Libya's oil-generated wealth; the GPC's now had to focus on policy formulation (effectively how to dismantle their own organizations and spin off their functions to as-yet undetermined bureaucratic structures) and implementation (actually dismantling the GPC's). Responding to P/E Chief's question as to whether the GPC's were up to the task of simultaneously undertaking radical privatization and government restructuring, he conceded there "could be" problems with lack of government capacity. INFLATION, CORRUPTION & PROPERTY PROTECTION ARE PRIVATE SECTOR'S KEY CONCERNS 7. (C) xxxxxxxxxxxx said the private sector in Libya agrees that there are three main economic challenges at present: managing inflationary pressures; a bloated civil service resistant to privatization; and defining and protecting property ownership. Distribution of oil wealth and privatization are cornerstones of al-Qadhafi's new vision; however, undertaking both simultaneously - and as the government potentially radically restructures and relinquishes centralized control - could foster significant inflationary pressures. The government needs to encourage production and incentivize and reward economic success as counterweights to inflation. xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed with the concern the Minister of Economy recently shared with us that many Libyans would simply choose not to work if they received a direct monthly stipend from oil revenues. Concerned that significant inflation could prompt old guard regime elements to roll back economic reforms, the private sector has recommended more modest wealth distribution through tax holidays, customs exemptions, and vouchers for education and health care. (Note: xxxxxxxxxxxx strongly criticized al-Qadhafi's call for total privatization of education and health care, flatly stating that "Libyans just aren't ready for that kind of responsibility after 30 years of a state-dominated system." End note.) RENT-SEEKING BUREAUCRATS WORRIED 8. (C) A problem, according to xxxxxxxxxxxx, is that the majority of Libya's public sector employees are essentially political creatures used to only carrying out orders, vice technocrats who are responsible for thinking issues through and recommending policies. Noting that there is "a big difference between making changes under martial law and in a more natural economic and TRIPOLI 00000402 003.2 OF 003 political environment", xxxxxxxxxxxx said private sector actors are pressuring officials to carefully consider the pace and scope of reform. A key problem is that Libya's bloated civil service fundamentally distrusts the private sector and views any privatization as a threat, in large part because of concerns that their ability to extract rents and other "commissions" would be threatened. Al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech was designed in part to address the problem of a corrupt, bloated bureaucracy; however, members of the Tripoli Chamber of Commerce and other chambers in Libya are concerned that rushing privatization and government restructuring (xxxxxxxxxxxx was dismissive of "shock therapy" approaches advocated by U.S. economist Jeffrey Sachs) could create serious economic disruptions and have counseled the five implementing committees to take a more measured approach. PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, TAXATION & COMMERCIAL CODE ARE KEYS TO FURTHER REFORM 9. (C) A critical issue in which corrupt, ineffective public sector employees have prevented further reform is in defining and protecting property ownership. Establishing a legal and regulatory framework that defines and protects ownership of private ventures is a major impediment to further meaningful economic reform, he said. In other states, a businessperson's stature grows as he becomes richer; however, in Libya, greater wealth only makes that individual a bigger target for corrupt officials seeking rents. Noting that "there should be no limits to the aspirations of businesspeople in Libya", he stressed that a goal of al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech is to "unleash private entrepeneurship". xxxxxxxxxxxx said a new, integrated commercial code under consideration contains - in its current iteration - clearer, stronger property protection provisions. (Note: Libyan commercial law currently comprises a confusing and sometimes contradictory patchwork of laws, regulations and edicts, some of which date to the 1950's. End note.) A revised tax system - separate from the commercial code effort - is also under consideration and government officials have pledged to xxxxxxxxxxxx and other senior private sector actors that private businesses will receive a five-year tax holiday as part of the package of privatization incentives proposed in line with al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech. 10. (C) Comment: Intelligent, well-spoken, thoughtful and urbane, xxxxxxxxxxxx is one of the more insightful Libyan interlocutors we've dealt with, and is certainly more candid in his analyses and criticism of the existing system than most. He receives no compensation for his work with the Tripoli Chamber of Commerce and the unified chambers; his private business interests include serving as the registered agent and distributor for electronics and appliances company Phillips. His comments likening al-Qadhafi's call for privatization and government restructuring to a return to the natural (pre-revolutionary) order of things are among the most forward-leaning we've heard. Like some western scholars of Libya, he essentially believes that by the early 1990's, it had become apparent that the ill-defined Jamahiriya system of governance had failed to manage oil wealth or diversify the economy beyond hydrocarbons. His description of profound unease and confusion among government ministers and members of the committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's vision for reform accords with the consensus here. Perhaps most significant was the extent to which xxxxxxxxxxxx and other senior private sector actors appear to be engaging the government on issues of economic reform, to include implementation of al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech and tax and commercial code reform. That they are doing so suggests a shift towards a healthier balance between a centralized, suspicious government and an increasingly robust, organized and vocal private sector that is willing and - to an extent at least - able to advocate for issues of common concern. xxxxxxxxxxxx remarks criticizing a bloated, corrupt public sector and the need for better property protection laws are consistent with other observers' insights. His analysis of the possibility for significant inflation and of the old guard's potential to exploit that issue to roll back reform efforts was a new line of thinking that will bear further tracking on this end. End comment. STEVENS | 2008-05-16 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI411 | EMBASSY DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST | 2008-05-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08MOSCOW1647 | SCENESETTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM WORKING GROUP | 2008-06-10 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Moscow
08TRIPOLI455 | LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU REF: A) STATE 14270, B) 07 TRIPOLI 1060, C) 07 STATE 163961, D) 07 TRIPOLI 723, E) 07 STATE 77783, F) 07 STATE 163961 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts, and the legal basis on which they are being detained in Libya. One detainee's trial has been completed and he is awaiting a verdict on the four charges he faces; the case of the second detainee is expected to go to trial in the next two to three months. End summary. 2. (S/NF) At a June 10 meeting, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) per ref A instructions. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli, and was attended by a host government security official. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on December 25, 2007 (ref B). ISN 194 3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. The security official explained that the Abu Salim prison is controlled and managed by military police; it is the facility at which terrorists, extremists and other individuals deemed to be particularly dangerous to state security are detained. Al-Rimi said he remains in solitary detention in a 15 foot by 15 foot cell and has not been mistreated. He is able to walk outside regularly, and is able to speak with other prisoners during exercise periods. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that members of his family have visited him three times since his return to Libya, most recently in March 2008. (Note: As reported ref D, their previous visits were in January and May 2007. End note.) 4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref D), al-Rimi said both were better. He repeated his earlier claim (ref A) that he sustained the injury to his arm in 2004 or 2005 during a scuffle with U.S. soldiers who entered his cell to punish him for allegedly instigating a disturbance among several other prisoners. 5. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, al-Rimi said he was questioned by the ESO and Internal Security Organization (ISO) officials between his return in December 2006 and February 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's office. His case has subsequently been been tried and is currently with a panel of judges, who are reviewing it. His understanding is that he faces four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. Al-Rimi has court-appointed legal counsel. The Prosecutor General's Office told al-Rimi and his attorney that the court was expected to render a verdict in his case on/about June 16. A verdict had been expected on/about May 5; however, the trial was delayed. Al-Rimi does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted of one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed his attorney told him he stood a good chance of being acquitted and released. ISN 557 6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he had been detained at an ESO detention facility for three months and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. He currently remains at Abu Salim, but understands he may be transferred next month to the Jdeida prison, which houses common criminals, in Ain Zaraa. He has been held in solitary detention since his return - his biggest complaint - and said he has not been mistreated. (Note: The security official explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population for extremist activities. End note.) He is not able to exercise at the Abu Salim prison, but was able to do so at the ESO facility before he was transferred. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have TRIPOLI 00000455 002 OF 002 access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been told he may be visited by a prison doctor if he is ill, but has not had need of one. Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law in January. He complained that his family had not visited since, but said he he did not know whether they had tried. (Note: He conceded that his wife had divorced him and remarried, and that relations between them were difficult; however, after the second visit, permission for further visits had to be obtained from the Prosecutor General's office, vice ISO. He speculated that the Prosecutor General's office may have been less efficient in processing visit requests. End note.) 7. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, Hamouda said he was questioned by ESO and ISO officials between his return in August 2007 and May 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. According to the security official, Hamouda escaped from prison and left Libya illegally in 1992 to travel to Sudan; he may/may face separate charges for escaping and leaving the country. Hamouda has no legal counsel, but said he does not want an attorney because he has committed no crimes. Claiming that if he were really a member of al-Qaeda " ~ the U.S. would have never returned me to Libya ~ ", he said his impression is that all of the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect. He has been told by the Prosecutor General that his trial may start in two to three months. Hamouda does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted for one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed that he had been granted a pardon by the Qadhafi Development Foundation for the original drug trafficking conviction and his subsequent escape from prison and illegal exit from Libya. | 2008-06-11 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI458 | CONDITIONS IN SECURITY DETENTION FACILITIES | 2008-06-12 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI494 | JOURNALIST JAILED FOR CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT'S | 2008-06-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI506 | FATHI EL-JAHMI'S SON ASKS EMBASSY TO STOP VISITING HIM | 2008-06-27 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI515 | LIBYAN LEADER AUTHOR OF HARD LINE ON DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS | 2008-07-01 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI527 | LIBYAN RESPONSE ON ARB-4 REVIEW PROCEEDINGS | 2008-07-03 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI564 | NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION CHAIRMAN SHUKRI GHANEM MAY SEEK TO | 2008-07-13 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI577 | QADHAFI FOUNDATION CONTINUES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE OF FORMER | 2008-07-15 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI685 | LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008, B) WILLIAMS-STEVENS EMAIL 08/ 23/2008, C) TRIPOLI 455, D) GODFREY-NARDI/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008, E) 07 TR IPOLI 723 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d) 1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts and clarify the status of any pending legal action against them. One detainee's trial has reportedly been completed and he understands he has been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The trial of the second detainee has begun and several hearings have been held; the next is scheduled for September 3. End summary. 2. (S/NF) Per refs A and B, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) on September 1. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli. A host government security official facilitated the meeting; however, no host government officials participated in the meetings with the two returned detainees. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on June 10, 2008 (ref C). ISN 194 3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: Al-Rimi had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between his return to Libya in December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to Abu Salim. End note.) Al-Rimi said he continues to be held alone in his cell, but he is able to exercise at least once a week for about an hour at a time. He indicated he is able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that he had received one family visit - his sisters came to see him in July - since our last meeting with him on June 10. (Note: Our understanding is that members of his family have visited him on four occasions since his return to Libya - January 2007, May 2007 (ref D), March 2008 and July 2008. End note.) Al-Rimi said he would like to receive more family visits, if possible. 4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref E), al-Rimi said both were fine. He noted that he needed dental care for another tooth, which had developed problems after his return to Libya. A dentist recently visited him at Abu Salim prison and told al-Rimi the tooth (a back tooth on the upper row in which al-Rimi has recently experienced pain) should be extracted. Al-Rimi said he instead requested that it be "cleaned and repaired", but the dentist said the tooth was not salvageable. According to al-Rimi, the dentist is to visit him again soon to discuss how to proceed. 5. (S/NF) In our previous meeting on June 10, al-Rimi said he understood his case was being deliberated at that time by a panel of judges, who were to render a verdict and issue a sentence on/about June 16. Al-Rimi said he was not present when his verdict and sentence were issued, but heard from other prisoners who were present in the courtroom on June 16 in connection with their own cases that he was found guilty of some charges (NFI) and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. (Note: Per ref C, al-Rimi's understanding was that he faced four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. It is not clear which of those he was convicted of. End note.) Al-Rimi has received no information from Libyan officials about his trial, verdict or sentence. He met with his court-appointed legal counsel on one occasion about two months before his reported conviction and sentencing on June 16, and has not heard from him since. ISN 557 6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: He was detained at an ESO detention facility for about three months after his return and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. End note.) He remains in solitary detention, his biggest complaint. He is able to speak through the walls with prisoners in adjacent cells, but is not able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners and is not able to exercise. Hamouda wants to be able TRIPOLI 00000685 002 OF 002 to leave his cell. (Note: During our previous meeting on June 10, the security official who facilitated the meeting explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population. End note.) Hamouda complained about the lack of sunlight and fresh air. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He requested that he be provided with pens, paper and books. Hamouda said he not received a family visit since our last meeting with him on June 10, but conceded that he was unsure whether they had tried to do so. (Note: Our understanding is that Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law saw him in January. End note.) 7. (S/NF) Hamouda has access to medications and was visited by a prison doctor in March/April, who responded to his complaints of depression and anxiety by prescribing him anti-depressant medication that left him "groggy and tired". He also received a prescription at that time from the Libyan doctor for an indeterminate condition for which he said he had been treated at Guantanamo Bay. He complained that the medication prescribed by the Libyan doctor for the condition was ineffective and asked for Laproxin, which was prescribed for him at Guantanamo Bay and had been effective; however, he has been told that Laproxin is not available in Libya. (Note: Per ref C, Hamouda said on June 10 that he may be seen by a prison doctor if he is ill, but that he had not needed to so since his return. He had no answer when he was asked to explain the contradictory accounts. End note.) 8. (S/NF) Hamouda said his trial had begun and that there had been three hearings to date, which he attended, at a court facility in the Abu Salim prison. His next hearing is scheduled for September 3; it is unclear whether the court will render a verdict at that hearing. He has court-appointed legal counsel, but has not met his lawyer outside of courtroom hearings. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. He complained that the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect, and maintained that he was innocent. 9. (S/NF) Facilitation of access to the detainees under the revised rubric detailed in ref D was quick and straightforward. Post submitted a diplomatic note on August 24 formally requesting access to the detainees and, despite the beginning of Ramadan and Libya's national day celebrations in the intervening period, access was granted on September 1 (i.e., within a week of the request). 10. (S/NF) Despite several requests for information about the legal basis on which the two returned detainees are being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against them, Post has received no response from the GOL to date. The only information we have is from the two detainees. We pressed the GOL to provide information about the detainees' legal status and the state of play in the legal proceedings against them, stressing that we needed to receive such information directly from the GOL. To date, however, we have not received the requested information from the GOL. STEVENS | 2008-09-02 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08LAPAZ2037 | BOLIVIA: REQUEST USG VISITORS POSTPONE TRAVEL | 2008-09-19 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy La Paz
08TRIPOLI833 | COLONEL AL-QADHAFI'S SUMMER READING LIST | 2008-10-20 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI919 | NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION REF: A) TRIPOLI 819, B) TRIPOLI 472, C) TRIPOLI 280, D) TRIPOLI 577 | 2008-11-26 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI992 | LIBYA INTERESTED IN U.S. WEAPONS, MORE AMBIVALENT ON OTHER MILITARY COOPERATION | 2008-12-31 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI993 | QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION RESUMES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE | 2008-12-31 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI48 | LATEST ROUND OF TALKS WITH IMPRISONED LIFG MEMBERS CONCLUDES, NEXT ROUND SCHEDULED FOR LATE FEBRUARY | 2009-01-22 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI57 | LIBYA REITERATES REQUEST FOR RETURN OF LIBYAN DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY REF: A) TRIPOLI 47, B) STATE 6516 | 2009-01-26 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09TRIPOLI64 | AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN | 2009-01-28 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
09MADRID98 | SPAIN TAKING STEPS TO SAFEGUARD NUCLEAR MATERIAL | 2009-01-29 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Madrid
09TRIPOLI76 | LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU | 2009-02-02 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
09STATE39054 | REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON THE ARREST OF | 2009-04-20 | 2011-02-01 | CONFIDENTIAL | Secretary of State
09BUJUMBURA302 | NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: STATE 030541 Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b) (d). | 2009-07-02 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Bujumbura
09BUJUMBURA378 | NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT BUJUMBURA REF: A. STATE 75013 B. BUJUMBURA 00302 Classified By: CDA Charles Twining for reasons 1.4 (b) (d). | 2009-08-07 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Bujumbura
09BERLIN992 | AUSTRALIA GROUP: GERMANY TO SUBMIT PROPOSAL FOR PARIS PLENARY | 2009-08-13 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Berlin
09MEXICO3378 | PORTAL DETECTION AT MANZANILLO, MEXICO (FALSE ALERT) | 2009-12-01 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Mexico
09MOSCOW2943 | ALLEGED NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT AT THE RUSSIA-KAZAKHSTAN BORDER REF: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN FSN AND RUSSIAN CUSTOMS OFFICER RELAYED TO EXBS ADVISOR Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B, C, D). | 2009-12-04 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Moscow
09BUJUMBURA689 | NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT | 2009-12-17 | 2011-02-01 | UNCLASSIFIED | Embassy Bujumbura
10DOHA60 | QATAR JANUARY 2010 VISAS VIPER MEETING AND | 2010-02-11 | 2011-02-01 | SECRET | Embassy Doha
07TRIPOLI964 | LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ARB III NOTIFICATIONS | 2007-11-13 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
07TRIPOLI1039 | LIBYA: FOLLOW-UP ON ACCESS TO RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES REF: A) STATE 165729, B) STATE 127608, C) TRIPOLI 723, D) TRIPOLI 797 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) | 2007-12-13 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
07MOSCOW5835 |  | 2007-12-17 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Moscow
07TRIPOLI1056 | LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: EXPERIENCING GROWING | 2007-12-23 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
07TRIPOLI1065 | CORRECTED COPY - DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TEAM FINALIZES HEU-LEU AGREEMENT LANGUAGE WITH GOL | 2007-12-28 | 2011-01-31 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Tripoli
07TRIPOLI1066 | QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION DIRECTOR SOUNDS WARNING ON | 2007-12-31 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET//NOFORN | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI4 | LIBYA: FAMILY VISIT FOR RETURNED GTMO DETAINEE CONFIRMED | 2008-01-03 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
08STATE3728 | A/S WELCH'S JANUARY 3 MEETING WITH LIBYAN FM | 2008-01-11 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Secretary of State
08TRIPOLI142 | EMBASSY VISITS HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI | 2008-02-21 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI167 | LIBYA: NOTIFICATION OF ARB-IV PROCEEDINGS | 2008-03-03 | 2011-01-31 | SECRET | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI182 | QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR RELEASE | 2008-03-04 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI183 | FOLLOW-UP ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI | 2008-03-04 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI204 | ENGAGING THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION | 2008-03-07 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI220 |  | 2008-03-13 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI229 |  | 2008-03-17 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI231 | LIBYA'S CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRAN BANKING MOU REF: TRIPOLI 0012 | 2008-03-17 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli
08TRIPOLI266 | GOL DELAYS RELEASING DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI REF: A) TRIPOLI 223, B) TRIPOLI 229 | 2008-03-31 | 2011-01-31 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Tripoli

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