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### Viewing cable 04MADRID527, SPANISH ELECTION OUTLOOK: ONE MONTH OUT, POPULAR

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04MADRID527 | 2004-02-13 17:05 | 2010-12-06 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Madrid

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000527

    SIPDIS

    STATE FOR EUR/WE
    NSC FOR VOLKER

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2014
    TAGS: PREL PGOV SP NATO
    SUBJECT: SPANISH ELECTION OUTLOOK: ONE MONTH OUT, POPULAR
    PARTY HOLDING ON TO LEAD

    Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares,
    reasons 1.4(B) and (D).

    Summary

    ¶1. (C) Polls one month before the March 14 Spanish general
    election continue to point to victory for the Popular Party
    and Aznar's successor as party leader, Mariano Rajoy. The PP
    hopes not just for a plurality, but for an absolute majority.
    Were the PP to fall far short of an absolute majority,
    coalition formation would prove troublesome. Most polling
    consistently shows the PP hovering just short of the absolute
    majority threshold. Socialist leader Rodriguez Zapatero has
    sought to breathe new life into his campaign by exploiting
    the Iraq/WMD controversy, criticizing Aznar for joining the
    Iraq coalition. Most analysts believe the Iraq issue will
    not be a major factor unless Spain's 1300 troops in Iraq
    suffer large casualties. One month before the election, the
    outlook is similar to when Rajoy became Aznar's successor
    last September: the perception in Spain is that it is Rajoy's
    race to lose. End Summary.

    Major Party Differences on Relations with the U.S.

    ¶2. (SBU) On March 14, Spaniards will go to the polls to
    select a new Parliament, which will, in turn, select a new
    Prime Minister, known in Spain as "President of the
    Government." Polling data and political commentary have, for
    the past six months, pointed to a plurality for the PP, led
    by Aznar's successor as party leader, Mariano Rajoy. This
    trend continues. Most polls show the PP leading by seven or
    eight points over the Socialists.

    ¶3. (C) Rajoy and Socialist (PSOE) leader Jose Luis
    Rodriguez Zapatero offer distinct domestic and foreign policy
    choices to the Spanish electorate. Rajoy has pledged to
    maintain Aznar's strong ties with the US, including its close
    counter-terrorism cooperation and participation in the Iraq
    coalition. He also promises to keep Spain's vigorous economy
    on track and preserve the integrity of the Spanish state in
    the face of nationalist pressures in the Basque and Catalunya
    regions.

    ¶4. (C) Zapatero, in contrast, pledges to re-focus Spain on
    Europe. Zapatero argues that Aznar's tilt to the US has
    damaged Spain's standing in the EU, where the Socialists see
    their country's future. Zapatero has been a relentless
    critic of Aznar's Iraq policy and what he sees as Aznar's
    "subservience" to the Bush Administration. Zapatero says he
    will establish a transatlantic relationship based on "mutual
    respect and friendship," not on submission.

    ¶5. (C) Zapatero also strongly criticized Aznar for appearing
    before a joint meeting of Congress February 4, saying that
    Aznar was willing to go before the US Congress while ignoring
    Socialist calls for him to appear before a special session of
    the Spanish parliament (in recess because of the elections)
    to explain pre-war intelligence on WMD in Iraq. On the
    domestic front, Zapatero pledges to increase social spending
    for education, health and culture. He has promised not to
    raise taxes and says he will pay for these programs by
    reducing defense spending.

    ¶6. (C) Despite efforts to shift attention again to Iraq,
    Zapatero has been unable to turn popular opposition to
    Aznar's Iraq policy (which brought millions of Spaniards into
    the streets in February and March 2003) into support for his
    candidacy. On February 12, Zapatero said that if elected, he
    would withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq in July if the
    mission had not been turned over to the UN by that date.
    Zapatero misses no opportunity to call the war "illegal and
    immoral" and to denounce Aznar for ignoring Spanish interests
    by allying Spain with what Zapatero calls "the most
    conservative US Administration in history."

    Role of Aznar

    ¶7. (C) The manager of the PP's national campaign, Gabriel
    Elorriaga (who is also State Secretary for Public
    Administration), told us in late January that one of the
    major challenges for the PP in the campaign is how to deploy
    Aznar. Elorriaga conceded that the PP needs to be careful
    not to overshadow Rajoy or antagonize the Socialist ranks and
    provoke greater Socialist turnout. Nonetheless, thus far,
    and consistent with his personal style, Aznar has been out in
    front ) and far more on the attack than Rajoy. On February
    10, in a typical jibe, Aznar declared that the Socialists
    have no coherent leader or party and are not fit to govern
    Spain. He demanded that Zapatero tell Catalan Socialists to
    break their coalition with the Catalan Republican ERC, whose
    leader, Carod Robira, met with ETA leaders in France in early
    January.

    ¶8. (C) Zapatero continues to focus his criticism largely on
    Aznar, rather than Rajoy. Rajoy's strategists tell us
    privately that this suits them just fine because the Iraq
    issue in particular is identified with Aznar, rather than
    Rajoy. Thus Aznar takes the heat while Rajoy enjoys a
    widespread reputation, even among Socialists, as more of a
    bridge-builder, with a far less dominating personality than
    Aznar.

    ¶9. (C) Some in his own party have criticized Rajoy, a
    veteran of eight years in key Ministerial portfolios in
    Aznar's two governments, for conducting an overly scripted
    and risk-averse "rose garden" campaign. Rajoy has resisted
    pressure from the Socialists to publicly debate Zapatero, for
    example. Others point out, however, that Spaniards vote
    according to party lists, not necessarily on personalities --
    a key difference between the Spanish and US systems -- and
    therefore the lack of a high profile is not necessarily a
    negative for Rajoy.

    Absolute Majority: the Numbers and Turnout

    ¶10. (C) The PP needs 176 seats in the 350-seat Congress of
    Deputies (lower house) to form an absolute majority. In
    2000, the PP won an absolute majority of 183 seats. In 1996
    the PP won 146 seats and formed a coalition government. Some
    of the 1996 coalition partners, such as the Basque
    Nationalist PNV, would not enter into a coalition with PP
    today.

    ¶11. (C) PP campaign manager Elorriaga told us he was
    confident the PP would win at least 171 seats this time and
    said that if the campaign went well, the PP could hope for an
    absolute majority, although he conceded this would be
    difficult. Elorriaga believed that the 183 seats the PP
    received in 2000 represented the PP's electoral ceiling. He
    doubted they would reach it in 2004 given the eight years of
    PP government and the natural desire of the public for a
    change.

    ¶12. (C) Should the PP fall four or five seats short of 176,
    Elorriaga said they can count on the Canary Coalition (a
    regional Canary Islands party) to cover that margin. Beyond
    that, coalition formation becomes problematic for the PP.
    Most PP analysts believe that CIU, the moderate Catalan
    nationalist party (which had 15 seats last legislature),
    would be willing to work out a deal with the PP, if it came
    to that. However PP strategists are not sure this would
    happen and would like to avoid this contingency.

    ¶13. (C) PP strategists and other analysts, including
    Elorriaga, focused on the issue of voter turnout. Elorriaga
    told us that the PP wanted to mobilize its people but avoid
    public gloating that could antagonize the Socialists and
    mobilize them against the PP. He said polls before the 1993
    general election had been favorable for the PP but that the
    PP had committed the error of holding large rallies on the
    eve of the election that, ironically, mobilized the
    socialists against them and helped cost the PP the election.
    Elorriaga said that over-confidence was a major danger for
    the PP.

    The Alternative to a PP Victory: Government of the Left

    ¶14. (C) The likely alternative to a PP victory is a
    coalition of the Socialists and the Left Union (Communists)
    supported by nationalists such as the Basque Nationalist
    Party (PNV). Zapatero has stated that he would not seek to
    form a government unless the Socialists get the most votes
    nationwide. Nonetheless, many analysts believe that if it
    came to it, the Socialists would lead such an "anybody but
    the PP" coalition. The PSOE sought to do it in the Madrid
    region last October and have done it in the Balearic Islands
    and elsewhere.

    Comment

    ¶15. (C) The percepction in Spain is that the March 14
    election remains the PP's to lose. Despite polls that show
    that a majority of Spaniards favors the idea of a change in
    government, the PP has enjoyed a solid lead for months. The
    Socialists, as a consequence of their disunity and weak
    leadership, have been unable to capitalize on a general
    desire for change. However, there are a few wildcards that
    have the potential to change the equation. These include
    possible large Spanish casualties in Iraq and a possible
    backfiring of Rajoy's cautious approach to campaigning and
    his unwillingness to debate Zapatero. Nonetheless, as it now
    stands, the majority of analysts, including many Socialist
    contacts, expect the PP to form the next government. What
    they do not agree on is whether the PP will receive an
    absolute majority. The polling is inconclusive. If Zapatero
    can prevent the PP from gaining an absolute majority ) which
    would involve the PP's loss of at least 8 seats ) he might
    be able to claim some victory and remain PSOE leader. Should
    the PP win an absolute majority, the knives among the
    Socialists may well come out for Zapatero. A resounding
    PSOE electoral defeat, were it to occur, might well bring
    calls for one of the longtime Socialist barons, such as Bono
    from Castilla La Mancha or Chavez from Andalusia to come to
    the PSOE's rescue.

    MANZANARES

`