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### Viewing cable 10SANSALVADOR85, Scenesetter for DoD Visit to El Salvador, March 8-9

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10SANSALVADOR85 | 2010-02-23 21:09 | 2010-12-07 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy San Salvador

`

    VZCZCXYZ0002
    RR RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHSN #0085/01 0551822
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
    R 232129Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
    TO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
    INFO RUMIESS/SOUTHCOM IESS MIAMI FL

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SAN SALVADOR 000085

    SIPDIS
    OSD FOR ASD STOCKTON AND DASD MORA

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/23
    TAGS: MARR DOD PREL PGOV ES
    SUBJECT: Scenesetter for DoD Visit to El Salvador, March 8-9

    SAN SALVAD 00000085 001.2 OF 003

    CLASSIFIED BY: RBlau, CDA, DOS; REASON: 1.4(D)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy San Salvador warmly welcomes the March 8-9
    visit of Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Paul N. Stockton and
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dr. Frank Mora. Your visit
    comes while the GOES is in the midst of combating a public security
    crisis of the first order. It also comes at a time when the ESAF
    has emerged as a major player in President Funes's anti-crime
    strategy and his efforts to pursue a center-left, generally
    pro-U.S. agenda. Your visit will help reinforce the U.S. policy of
    active engagement with the GOES, which strengthens the moderate,
    pragmatic elements in the current administration.

    ¶2. (C) Summary, continued: Recent polls show President Mauricio
    Funes with an 80 percent approval rating and overwhelming public
    support for a strong bilateral relationship with the U.S. Funes
    has fostered strong ties with the U.S. and Brazil, though some in
    the FMLN have pushed him to strengthen ties with Venezuela and Cuba
    while de-emphasizing the U.S. relationship. President Funes'
    non-FMLN campaign support group, the Friends of Mauricio (now the
    Citizen Movement for Change), is largely in control of the economic
    apparatus of the government. Similarly, Defense is in the hands of
    a formerly-retired, recently-promoted military officer and Friend
    of Mauricio, Brigadier General David Munguia Payes. FMLN members
    control security, education, and intelligence elements of the GOES.
    Foreign policy is in the hands of a loyal FMLN member, but has thus
    far been characterized by pragmatism and outreach to the U.S.
    Combating violent crime and rejuvenating the economy are the GOES's
    top priorities, but the Funes administration has made little
    progress on either issue since taking office last June. End
    Summary.

    ----------------------------------

    Good Relations with U.S. Essential

    ----------------------------------

    ¶3. (C) On the day he was inaugurated, President Funes told
    Secretary of State Clinton that his government needs a good
    relationship with the United States. Three out of every ten
    Salvadorans live in the U.S. and those who remain at home are avid
    consumers of all manner of American products, media, and culture.
    Nearly half of all Salvadoran exports are to the U.S. Given
    transnational crime links to and from the U.S. via Central America,
    there are no serious alternatives to cooperation with U.S. law
    enforcement agencies. The Salvadoran military admires and trusts
    our armed forces, and naturally look to us for training, equipment,
    and mentoring. USAID and MCC are prominent actors in social and
    economic development and are held in high esteem by the GOES and
    the people of El Salvador. As a result, the Salvadoran public is
    among the most pro-American in the hemisphere. Even the hard-line
    FMLN recognize these points, if at the same time they do not forget
    our role in preventing them from seizing power with violence during
    the country's protracted and bloody civil war.

    ¶4. (C) There is a growing division between Funes and the party that
    brought him to power. Funes joined the FMLN at the end of the 2009
    presidential campaign. Throughout the campaign, he maintained a
    close group of pragmatic, non-FMLN advisors (the Friends of
    Mauricio), a fact which rankled some FMLN hard-liners. Since Funes
    took power, tensions between Funes's centrist camp and the far-left
    FMLN leadership have grown. Funes has publicly rebuked his own
    Vice President, FMLN hard-liner Salvador Sanchez Ceren, and other
    members of the FMLN for advocating policies that sharply depart
    from Funes's moderate reform strategy. The FMLN appears content to
    ride Funes' high approval numbers while applying pressure via
    street protests, radical rhetoric, high-profile travel to Havana
    and Caracas, and back-room legislative maneuvering. So far, the
    fragile pact between Funes and the FMLN remains intact, but the
    relationship is clearly strained.

    ¶5. (C) The political right is in disarray, though there are signs
    that the worst of the post-election turmoil may be over. After
    losing the presidential elections in March 2009, (center-right)
    ARENA has seen 13 of its 32 legislative deputies leave the party,
    12 of them forming a new party, the Grand Alliance for National
    Unity (GANA). In December 2009, ARENA expelled former President
    Tony Saca (2004-2009) from the party for alleged involvement in
    GANA's rebellion. While collectively the right-of-center parties
    could control a majority in the Legislative Assembly, infighting

    SAN SALVAD 00000085 002 OF 003

    and opportunism have prevented them from uniting to mount an
    effective opposition to the FMLN's and President Funes's proposals.
    However, inter-party bickering on the right has died down in recent
    months, and recent conversations with ARENA leaders suggest the
    party is finally righting the ship after more than a year of
    internal confusion and passivity. If this rebound strategy works,
    a rejuvenated ARENA could serve as an important base of support for
    President Funes in his struggle with the far-left FMLN leadership.

    ---------------------------

    Military and Defense Update

    ---------------------------

    ¶6. (S) Responding to public pressure to stem escalating rates of
    violent crime, in November 2009, President Funes deployed
    approximately 2,500 soldiers to occupy and control 28 of the most
    violent urban areas in the country. These forces supplement the
    1,700-2,000 troops already operating joint patrols with the
    National Civilian Police (PNC), meaning that about half of the
    Salvadoran Army's 10,000 soldiers are engaged in domestic law
    enforcement. Aside from natural disaster relief efforts, this is
    the largest domestic deployment of the ESAF since the end of the
    1980-92 civil war. While initially popular, a consensus has
    emerged that the added military presence has not significantly
    reduced violent crime.

    ¶7. (SBU) Highlights of the bilateral military relationship include:

    -- Cooperation and training programs intended to maintain a rich
    military-to-military relationship in humanitarian
    assistance/disaster relief, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics,
    and peacekeeping operations.

    -- As a testament to the strength of the mil-mil relationship and
    the effectiveness of our training programs, El Salvador deployed
    troops to Iraq from August 2003 until early-2009 who were
    considered professional and competent by U.S. and coalition
    members.

    -- In November 2009, Southern Command helicopters, based in
    Honduras, ensured rapid and effective delivery of emergency (mostly
    USAID) supplies in the wake of tropical storm Ida.

    -- In June 2009, the USNS Comfort visit provided medical attention
    to nearly 20,000 people and two engineering projects to rural
    communities. Beyond-the-Horizons deployments are scheduled for
    2010 and 2011. In November 2009, the Chief of the Salvadoran Navy
    signed a letter of request for four high-speed maritime
    interceptors under the Enduring Friendship Program.

    -- In April 2009, we renewed the agreement to operate a Cooperative
    Security Location (CSL) for another five years. The CSL is located
    at the military end of the international airport, and serves as a
    regional hub for counter-drug detection-and-monitoring flights.

    ---------------

    U.S. Priorities

    ---------------

    ¶8. (SBU) Our work in El Salvador is focused on (1) promoting
    improved public security; (2) supporting stable, democratic
    governance; (3) broadening economic prosperity; and (4) investing
    in people.

    SAN SALVAD 00000085 003 OF 003

    ¶9. (SBU) Although El Salvador has made remarkable progress since
    the 1992 Peace Accords, violent crime continues unabated. The
    Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), coupled with
    ongoing efforts to strengthen the police, expand crime prevention
    programs, and implement judicial reforms, aims to improve public
    security and the rule of law. On February 18, the Legislative
    Assembly passed a landmark wiretap law which will help authorities
    combat the growing problem of telephone extortions and assist
    investigations into a wide range of criminal activities. The
    significant USG commitment to improving regional security, as
    evidenced by the presence of the CSL and the International Law
    Enforcement Academy (ILEA), provides us with additional credibility
    with the Funes administration.

    ¶10. (SBU) Promoting economic growth, spurring job creation, and
    encouraging investment are important near-term USG priorities.
    Funes's electoral victory had a great deal to do with public
    dissatisfaction over economic conditions in El Salvador. Funes
    inherited an economy already in recession and a fiscal deficit
    which severely limits what he can do to stimulate growth. The GOES
    expects to raise $190 million in new revenue with a tax reform
    passed in December 2009; however, many economists project far lower
    revenue growth. The private sector has criticized the tax reform
    as excessively complex and poorly timed given the economic
    downturn. Business leaders also complain the GOES has yet to
    detail regulations on how it will implement the new taxes.
    Redirecting loans from multilateral institutions from debt
    refinancing to budget assistance will provide some immediate fiscal
    relief. El Salvador's economic recovery will largely depend on the
    U.S. economy, the destination for about half of its exports and
    major source of remittances ($3.8 billion, or 18 percent of GNP, in
    2008). In the short run, the ($461 million) Millennium Challenge
    Corporation project will provide much-needed fiscal stimulus and
    new jobs, while CAFTA and our USAID assistance programs will help
    strengthen the foundations for future prosperity.

    -------------

    The Way Ahead

    -------------

    ¶11. (S) Although the Salvadoran electorate granted President Funes
    a mandate for change, by all appearances the voters expect him to
    work with the country's dynamic private sector, and to maintain
    good relations with the United States. Despite continuing problems
    with crime and a weak economy, the public is pleased with Funes's
    work thus far - his approval rating is above 80 percent in recent
    polling. Tensions between Funes and the FMLN could undermine
    governability and potentially damage the bilateral relationship
    with the U.S. Meanwhile, transnational organized crime and violent
    street gang activity pose as serious threat to the stability of the
    country. Your visit will help reaffirm our commitment to assisting
    the GOES in combating this non-traditional national security threat
    while continuing our traditionally-strong military-to-military
    relationship.
    BLAU

`