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### Viewing cable 10MEXICO614, SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S FEBRUARY 24

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
10MEXICO614 | 2010-02-19 15:03 | 2010-11-30 21:09 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Mexico

`

    VZCZCXYZ0003
    OO RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHME #0614 0501538
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    O R 191538Z FEB 10
    FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0530
    INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO

` `

    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 000416

    SIPDIS

    NEW DELHI PLEASE PASS TO FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER,S PARTY

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2030
    TAGS: PHUM SNAR ASEC MX
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FBI DIRECTOR MUELLER'S FEBRUARY 24
    VISIT

    Classified By: DCM Gerald M. Feierstein, Reasons 1.4 (b)/(d)

    ¶1. (C) Summary: Embassy Islamabad warmly welcomes your
    February 24 visit to Pakistan. You will participate in a
    trilateral cooperation meeting with Pakistani Interior
    Minister Rehman Malik and Afghan Interior Minister Hanif
    Atmar, followed by bilateral meetings with senior Pakistani
    officials, including Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
    Director General Zafarullah Khan, Intelligence Bureau (IB)
    Director General Javed Noor, and Inter-Services Intelligence
    (ISI) Director General Ahmed Shuja Pasha.

    ¶2. (C) You should express to your Pakistani interlocutors
    appreciation for ongoing law enforcement cooperation and
    express our readiness to enhance such efforts. You may want
    to register U.S. concerns about terrorist threats to U.S.
    citizens and U.S. interests that emanate from Pakistan, and
    encourage continued Pakistani action to counter these
    threats. You should press the Pakistanis to follow through
    on their prosecution of the seven Mumbai defendants. End
    Summary.

    Domestic Overview
    ------------------

    ¶3. (C) Pakistan continues to face extraordinary challenges on
    the security and law enforcement front. The country has
    suffered greater military, law enforcement, and civilian
    casualties in fighting extremism and terrorism than almost
    any other country. Pakistan's military is currently engaged
    in combat operations against militant groups in the Malakand
    Division of North West Frontier Province (NFWP) and six of
    the seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
    (FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border. At the same time,
    Pakistan has experienced an alarming increase in terrorist
    attacks against government and civilian targets in Pakistan's
    major cities, resulting in several hundred deaths in recent
    months. In your meetings, you should acknowledge the
    sacrifices made by Pakistan's law enforcement agencies and
    the pressure the terrorist attacks have placed on their
    resources.

    ¶4. (C) In the midst of this difficult security situation,
    Pakistan's civilian government remains weak, ineffectual, and
    corrupt. Domestic politics is dominated by uncertainty about
    the fate of President Zardari. He enjoys approval ratings in
    the 20 percent range and has repeatedly clashed with key
    power centers, including the military, politically ambitious
    Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, and opposition
    leader Nawaz Sharif. In December, the Supreme Court ruled
    unconstitutional the November 2007 National Reconciliation
    Ordinance, promulgated by then-President Musharraf, which
    provided legal amnesty for Benazir Bhutto, Zardari, and key
    figures in their party, enabling them to participate in 2008
    elections. The Court's ruling has paved the way for a
    revival of corruption cases against a number of officials,
    including Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Whether corruption
    cases can be revived against Zardari himself is less certain,
    as Pakistan's constitution includes a clause providing
    sitting presidents with criminal immunity.

    ¶5. (C) While we have had major successes in our military and
    law enforcement cooperation with Pakistan, cooperation has
    frequently been hampered by suspicion in Pakistan's military
    and intelligence establishment about U.S. intentions and
    objectives. Among other things, the Pakistanis believe that
    we have favored India over Pakistan -- most notably, by
    approving civil-nuclear cooperation with India -- and that we
    aim to dismantle Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, which,
    in light of their conventional military disadvantage
    vis-a-vis India, they consider critical to their national
    security. The military and intelligence establishment is
    also concerned that we are working with Pakistan's civilian
    leadership to limit the military's prerogative in determining
    Pakistan's national security policies. As a result of these
    concerns, the military and intelligence establishment has
    taken steps since Spring 2009 to hamper the operations of the

    ISLAMABAD 00000416 002 OF 004

    Embassy. These steps include holding up the issuance and
    renewal of Pakistani visas for permanent Embassy staff and
    TDYers; denying import permits for armored vehicles for
    Embassy use; sabotaging our contract with DynCorp
    International to provide enhanced protective support for
    Consulate General Peshawar personnel; slowing down
    importation of U.S. assistance for the Pakistani government,
    including equipment for Pakistani law enforcement agencies;
    shutting down our Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training
    program at Pakistan's Sihala Police Academy; putting up
    roadblocks for our acquiring additional land for the
    Embassy's expansion; and harassing Embassy personnel by
    stopping and detaining Embassy vehicles. Some of these
    problems have recently abated in response to our repeatedly
    raising them with the highest levels of the Pakistani
    government. However, we expect we will have to continue to
    push back against such impediments for the foreseeable future.

    Federal Investigation Agency
    ----------------------------

    ¶6. (C) The FBI's primary Pakistani counterpart is the Federal
    Investigation Agency (FIA). On December 7, the government
    replaced FIA Director General Tariq Khosa with Zafarullah
    Khan. While Khosa was ostensibly given a promotion by being
    named Secretary of the Ministry of Narcotics Control, a
    number of press reports maintained that Khosa was removed
    from his FIA position for his aggressive pursuit of
    corruption cases against government officials and
    businessmen. Khosa had developed close cooperation with the
    U.S. on a host of law enforcement issues, including on the
    Mumbai case. While Khan has a strong law enforcement
    background, he has not shown an inclination to be as
    forward-leaning on cooperation as Khosa was.

    Counter-Terrorism Finance
    -------------------------

    ¶7. (S) In the past year, Pakistan has made steady progress in
    combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
    Earlier this year, the FIA partnered with the State Bank of
    Pakistan to crack down on large licensed and unlicensed money
    service businesses that were violating foreign exchange laws
    and contributing to money laundering. In January, the
    National Assembly passed new Anti-Money Laundering (AML)
    legislation; the bill is currently awaiting Senate action.
    In the interim, the legislation is in force through its
    promulgation as an ordnance signed by President Zardari.
    Separately, during a February 12 meeting in Islamabad,
    Assistant Treasury Secretary David Cohen provided the
    Pakistanis with a compilation of tearline information on the
    financial activities of terrorist organizations in Pakistan
    -- including their use of the formal financial sector -- and
    affiliated charities, businesses, and individuals. Cohen
    encouraged the Pakistanis to exploit these leads in the
    pursuit of additional inform
    ation to identify key terrorism donors, fundraisers, and
    financial facilitators. Cohen also passed declassified
    terrorism finance information to four Pakistani banks.

    Law Enforcement Assistance
    --------------------------

    ¶8. (SBU) Pakistan's terrorism threats necessitate substantial
    strengthening of the country's law enforcement capabilities.
    The State Department's International Narcotics and Law
    Enforcement (INL) Bureau is providing significant training,
    equipment, and infrastructure assistance to the police in
    North West Frontier Province (NWFP), i.e., the province most
    affected by terrorist attacks. This assistance -- $40.5
    million in FY2009 and $34.6 million in FY2010 -- focuses on
    the NWFP police's Elite Force, a "heavy" police force with
    SWAT-like capabilities established in 2008. Equipment we
    are providing the Elite Force includes vehicles, armored
    personnel carriers, protective vests, night vision goggles,
    and communications gear. We are hardening police checkpoints
    with Hesco-like barriers and are rebuilding three police

    ISLAMABAD 00000416 003 OF 004

    stations in NWFP's Malakand Division that were destroyed by
    militants. INL is also funding a variety of police training
    courses implemented by the Department of Justice's ICITAP
    program that are open to nationwide participation.

    ¶9. (C) The Department of State's Anti-Terrorism Assistance
    (ATA) program has separate activities aimed at enhancing the
    counter-terrorism capabilities of Pakistan's law enforcement
    agencies. A key component of the ATA program is focused on
    "hard skills" tactical training, including explosives
    detection and disposal, quick reaction, and VIP protection.
    Unfortunately, the ATA program is now under threat of
    termination. Following false press reports that our ATA
    trainers are using the training center provided by the
    Pakistani government, i.e., the Sihala Police Academy, for
    nefarious purposes -- including to gather information on a
    nearby Pakistan nuclear installation -- the government has
    decided to end our use of that facility and has not yet
    provided an acceptable alternative site.

    Mumbai Case
    -----------

    ¶10. (C) Pakistan's prosecution of the seven suspects it
    arrested in the Mumbai case -- i.e., Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT)
    operatives Zakiur Rehman Lahkvi, Zarrar Shah, Al-Qama, Shahid
    Jamil Riaz, and Hammad Amin Saqid, and terrorism financiers
    Jamil Ahmed and Younos Anjum -- is proceeding, though at a
    slow pace. The defense lawyers have aggressively filed
    motions challenging varying aspects of the case. On November
    25, an Anti-Terrorism Court finally framed the charges
    against the seven defendants, allowing the court proceedings,
    which are being held in camera, to move to the trial phase.
    Four FBI expert witnesses are expected to be called to
    testify for the prosecution. The government has continually
    reassured us that the prosecutors will win convictions
    against all the defendants after a trial lasting several
    months, though it has a stronger case against the five LeT
    operatives than against the two terrorism financers. There
    are concerns that some of the convictions could be overturned
    at the appellate level, where the courts set an extremely
    high evidentiary bar. On October 12, a Pakistani court
    quashed all remaining cases against Hafiz Saeed, the head of
    LeT alias Jama'at-ud-Dawa (JuD). Those cases were not
    related to the Mumbai attack. The government has repeatedly
    told us that it would need much more evidence of Saeed's
    direct involvement in the Mumbai attacks to move forward with
    Mumbai-related charges against him.

    David Coleman Headley
    ---------------------

    ¶11. (S) In December, an FBI-DOJ team briefed Pakistani
    officials from the ISI, Ministry of Interior, FIA, IB, and
    MFA on the David Coleman Headley investigation, providing
    them with tear-line information on Headley's statements to
    U.S. authorities. ISI officials said they had very little
    information to identify the Pakistanis mentioned in the
    statements. They discussed their investigation into First
    World Immigration Service, a business front used by Headley
    and his co-conspirators. The ISI said while they would not
    grant direct FBI access to co-conspirator Major (retd.)
    Abdurrehman Syed, who was in ISI custody, the FBI could
    submit questions for Syed through the ISI. The FIA and
    Ministry of Interior informed the FBI that it would be
    difficult to introduce Headley-related evidence in the
    government's prosecution of the Mumbai defendants, including
    because Headley's statements to U.S. authorities would be
    treated as hearsay with little evidentiary value in court.

    Sargodha Five
    -------------

    ¶12. (C) The Pakistanis continue to pursue their own case
    against the five American citizens from Northern Virginia who
    were arrested in Sargodha, Punjab province, on December 8,
    following suspicions they had travelled to Pakistan to engage

    ISLAMABAD 00000416 004 OF 004

    in jihadist activities. They have not acted on our request
    that the five be returned to the United States. The
    Pakistani prosecutor has repeatedly asked for continuations
    in the case because he is not yet prepared to move forward
    with charges. The five suspects, who claim to have been
    abused while in custody, were denied bail at a February 16
    court hearing. The next hearing will take place sometime in
    March.

    Aafia Siddiqui
    --------------

    ¶13. (C) There has been widespread condemnation here of the
    February 3 guilty verdict against Dr. Aafia Siddiqui, a
    Pakistani citizen who was tried in Federal Court in New York
    on charges of attempting to murder U.S. soldiers and law
    enforcement authorities in Afghanistan. Many Pakistanis were
    taken by surprise by the verdict because one-sided Pakistani
    media coverage of the case reported only on her defense and
    not the prosecution's case, leading local observers to
    conclude her acquittal was a near certainty. We have
    stressed to the Pakistanis that Siddiqui received a fair
    trial and has a right to an appeal. A number of our
    Pakistani interlocutors have suggested that President Obama
    consider pardoning Siddiqui, and Prime Minister Gilani told
    Senator Kerry on February 16 that Siddiqui should be
    transferred to Pakistan to serve out her sentence here.
    PATTERSON

`