Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3373 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt

### Browse latest releases

2011/02/01 2011/01/31 2011/01/30 2011/01/29 2011/01/28 2011/01/27 2011/01/26 2011/01/25 2011/01/24 2011/01/23 2011/01/22 2011/01/21 2011/01/20 2011/01/19 2011/01/18 2011/01/17 2011/01/16 2011/01/15 2011/01/14 2011/01/13 2011/01/12 2011/01/11 2011/01/10 2011/01/09 2011/01/07 2011/01/05 2011/01/04 2011/01/02 2011/01/01 2010/12/30 2010/12/29 2010/12/28 2010/12/27 2010/12/26 2010/12/25 2010/12/24 2010/12/23 2010/12/22 2010/12/21 2010/12/20 2010/12/19 2010/12/18 2010/12/17 2010/12/16 2010/12/15 2010/12/14 2010/12/13 2010/12/12 2010/12/11 2010/12/10 2010/12/09 2010/12/08 2010/12/07 2010/12/06 2010/12/05 2010/12/04 2010/12/03 2010/12/02 2010/12/01 2010/11/30 2010/11/29 2010/11/28

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AM AE AG AR AS AU AORC AJ AMGT AGMT AFIN APER ABUD ATRN ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AL ASIG ABLD AA AEMR AFU ASUP
BR BM BRUSSELS BL BK BA BO BILAT BTIO BEXP BH BE BX BU BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR
COUNTER CH CO CG CE CA CASC CU CLINTON CI CVIS CDG CIA CACM CDB CS CBW CD CV CMGT CJAN CF CN CAN CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COUNTERTERRORISM
DA DJ DEAX DR DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DOD
ECON EG EAID EFIN ELAB EUN ETRD EU EXTERNAL ENRG ETTC EPET EINV EMIN ECIP ECPS EINDETRD EAGR EN EZ ER ET ES EUC EI EAIR EIND EWWT ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ENVR ECA EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FJ FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN
GTMO GOI GM GG GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GCC GAZA GZ
HILLARY HA HU HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI
IS IR IZ INRB IAEA IN IT ID IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR IRAJ INRA INRO IC IIP ITPHUM IWC IO ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JO JA JOSEPH JUS
KDEM KJUS KCOR KOLY KIPR KNNP KU KWBG KPAL KN KS KZ KAWK KISL KPAO KCRM KSEC KGHG KIFR KTFN KDRG KV KSUM KWAC KAWC KDEMAF KFIN KTIP KHLS KSPR KGCC KPIN KG KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KFRD KNUC KMDR KPLS KUNR KIRF KIRC KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KTIA KPRP KCIP KCFE KOCI KPKO KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KR KPWR KMIG
LY LE LG LH LU LI LO LOG
MARR MOPS MCAP MNUC MZ MO MASS MY MEPP MA MR ML MX MIL MTCRE MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MPOS MD
NATO NI NZ NG NU NO NL NIPP NE NS NAR NPT NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NATIONAL
OTR OVIP OVP OREP ODIP OPDC OPRC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC OFDP OTRA OSCE OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI
PREL PGOV PTER PHUM PINR PAK PREF PL PBTS PHSA PARM PO PINS PK PINT PROP PE POGOV PINL POL PBIO PSOE PKFK PGOF PA PM PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY POLITICS PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON
QA
RS RU RO RW REGION RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SP SY SOCI SCUL SNAR SA STEINBERG SENV SF SO SR SG SW SU SL SMIG SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SI
TIP TERRORISM TI TU TC TRGY TX TS TBIO TW TSPA TH TR TT TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UN US UK UG UNSC UP USEU UNMIK UV UZ UY UNGA UNO USUN UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS
VZ VT VE VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WTO WA WI WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XK XH XY XC XZ XW
YE YM YI
ZI ZU ZP ZR ZB ZK ZF ZANU ZOELLICK

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 04BRASILIA2863, BRAZIL-HAITI: READOUT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY'S ASSESSMENTS, 22 NOVEMBER 2004

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #04BRASILIA2863.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
04BRASILIA2863 | 2004-11-22 13:01 | 2011-01-14 00:12 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Brasilia

`

    This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 002863

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014
    TAGS: PREL BR MARR MOPS UNSC POL MIL
    SUBJECT: BRAZIL-HAITI: READOUT OF PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY'S ASSESSMENTS, 22 NOVEMBER 2004

    REF: A. BRASILIA 2799 AND 2764
    ¶B. PORT AU PRINCE 2325
    Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DENNIS W. HEARNE. REASONS: 1.4 (B)(D )

    ¶1. (C) Summary. Presidential Foreign Affairs Advisor Marcos Aurelio Garcia and his deputy, Marcel Biato, returned from a mid-November fact-finding mission to Haiti with the strong view that Aristide must not be allowed back into Haitian politics under any circumstances, Biato told PolCouns in a 19 November meeting at the presidency. The dominant impression gathered over several days meeting with multiple sources is that Aristide is a criminal who should be prosecuted, but still a powerful "shadow" over Haiti that inspires both terror and ill-founded hopes among many. Hence Garcia and Biato brought back to the GOB the key assessment that the "grand strategic question" now is how to quickly create hope for the future among Haitians that is decoupled from Aristide, and specific GOB views outlined below on requirements for stability, assistance programs and political dialogue flow from that question, according to Biato. The highly negative assessment of Aristide by this influential advisor to President Lula da Silva will likely inform GOB policies and actions henceforth. End summary.

    Aristide: --------

    ¶2. (C) Garcia and Biato returned from their mid-November fact-finding mission to Haiti with a strong view that Aristide must not be allowed back into Haitian politics under any circumstances, that he is "a shadow over the country" and should be "exorcised," if possible by some form of trial in Haiti, Biatio told PolCoun. Biato allowed that Garcia had traveled to Haiti believing that Aristide was a political reality that might have to be considered as a factor in political dialogues. However, after 27 meetings with government officials, diplomats, UN officials, church leaders, military sources, and moderate Lavalas figures (who would only meet with Garcia after he publicly denounced Aristide in Port au Prince), Garcia came away from Haiti viewing Aristide as a completely unacceptable actor, "a mobster" involved in a range of illegal activity who "orders assassinations by cell phone," Biato said.

    ¶3. (C) Biato (strictly protect on this) said Garcia's highly negative assessment of Aristide is being heard by Lula and the senior GOB leadership, and will be factored into any consideration of sending an unofficial Brazilian emissary to meet with Aristide (a possibility reported previously in ref a). Instead, Biato opined that the GOB may communicate to South African President Mbeki its concerns about the apparent freedom Aristide enjoys in inciting violence and provocations from his South African enclave.

    ¶4. (C) The "exorcism" of Aristide is essential because he inspires both terror and "what passes for hope" among so many in Haiti's masses, Biato said. The "grand strategic question is how to create hope for the future among Haitians that is not linked to Aristide." Biato said. From that question flow several of the specific policy and practical assessments that Garcia brought back from his trip, which also tend to reinforce the GOB view that progress must move simultaneously in establishing stability and order, starting real political engagement, amd most importantly, bringing to bear assistance projects that have an immediate and positive effect on the population. Progress on all fronts needs to move ahead quickly, "because time is on Aristide's side," Biato said.

    Stability and Public Order: --------------------------

    ¶5. (C) The GOB assessed that the threat to general stability appears to have diminished after "Operation Baghdad" dissipated, although crime and disturbances continue. MINUSTAH's commander indicated to Garcia that force levels expected on the ground by the end of the year should be sufficient for maintaining general control, Biato said. Biato noted that Brazil deployed a plus-up of 250 marines and support personnel, 44 vehicles (including armored personnel carriers) and provisions on 18 November from Rio. He said the GOB is also planning to send an army engineering battalion for civil works projects as part of its scheduled December rotation. However, he stressed that the GOB does not plan a substantial increase in its MINUSTAH contingent, in part owing to domestic political sensitivities about the mission in Haiti.

    ¶6. (C) Garcia returned concerned about the overall law enforcement situation and the dysfunctionality of the national police, Biato said, and the GOB will be trying to work with others on police training and related initiatives.

    Assistance: ----------

    ¶7. (C) Of the more than one billion dollars in assistance potentially available for Haiti, little has started to flow, and at the current rate, the GOB fears there will not be appreciable progress visible to the public before the elections, Biato said. A main challenge continues to be a lack of reliable interlocutors and institutions for turning assistance funds into viable projects, so donors are standing off, Biato said. Specific steps the GOB will pursue include:

    --The GOB will pressure the EU, U.S. and others to accelerate release of funds (e.g., the GOB met with other donors on the margins of the Ibero-American summit, FM Amorim spoke to the visiting German foreign minister, Garcia spoke recently to French officials and Lula will soon call EU Commission President Durao Baroso, Biato said).

    --Coupled with this, the GOB will urge the UN to place competent aid technicians on the ground asap, headed by a senior UN official experienced both in large-scale program management and dealing with the New York bureaucracy, Biato said.

    --Biato said the GOB is also planning to approach the World Bank regarding a USD 70 million dollar loan that is available for Haiti, but not released yet owing to Haiti's 50 million debt to the Bank. The GOB, in coordination with Canada, plans to loan the IGOH the required 50 million to pay the debt off and trigger release of the World Bank loan. Once the GOB is repaid and other adjustments are made, the GOB estimates 25 to 30 million would be immediately deployable for assistance efforts.

    --The GOB is working with Canada and hopes to approach others about quickly designing and implementing joint projects in health, sanitation and utilization of such resources as Haiti has, Biato said. Biato indicated he will approach the Mission about possible U.S.- Brazil joint projects when the GOB has developed more specific plans, but opined that the single most dramatic U.S. contribution would be an immediate adjustment of textile quotas to benefit Haitian producers.

    --The GOB alone plans to send Brazilian technicians to assist Haitians in enhancing their production of manioc and cashews (the island's main export). Brazil will also build a garbage recycling facility and plans to invite other donors to support it in exporting to Haiti a successful Brazilian program for building affordable housing (approximately USD 1,000 per house).

    Political Engagement:

    --------------------

    ¶8. (C) Following Garcia's visit the GOB has the view that elements of the sprawling Lavalas are willing to be part of a national dialogue, if Aristide's intimidation efforts can be diminished and if what many Lavalas members view as IGOH repression is curtailed, Biato said. Opponents of Lavalas also indicated to Garcia that there are "moderate" and "intellectual" elements in Lavalas with whom they would be willing to engage. The UN should expand on this baseline for dialogue with a series of conferences on political, economic, social and reconciliation topics, Biato said.

    ¶9. (C) Biato indicated that the GOB also plans to invite a number of political figures from Haiti to a December OAS conference in Brasilia on political party development, to provide exposure of isolated Haitian political leaders to international concepts of democracy and party politics.

    ¶10. (C) Garcia left Haiti convinced of the importance of concentrating now on election mechanics, Biato said. The GOB will work with others on efforts to make Haiti's election commission functional and will send to Haiti over 10,000 of Brazil's highly reliable computer voting machines. Political efforts of all kinds will "fall into a vacuum," however, if there is not apparent progress on aid projects, Biato opined.

    ¶11. (C) Comment: Garcia is an influential advisor to the president and Garcia's fact-finding mission to Haiti produced a realistic and negative assessment of Aristide that, we believe, will inform Lula's approach to this issue and GOB actions henceforth. We will be attentive to the possibility that the GOB may reach out to Mbeki to underscore their concerns about Aristide, and we will also be ready to discuss with the GOB any specific assistance proposals they present to us for possible bilateral collaboration.

    Chicola

`