Cable Viewer

Currently released so far... 3373 / 251,287

### Articles

Brazil Sri Lanka United Kingdom Sweden Editorial United States Latin America Egypt

### Browse latest releases

2011/02/01 2011/01/31 2011/01/30 2011/01/29 2011/01/28 2011/01/27 2011/01/26 2011/01/25 2011/01/24 2011/01/23 2011/01/22 2011/01/21 2011/01/20 2011/01/19 2011/01/18 2011/01/17 2011/01/16 2011/01/15 2011/01/14 2011/01/13 2011/01/12 2011/01/11 2011/01/10 2011/01/09 2011/01/07 2011/01/05 2011/01/04 2011/01/02 2011/01/01 2010/12/30 2010/12/29 2010/12/28 2010/12/27 2010/12/26 2010/12/25 2010/12/24 2010/12/23 2010/12/22 2010/12/21 2010/12/20 2010/12/19 2010/12/18 2010/12/17 2010/12/16 2010/12/15 2010/12/14 2010/12/13 2010/12/12 2010/12/11 2010/12/10 2010/12/09 2010/12/08 2010/12/07 2010/12/06 2010/12/05 2010/12/04 2010/12/03 2010/12/02 2010/12/01 2010/11/30 2010/11/29 2010/11/28

### Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 79 86 88 89 90 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
1966/12
1972/02 1972/08
1973/04
1975/03
1979/08
1986/05
1988/01
1989/12
1990/01 1990/07 1990/08
2000/09 2000/11
2001/02 2001/03 2001/07 2001/10
2002/02 2002/03 2002/11
2003/03 2003/04 2003/05 2003/06 2003/07 2003/08 2003/09 2003/10 2003/11 2003/12
2004/01 2004/02 2004/03 2004/04 2004/05 2004/06 2004/07 2004/08 2004/09 2004/10 2004/11 2004/12
2005/01 2005/02 2005/03 2005/04 2005/05 2005/06 2005/07 2005/08 2005/09 2005/10 2005/11 2005/12
2006/01 2006/02 2006/03 2006/04 2006/05 2006/06 2006/07 2006/08 2006/09 2006/10 2006/11 2006/12
2007/01 2007/02 2007/03 2007/04 2007/05 2007/06 2007/07 2007/08 2007/09 2007/10 2007/11 2007/12
2008/01 2008/02 2008/03 2008/04 2008/05 2008/06 2008/07 2008/08 2008/09 2008/10 2008/11 2008/12
2009/01 2009/02 2009/03 2009/04 2009/05 2009/06 2009/07 2009/08 2009/09 2009/10 2009/11 2009/12
2010/01 2010/02

### Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z
Embassy Athens Embassy Asuncion Embassy Astana Embassy Asmara Embassy Ashgabat Embassy Ankara Embassy Amman Embassy Algiers Embassy Addis Ababa Embassy Accra Embassy Abuja Embassy Abu Dhabi Embassy Abidjan Consulate Amsterdam American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Embassy Bujumbura Embassy Buenos Aires Embassy Budapest Embassy Bucharest Embassy Brussels Embassy Bridgetown Embassy Bratislava Embassy Brasilia Embassy Bogota Embassy Bishkek Embassy Bern Embassy Berlin Embassy Belgrade Embassy Beirut Embassy Beijing Embassy Bangkok Embassy Bandar Seri Begawan Embassy Bamako Embassy Baku Embassy Baghdad Consulate Barcelona
Embassy Copenhagen Embassy Conakry Embassy Colombo Embassy Chisinau Embassy Caracas Embassy Canberra Embassy Cairo Consulate Curacao Consulate Casablanca Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe Embassy Dublin Embassy Doha Embassy Djibouti Embassy Dhaka Embassy Dar Es Salaam Embassy Damascus Embassy Dakar Consulate Dubai
Embassy Freetown
Embassy Guatemala Embassy Gaborone
Embassy Harare Embassy Hanoi Consulate Hamburg
Iran RPO Dubai Embassy Islamabad Consulate Istanbul
Embassy Jakarta Consulate Jerusalem Consulate Jeddah
Embassy Kyiv Embassy Kuwait Embassy Kuala Lumpur Embassy Kinshasa Embassy Kigali Embassy Khartoum Embassy Kampala Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg Embassy Luanda Embassy London Embassy Lisbon Embassy Lima Embassy La Paz Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO Embassy Muscat Embassy Moscow Embassy Montevideo Embassy Monrovia Embassy Minsk Embassy Mexico Embassy Maputo Embassy Manama Embassy Managua Embassy Madrid Consulate Munich Consulate Montreal Consulate Monterrey
Embassy New Delhi Embassy Nassau Embassy Nairobi Consulate Naples
Embassy Ouagadougou Embassy Ottawa Embassy Oslo
Embassy Pristina Embassy Pretoria Embassy Prague Embassy Port Au Prince Embassy Phnom Penh Embassy Paris Embassy Paramaribo Embassy Panama Consulate Peshawar
Embassy Quito
REO Basrah Embassy Rome Embassy Riyadh Embassy Riga Embassy Reykjavik Embassy Rangoon Embassy Rabat Consulate Rio De Janeiro Consulate Recife
Secretary of State Embassy Stockholm Embassy Sofia Embassy Skopje Embassy Singapore Embassy Seoul Embassy Sarajevo Embassy Santo Domingo Embassy Santiago Embassy Sanaa Embassy San Salvador Embassy San Jose Consulate Strasbourg Consulate Shenyang Consulate Shanghai Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis Embassy Tripoli Embassy Tokyo Embassy The Hague Embassy Tel Aviv Embassy Tehran Embassy Tegucigalpa Embassy Tbilisi Embassy Tashkent Embassy Tallinn
USUN New York USEU Brussels US Mission Geneva US Interests Section Havana US Delegation, Secretary UNVIE Embassy Ulaanbaatar
Embassy Vilnius Embassy Vienna Embassy Vatican Consulate Vladivostok
Embassy Windhoek Embassy Wellington Embassy Warsaw
Embassy Yerevan Embassy Yaounde
Embassy Zagreb

### Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AF ASEC AM AE AG AR AS AU AORC AJ AMGT AGMT AFIN APER ABUD ATRN ACOA AEC AO AX AMED ADCO AODE AFFAIRS AC AL ASIG ABLD AA AEMR AFU ASUP
BR BM BRUSSELS BL BK BA BO BILAT BTIO BEXP BH BE BX BU BIDEN BY BG BF BB BC BBSR
COUNTER CH CO CG CE CA CASC CU CLINTON CI CVIS CDG CIA CACM CDB CS CBW CD CV CMGT CJAN CF CN CAN CIS CM CONDOLEEZZA COE CR CY CTM COUNTRY CLEARANCE CPAS CWC CT CKGR CB CACS COUNTERTERRORISM
DA DJ DEAX DR DHS DOE DEA DK DISENGAGEMENT DOD
ECON EG EAID EFIN ELAB EUN ETRD EU EXTERNAL ENRG ETTC EPET EINV EMIN ECIP ECPS EINDETRD EAGR EN EZ ER ET ES EUC EI EAIR EIND EWWT ELTN EREL ECIN EFIS EINT EC ENVR ECA EINVETC ENIV EINN ENGR EUR ELECTIONS ECUN EINVEFIN
FR FJ FINR FAO FTAA FREEDOM FI FARC FBI FMLN
GTMO GOI GM GG GV GH GA GE GT GR GTIP GCC GAZA GZ
HILLARY HA HU HR HUMAN HO HYMPSK HURI
IS IR IZ INRB IAEA IN IT ID IV ICTY IQ ICAO INTERPOL IPR IRAJ INRA INRO IC IIP ITPHUM IWC IO ISRAELI IRAQI ICRC IMO IF ILC IEFIN INTELSAT ITALY ITALIAN
JAMES JO JA JOSEPH JUS
KDEM KJUS KCOR KOLY KIPR KNNP KU KWBG KPAL KN KS KZ KAWK KISL KPAO KCRM KSEC KGHG KIFR KTFN KDRG KV KSUM KWAC KAWC KDEMAF KFIN KTIP KHLS KSPR KGCC KPIN KG KBIO KHIV KSCA KE KFRD KNUC KMDR KPLS KUNR KIRF KIRC KACT KGIC KRAD KCOM KMCA KHDP KVPR KDEV KWMN KTIA KPRP KCIP KCFE KOCI KPKO KTDB KMRS KLIG KBCT KICC KGIT KSTC KPAK KNEI KSEP KPOA KFLU KNUP KNNPMNUC KOMC KO KTER KHUM KRFD KBTR KDDG KWWMN KFLO KSAF KBTS KPRV KMPI KNPP KR KPWR KMIG
LY LE LG LH LU LI LO LOG
MARR MOPS MCAP MNUC MZ MO MASS MY MEPP MA MR ML MX MIL MTCRE MOPPS MTCR MAPP MU MG MASC MCC MK MTRE MP MDC MAR MEPI MRCRE MI MT MQADHAFI MPOS MD
NATO NI NZ NG NU NO NL NIPP NE NS NAR NPT NPG NK NSG NA NT NASA NATIONAL
OTR OVIP OVP OREP ODIP OPDC OPRC OIIP OFFICIALS OSAC OAS OEXC OFDP OTRA OSCE OPIC OECD OPCW OSCI
PREL PGOV PTER PHUM PINR PAK PREF PL PBTS PHSA PARM PO PINS PK PINT PROP PE POGOV PINL POL PBIO PSOE PKFK PGOF PA PM PMIL PTERE PF PALESTINIAN PY PGGV PNR POV PAO PFOR PHALANAGE PARTY POLITICS PEPR PSI PU POLITICAL PARTIES PECON
QA
RS RU RO RW REGION RP RIGHTS RICE ROBERT RF RFE
SP SY SOCI SCUL SNAR SA STEINBERG SENV SF SO SR SG SW SU SL SMIG SN SHUM SZ SYR ST SANC SC SAN SIPRS SI
TIP TERRORISM TI TU TC TRGY TX TS TBIO TW TSPA TH TR TT TO TFIN TD TSPL TZ TPHY TK TNGD
UN US UK UG UNSC UP USEU UNMIK UV UZ UY UNGA UNO USUN UE UNESCO UAE UNEP USTR UNHCR UNDP UNHRC USAID UNCHS
VZ VT VE VTPREL VN VM
WTRO WTO WA WI WMO WTRQ WHO WWARD
XF XA XG XT XM XR XS XL XK XH XY XC XZ XW
YE YM YI
ZI ZU ZP ZR ZB ZK ZF ZANU ZOELLICK

### Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN SECRET SECRET//NOFORN UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

courage is contagious

### Viewing cable 09CAIRO874, SCENESETTER: PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CAIRO874.

Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09CAIRO874 | 2009-05-19 12:12 | 2011-01-31 21:09 | SECRET | Embassy Cairo

`

    O 191258Z MAY 09
    FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
    TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2465

` `

    S E C R E T CAIRO 000874

    NEA FOR FO; NSC FOR KUMAR AND SHAPIRO

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019
    TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM ECON EG IS IR IZ
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER:  PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT TO
    WASHINGTON

    Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey
    for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    ¶1. (S/NF) Introduction:  President Mubarak last visited
    Washington in April 2004, breaking a twenty year tradition of
    annual visits to the White House.  Egyptians view President
    Mubarak's upcoming meeting with the President as a new
    beginning to the U.S.-Egyptian relationship that will restore
    a sense of mutual respect that they believe diminished in
    recent years.  President Mubarak has been encouraged by his
    initial interactions with the President, the Secretary, and
    Special Envoy Mitchell, and understands that the
    Administration wants to restore the sense of warmth that has
    traditionally characterized the U.S.-Egyptian partnership.
    The Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt
    remains America's "indispensible Arab ally," and that
    bilateral tensions have abated.  President Mubarak is the
    proud leader of a proud nation.  He draws heavily from his
    own long experience in regional politics and governance as he
    assesses new proposals and recommendations for change.

    MUBARAK'S PROFILE
    -----------------

    ¶2. (S/NF) Mubarak is 81 years old and in reasonably good
    health; his most notable problem is a hearing deficit in his
    left ear.  He responds well to respect for Egypt and for his
    position, but is not swayed by personal flattery.  Mubarak
    peppers his observations with anecdotes that demonstrate both
    his long experience and his sense of humor.  The recent death
    of his grandson Mohammad has affected him deeply and
    undoubtedly will dampen his spirits for the visit which he
    very much wants to make.  During his 28 year tenure, he
    survived at least three assassination attempts, maintained
    peace with Israel, weathered two wars in Iraq and post-2003
    regional instability, intermittent economic downturns, and a
    manageable but chronic internal terrorist threat.  He is a
    tried and true realist, innately cautious and conservative,
    and has little time for idealistic goals.  Mubarak viewed
    President Bush (43) as naive, controlled by subordinates, and
    totally unprepared for dealing with post-Saddam Iraq,
    especially the rise of Iran,s regional influence.

    ¶3. (S/NF)  On several occasions Mubarak has lamented the U.S.
    invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam.  He routinely
    notes that Egypt did not like Saddam and does not mourn him,
    but at least he held the country together and countered Iran.
    Mubarak continues to state that in his view Iraq needs a
    "tough, strong military officer who is fair" as leader.  This
    telling observation, we believe, describes Mubarak's own view
    of himself as someone who is tough but fair, who ensures the
    basic needs of his people.

    ¶4. (S/NF) No issue demonstrates Mubarak,s worldview more
    than his reaction to demands that he open Egypt to genuine
    political competition and loosen the pervasive control of the
    security services.  Certainly the public "name and shame"
    approach in recent years strengthened his determination not
    to accommodate our views.  However, even though he will be
    more willing to consider ideas and steps he might take
    pursuant to a less public dialogue, his basic understanding
    of his country and the region predisposes him toward extreme
    caution.  We have heard him lament the results of earlier
    U.S. efforts to encourage reform in the Islamic world.  He
    can harken back to the Shah of Iran: the U.S. encouraged him
    to accept reforms, only to watch the country fall into the
    hands of revolutionary religious extremists.  Wherever he has
    seen these U.S. efforts, he can point to the chaos and loss
    of stability that ensued.  In addition to Iraq, he also
    reminds us that he warned against Palestinian elections in
    2006 that brought Hamas (Iran) to his doorstep.  Now, we
    understand he fears that Pakistan is on the brink of falling
    into the hands of the Taliban, and he puts some of the blame
    on U.S. insistence on steps that ultimately weakened
    Musharraf.  While he knows that Bashir in Sudan has made
    multiple major mistakes, he cannot work to support his
    removal from power.

    ¶5. (S/NF) Mubarak has no single confidante or advisor who can
    truly speak for him, and he has prevented any of his main
    advisors from operating outside their strictly circumscribed
    spheres of power.  Defense Minister Tantawi keeps the Armed
    Forces appearing reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied
    with their perks and privileges, and Mubarak does not appear
    concerned that these forces are not well prepared to face
    21st century external threats.  EGIS Chief Omar Soliman and
    Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic beasts at bay,
    and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics.
    Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input
    on economic and trade matters, but Mubarak will likely resist
    further economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful
    to public order and stability.  Dr. Zakaria Azmi and a few
    other senior NDP leaders manage the parliament and public
    politics.

    ¶6. (S/NF) Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates
    religious extremism and interference in politics.  The Muslim
    Brothers represent the worst, as they challenge not only
    Mubarak,s power, but his view of Egyptian interests.  As
    with regional issues, Mubarak, seeks to avoid conflict and
    spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge
    from unleashed personal and civil liberties.  In Mubarak,s
    mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than
    risk chaos for society as a whole.  He has been supportive of
    improvements in human rights in areas that do not affect
    public security or stability.  Mrs. Mubarak has been given a
    great deal of room to maneuver to advance women's and
    children's rights and to confront some traditional practices
    that have been championed by the Islamists, such as FGM,
    child labor, and restrictive personal status laws.

    SUCCESSION
    ----------

    ¶7. (S/NF) The next presidential elections are scheduled for
    2011, and if Mubarak is still alive it is likely he will run
    again, and, inevitably, win.  When asked about succession, he
    states that the process will follow the Egyptian
    constitution. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no one
    in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually succeed
    Mubarak nor under what circumstances.  The most likely
    contender is presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is
    ever-increasing at the ruling party); some suggest that
    intelligence chief Omar Soliman might seek the office, or
    dark horse Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa might
    run.  Mubarak's ideal of a strong but fair leader would seem
    to discount Gamal Mubarak to some degree, given Gamal's lack
    of military experience, and may explain Mubarak's hands off
    approach to the succession question.  Indeed, he seems to be
    trusting to God and the ubiquitous military and civilian
    security services to ensure an orderly transition.

    MUBARAK'S EGYPT: 1982 -- 2009
    -----------------------------

    ¶8. (C) Egypt continues to be a major regional economic,
    political, and cultural power.  However, economic problems
    have frustrated many Egyptians.  Egypt's per capita GDP was
    on par with South Korea's 30 years ago; today it is
    comparable to Indonesia's.  There were bread riots in 2008
    for the first time since 1977.  Political reforms have
    stalled and the GOE has resorted to heavy-handed tactics
    against individuals and groups, especially the Muslim
    Brotherhood, whose influence continues to grow.

    ¶9. (SBU) Economic reform momentum has slowed and high GDP
    growth rates of recent years have failed to lift Egypt's
    lower classes out of poverty.  High inflation, coupled with
    the impact of the global recession, has resulted in an
    increase in extreme poverty, job losses, a growing budget
    deficit and projected 2009 GDP growth of 3.5% - half last
    year's rate.

    ¶10. (S/NF) Mubarak himself refuses to discuss economic
    assistance to Egypt, but other interlocutors may raise it.
    On May 7, Egypt formally and publicly accepted FY 2009 and FY
    2010 assistance levels, ending a stalemate over the FY 2009
    program, linked to levels, a perceived lack of consultation,
    and political conditionality.  Based on our assessment of
    Egypt's most pressing assistance needs, and broad public
    consensus in Egypt that the educational system is seriously
    deficient, we would like to focus on education.  We believe
    the Egyptians would welcome a new presidential level
    initiative in this area, which would also be in U.S. national
    interests given the critical role education will play in
    Egypt's political and economic development.

    MUBARAK'S REGIONAL OUTLOOK
    --------------------------

    ¶11. (S/NF) Israeli-Arab conflict:  Mubarak has successfully
    shepherded Sadat,s peace with Israel into the 21st century,
    and benefitted greatly from the stability Camp David has
    given the Levant: there has not been a major land war in more
    than 35 years.  Peace with Israel has cemented Egypt,s
    moderate role in Middle East peace efforts and provided a
    political basis for continued U.S. military and economic
    assistance ($1.3 billion and $250 million, respectively).
    However, broader elements of peace with Israel, e.g. economic
    and cultural exchange, remain essentially undeveloped.

    ¶12. (S/NF) Camp David also presented Mubarak with the
    perpetual challenge of balancing Egypt,s international image
    as a moderate with its domestic image as pan-Arab leader.
    Mubarak has managed this strategic dichotomy most effectively
    in times of regional stability.  However, the Gulf wars, and
    especially post-Saddam regional crises, have taxed this
    equation.  For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war, the Bush
    Administration asked Egypt to side against Hizballah; at the
    same time Egyptian protestors demanded the peace treaty with
    Israel be vacated.  The Egyptians were frozen, and relegated
    to waiting for the situation to stabilize. More recently,
    with Iran bringing the battlefield closer with Hamas' actions
    in Gaza and discovery of the Hizballah cell in Egypt, the
    Egyptians appear more willing to confront the Iranian
    surrogates and to work closely with Israel.

    ¶13. (S/NF) Mubarak has been effective as an intermediary
    during various phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict.  In the
    Arafat era, Egypt worked between the Palestinian Authority
    and Israel.  At the outset of the Abbas era, Egypt,s role
    was unclear as the Israelis and Palestinians communicated
    directly, and Mubarak for a time was left with no deliverable
    either to the West or his public.  He firmly believes,
    incorrectly, that the Bush Administration "forced" the
    Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 (which Hamas won).
    Hamas' June 2007 takeover of Gaza allowed the Egyptians back
    into the game as a go-between, and Mubarak,s team has made
    clear they will not cede the "Palestinian file" to another
    Arab state.  In general, the Egyptian-Israeli strategic
    relationship is on solid ground, as they face a shared threat
    from Hamas.

    ¶14. (S/NF) The ongoing intra-Arab dispute, which pits Egypt
    and Saudi Arabia against Syria and Qatar and is primarily
    driven by Iran's regional influence, is the current test for
    Mubarak.  For the moment the Egyptian-Saudi moderate camp is
    holding.  Mubarak has maneuvered with reasonable
    effectiveness, brandishing Egyptian clout through a hastily
    prepared but effective summit in Sharm el Sheikh in February,
    but Iran,s Arab surrogates (especially Qatar) continue to
    unsettle the Egyptians.  Mubarak will rail against President
    Bush,s decision to invade Iraq, contending that it opened
    the door to Iranian influence in the region.  That said, the
    Egyptians recently told Special Envoy Ross they expect our
    outreach to Iran to fail, and that "we should prepare for
    confrontation through isolation."  Mubarak and his advisors
    are now convinced that Tehran is working to weaken Egypt
    through creation of Hizballah cells, support of the Muslim
    Brotherhood, and destabilization of Gaza.  Egypt has warned
    that it will retaliate if these actions continue.

    ¶15. (S/NF) Egypt views the stability and unity of Sudan as
    essential to its national security because of concern over
    its access to Nile waters and the potential for increased
    Sudanese refugee flows.  The GOE is using development
    assistance in South Sudan to encourage unity.  Here too, the
    Egyptians are jealous and sensitive to the Qatari foray into
    resolving Darfur, a crisis squarely in Egypt's backyard.
    Mubarak may ask about the potential for cooperation with the
    U.S. on Sudan and will probably want to hear how the
    Administration will approach the issue.  If he agrees,
    Mubarak can use his stature and credibility with Bashir to
    make progress on Darfur and human rights issues.

    ¶16. (S/NF) MUBARAK REGIONAL TALKING POINTS
    -----------------------------------------
    Israeli-Arab peace: He will ask for continued U.S. leadership and highlight Egypt’s role as moderate interlocutor. He will stress the primacy of the Palestinian track over efforts with Syria. He will press for concrete action on settlements and resist Arab gestures to Israel until the Arabs can see whether or not Netanyahu is credible.
    Iran: He will rail against Iranian regional influence and express pessimism about U.S. outreach to Tehran. He will make clear that there should be no linkage between Israeli-Arab peace and Iran but will agree with the President’s assessment that such linkage as does exist argues for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track to undermine Hamas and Hizballah.

    Sudan: He will highlight Egypt’s role as provider of humanitarian and military assistance, and stress the need to maintain stability.
    Intra-Arab strife: He may criticize Qatar, and perhaps Syria, as Iranian surrogates. He may ask about our plan to engage Damascus and suggest we coordinate our efforts.
    Iraq: He may be circumspect, but harbors continuing doubts about Maliki and his Iranian ties. He will say Egypt is open to bilateral improvement but is awaiting Iraqi actions.
    SCOBEY

`