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### Viewing cable 09SEOUL1241, SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SEOUL1241 | 2009-08-06 06:06 | 2010-11-29 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Seoul
Appears in these articles: nytimes.com

`

    VZCZCXYZ0000
    PP RUEHWEB

    DE RUEHUL #1241/01 2180645
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    P 060645Z AUG 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5228
    INFO RUCNKOR/KOREA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/COMUSFK SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
    RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
    RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA CC SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
    RUACAAA/COMUSKOREA INTEL SEOUL KOR PRIORITY

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001241

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
    SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA

    Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Tokola.
    Reasons 1.4 (b),
    (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  CODEL Berman, welcome to Korea.  The
    alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is
    strong, enduring, and strategically important.  Your visit
    follows the successful June 16 U.S.-ROK Presidential Summit
    and adoption of the Joint Vision Statement.  The Joint Vision
    Statement was well-received here, both for its recommitment
    to a continued strengthening of our security relationship
    (including its affirmation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and
    extended deterrence to the ROK), and for outlining what a
    21st century U.S.-ROK relationship entails.  To realize this
    vision, we will need to continue to expand our cooperation,
    both regionally and globally.  Security in the region,
    particularly in view of North Korea,s continued belligerent
    posture and Kim Jong-Il,s declining health, is important to
    Korean officials.  Like us, the ROK supports the Six Party
    Talks and remains adamant that we should not recognize North
    Korea as a nuclear state.  Your South Korean interlocutors
    are very interested in how you view the proposed North Korean
    contingency plan, and prospects for denuclearizing North
    Korea.

    ¶2. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents
    for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S.
    (KORUS) FTA in Washington.  Ratification of the FTA is seen
    as a sign of America's strategic commitment in northeast
    Asia.  President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting
    with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the
    KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled
    Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in
    Korea,s National Assembly in late April.  A full plenary
    vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while
    opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about
    a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is
    strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected
    to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington.
    The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of
    the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to
    understand the exact nature of their concerns, and to develop
    recommendations for addressing them.  To assist with this
    review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in
    this free trade agreement are able to fully express their
    views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009,
    requesting comments on the KORUS FTA.  End Summary.

    ----------
    BACKGROUND
    ----------

    ¶3. (C) The ROK, with its vibrant democracy, free market,
    high-tech economy, highly educated population, free press,
    and ever-deepening people-to-people ties with the United
    States, is a striking success story, including for U.S.
    foreign policy.  Our intensive engagement with the ROK since
    its founding in 1948 exemplifies the importance of all three
    pillars Secretary Clinton has outlined describing U.S.
    foreign policy:  defense, diplomacy, and development.  South
    Korea's success is based on a shared commitment to defense,
    as shown by the 28,500 U.S. troops still on the Peninsula,
    the substantial development assistance the U.S. provided
    after the Korean War, and our close diplomatic cooperation to
    achieve a denuclearized North Korea and a more secure and
    prosperous future for the region.

    ¶4. (C) Now a developed country with a tested democratic
    system, South Korea increasingly has the capability as well
    as the political will to assume larger regional and global
    roles.  Your visit will encourage your interlocutors to
    become even more active partners with us on issues ranging
    from human rights promotion to climate change to sea piracy
    to counter-terrorism.  We share values and strategic goals
    with this highly capable ally; we need to give substance to
    our shared aspiration to upgrade our bilateral relationship,
    making it a global partnership.

    ----------------------
    The Domestic Situation
    ----------------------

    ¶5. (C) President Lee, of the center-right Grand National
    Party (GNP), began his single five-year term in February
    2008, ending ten years of center-left control of the
    Presidency.  In April 2008 the GNP won a solid majority over
    the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) in the unicameral
    National Assembly.  The GNP's success at the polls, however,
    belied the lack of consensus among the South Korean public on
    domestic political issues like media law reform, labor relations,
    tax policy, and education.  President Lee has
    struggled with low approval ratings -- about 30 percent --
    since taking office, especially following his decision to
    re-open the Korean market to U.S. beef last year.  In the
    National Assembly, the GNP and DP have even lower approval
    ratings than President Lee, resulting in a virtually
    deadlocked domestic agenda.

    ¶6. (C) President Lee has remained publicly disengaged from
    the squabbling in the National Assembly and is focusing
    instead on foreign policy, resource diplomacy, and
    international cooperative efforts on green growth, climate
    change, and overcoming the economic crisis.  He campaigned on
    a pledge to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, and is widely
    seen as having been successful.  With China and Russia, he
    has substantially expanded the ROK's economic and political
    ties.  He has attempted to overcome historical animosities
    with Japan to advance Korea-Japan ties based on Korea's
    pragmatic interests, but sensitivities to Japan's
    colonization of Korea run deep.  Looking wider, President Lee
    is actively cultivating new ties with Southeast Asia, Central
    Asia, and Europe.

    ¶7. (C) Former President Kim Dae-jung's health has been
    failing and he is currently hospitalized in Seoul in
    intensive care.  The prognosis for President Kim, who was in
    office 1998-2003 and who is 84, is not good.

    ------------
    The Alliance
    ------------

    ¶8. (C) For over half a century the U.S.-ROK alliance has
    provided the foundation for peace and prosperity in Northeast
    Asia.  The ROK has benefitted greatly; neither the economic
    "Miracle on the Han" nor Korea,s democratic flowering would
    have been possible absent a U.S. defense shield and economic
    assistance and support.  The U.S. too has benefited.  USFK
    (U.S. Forces in Korea) is our only troop presence in mainland
    East Asia, and South Korea contributes billions of dollars to
    USFK operating expenses.

    ¶9. (C) The Summit Joint Vision Statement offers a compelling
    vision of expanding the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance
    regionally and globally.  On the Korean Peninsula, we are
    also working to strengthen, further broaden, and
    appropriately evolve the security relationship by
    implementing three key bilateral transformation agreements
    known as YRP, LPP and STP.

    -- YRP:  The Yongsan Relocation Plan will relocate the
    headquarters of U.S. Forces (USFK) from the middle of Seoul
    to a new, purpose-built war-fighting headquarters south of
    the city, thereby giving back to the Koreans a large tract of
    land historically associated with Japanese occupation which
    they plan to turn into a central park.  Progress on the
    implementation of YRP continues but construction to prepare
    U.S. Army Garrison ) Humphreys, the hub for the relocation,
    continues on schedule but faces obstacles that require
    President Lee,s and his administration,s support if we are
    to meet the agreed 2014 completion date.

    -- LPP:  The Land Partnership Plan will consolidate over 100
    U.S. military bases spread all across Korea into two key
    strategic hubs south of the Han River, replacing an outdated
    military footprint from the end of the Korean War with a
    modern and better-positioned force posture.  The ROK Ministry
    of National Defense (MND) seeks to complete the LPP by the
    end of 2015.

    -- STP: The Strategic Transition Plan is the process under
    which we are transferring wartime operational control (OPCON)
    of South Korean forces from the U.S. military to the ROK
    military by April 17, 2012.  President Lee has emphasized the
    need to keep the spotlight off of wartime OPCON transition
    due to increased scrutiny by ROK domestic opposition groups
    regarding the April 17, 2012 transition date (in the wake of
    North Korea,s recent claimed nuclear test).  We are
    continuing to emphasize the process for close cooperation in
    reviewing OPCON transition progress through the SCM and
    management of messaging and public perceptions to highlight
    the value of the restructuring.

    ¶10. (C) We must continue to emphasize the importance of
    completing the two relocation elements of USFK
    transformation, YRP and LPP.  Those agreements, signed in
    2004, did not come with appropriated funds.  The Master Plan,
    finished in 2007, lays out the cost and timeline but the ROKG
    has yet to request funding from the National Assembly.  Other
    U.S. and ROK private sector initiatives are failing to fill
    the funding gap.  As a result, alliance transformation, which
    was originally scheduled for completion in 2008, is facing a
    delay of many more years.  To avoid further delays, the ROKG
    must make implementation of these moves a priority.  For our
    part, we must be clear and consistent in identifying our own
    top priorities .

    ¶11. (C).  The time is right to expand the areas in which the
    U.S. and the ROK cooperate on global security issues.  You
    may want to raise the following areas where the ROK may be
    ready to increase its global security role:

    -- Afghanistan:  The ROKG is planning to provide more
    assistance and training in Afghanistan, including building a
    new hospital and a training center in Bagram, and
    contributing ambulances, motorcycles, and police trainers.
    However, we need a lot more from the ROK, especially
    financial support for the Afghan Army, for which we have
    requested USD 100 million a year for five years, which is the
    USG primary request of the ROK.  The ROKG also is considering
    sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to
    Afghanistan, which we would welcome, but we also have
    insisted that any such PRT include a military unit to provide
    for its own security.  Such a deployment (the PRT as well as
    any other military assets, such as an ISR unit )
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) will need
    National Assembly approval, which will pose difficult, but
    not insurmountable, political problems for President Lee.

    -- UN Peacekeeping Operations:  The National Assembly is
    deliberating on a bill that will allow the ROK military to be
    deployed for peacekeeping missions without prior legislative
    approval.  In the meantime, the National Assembly in July
    approved extending the ROK,s PKO deployment in Lebanon until
    the end of December 2010.  The ROK has contributed 367
    soldiers for peacekeeping in Lebanon since 2007 and is
    participating in eight other PKO operations around the world.
    As of January 1, 2008 the ROK was the 10th largest provider
    of assessed contributions to the UN PKO budget.

    -- Combating Piracy off Somalia:  The ROK is a member of the
    Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.
    Additionally, the ROKG deployed a 4,500 ton class destroyer
    equipped with a Lynx helicopter and rigid inflatable craft to
    the Gulf of Aden to be part of the maritime security
    operations of the combined maritime forces.  The destroyer
    carries up to 310 personnel.

    -- Proliferation Security Initiative:  In response to the
    DPRK,s May rocket launch and nuclear test, the ROK on May 26
    joined the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative
    (PSI).   In June the ROK participated in a PSI meeting in
    Poland, and held a workshop in Seoul in July.  The ROKG plans
    to attend the next workshop in Sydney in September, and has
    expressed interest in attending the interdiction exercises in
    Singapore in October.  PSI is an international, interagency
    effort aimed at preventing or interdicting the proliferation
    of weapons of mass destruction using existing domestic laws
    and established international agreements.  The ROKG currently
    is formulating an interagency strategy for its effective PSI
    participation.

    ---------------------------
    U.S.-ROK Global Partnership
    ---------------------------

    ¶12. (C) The ROK also wants to play a bigger role on other
    global issues and the following are good areas for increased
    cooperation:

    -- Democracy and Human Rights: The ROK has demonstrated a new
    readiness to address human rights concerns in the DPRK,
    co-sponsoring the annual UNGA North Korea human rights
    resolution in 2008 for the first time.  In October 2008 the
    ROK agreed to chair the first Senior Officials' Meeting of
    the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership, a U.S.-supported
    regional subset of the Community of Democracies.

    -- Climate Change:  Korea, the 13th largest per capita
    emitter of greenhouse gases and the world,s 15th largest
    economy in terms of GDP, is playing a constructive role in
    discussions on global climate change.  The ROKG shares the
    U.S. view that that investment in new and renewable energy
    sources not only can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but
    also can create jobs, spur economic growth, and enhance
    energy security. The U.S. Department of Energy is engaged in
    a variety of collaborative R&D activities with Korea,
    including in nuclear energy, fusion, gas hydrates,
    "smart grids," and other new and renewable energy technologies, but
    there is room to expand and strengthen our cooperation.

    -- Development Assistance:  Korea's overseas development
    assistance program currently includes nearly USD 500 million
    in Official Development Assistance (ODA), as well as a
    roughly similar figure for North Korea (suspended).  The ROKG
    target is to triple ODA (as a percentage of GDP) by 2015.
    With limited functional and regional capacity, Korea should
    be receptive to policy discussions on ODA coordination.

    -- Counter-Proliferation:  The ROKG has told Iranian
    counterparts at every opportunity that Tehran's uranium
    enrichment activities are unacceptable and has supported the
    P5-plus-1 incentives package.

    -----------------------
    FTA and Economic Issues
    -----------------------

    ¶13. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents
    for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S.
    (KORUS) FTA in Washington.  President Obama's statement at
    the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find
    a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety
    in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the
    committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in
    late April.  A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has
    not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA
    continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean
    public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority
    GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of
    movement in Washington.  The Obama Administration is
    conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting
    closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature
    of their concerns, to develop recommendations for addressing
    them.  To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who
    may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to
    fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register
    Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA.

    ¶14. (C) Korea is our seventh largest trading partner, with
    total merchandise trade in 2008 of over USD 82 billion (and
    more than USD 100 billion if services are included).  The
    U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in September
    2007 that U.S. merchandise exports to Korea would expand by
    USD 10-12 billion on an annual basis as a result of the FTA
    and that services exports would also expand.  The United
    States has traditionally been the ROK's biggest trading
    partner in the post-WWII era.  One tangible sign of China's
    growing importance in Asia and in Korea, however, is that
    China displaced the United States as Korea's top trading
    partner in 2004.  By 2008, China-ROK merchandise trade
    reached USD 168 billion, doubling the U.S.-ROK total.  With
    respect to North Korea, China accounts for nearly 50 percent
    of that country's total trade.  The growing economic and
    political role of China on the Korean peninsula is one of the
    most important motivations for Korea to enter into FTA
    negotiations with the United States.  Successive ROK
    Governments have seen the ratification and implementation of
    the KORUS FTA as symbolic of the U.S. will to remain fully
    engaged in Northeast Asia in the face of increasing Chinese
    influence.

    ¶15. (C) Korea also wants to conclude an FTA with the United
    States because Korean economic reformers recognize that the
    Korean economy needs to liberalize and open in order to
    promote greater competitiveness vis--vis China and Japan.
    South Korea has concluded a number of FTAs and launched
    negotiations on others since the signing of the KORUS FTA
    negotiations on June 30, 2007.  The ROK has implemented FTAs
    with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN (except investment).
    The ROK has concluded negotiations with India and signing is
    reportedly imminent.  Negotiations are underway with Canada,
    Mexico, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, New Zealand,
    and Peru.  In July, the ROKG announced that negotiations on
    the EU-Korea FTA were concluded (but the agreement is not yet
    signed).  ROK media have been filled with stories of the
    increasing economic weight of Europe in Korea as a result of
    the FTA.  The Board of Governors of the American Chamber of
    Commerce has expressed concern that the EU-Korea FTA will
    disadvantage the competitiveness of U.S. firms vis--vis
    their European competitors in Korea.

    ¶16. (C) The reopening of the beef market was accomplished in
    an April 2008 agreement separate from the FTA.  Under this
    agreement, the United States and Korea agreed to reopen
    Korea,s market to U.S. beef and beef products in a manner
    fully consistent with international standards and science.
    In June 2008, following massive street protests in Seoul,
    U.S. beef exporters and Korean beef importers reached a
    temporary commercial agreement to only export beef and beef
    products from cattle under 30 months of age, as a
    transitional measure, until Korean consumer confidence
    improves.  While beef sales have not yet returned to past
    levels due to Korea,s currency exchange fluctuations,
    increased competition from Australian beef, and lingering
    public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, the market is
    open and we expect increased sales over the medium term.
    Korea is also watching closely our ongoing negotiations with
    other countries that have stricter restrictions on U.S. beef.

    ¶17. (C) On the global financial reform discussions, Korea is
    a strong ally in the G-20 process (which it will chair in
    2010).  Korea is enthusiastic about the G20 as the global
    forum for action on the global financial system.  The ROKG is
    concerned that European countries are advocating other
    formulas for such discussions that would exclude Korea.
    Within the G20, President Lee has called for a strong fiscal
    response and refraining from protectionism as well as
    necessary regulatory improvements.  President Lee Myung-bak
    has strongly argued that it would be premature to withdraw
    the national fiscal stimulus packages at this juncture.
    Korea sees itself as lining up on the U.S. side on almost all
    G20 debates.

    ¶18. (C) The Korean economy is looking better and is
    increasingly forecast to be one of the first major economies
    to emerge from recession.  The benchmark KOSPI stock index in
    early August reached the highest level since mid-August 2008
    and the won, the Korean currency, closed at 1218 per dollar
    on August 4, the strongest level since October 14, 2008.
    Most analysts foresee further strengthening of the won in the
    months ahead.  The picture looked far different last fall,
    when the financial crisis hit Korea hard.  A USD 30 billion
    swap line extended by the U.S. Federal Reserve in October, as
    the Korean won was plummeting and Korea looked to be on the
    brink of a financial panic, helped Korea weather the worst of
    the storm, and gained tremendous gratitude.  The later
    Japanese and Chinese swap mechanisms did not have the same
    impact.  In the closing months of 2008 Korea experienced
    dramatic contraction of demand for its exports.  The ROKG's
    stabilization and stimulus packages mitigated the impact and
    the weakened currency has generated a significant current
    account surplus in recent months.  Sectors of the Korean
    economy facing restructuring challenges include construction,
    shipbuilding, shipping and automotive.  GM Daewoo, GM,s
    Korean subsidiary, is negotiating with the Korea Development
    Bank for a sizeable loanto restructure its operations.

    -----------
    North Korea
    -----------

    ¶19. (C) Presidents Obama and Lee agreed to send a clear
    message to North Korea that its provocations come at a price.
    They also agreed on principles to deal with North Korea's
    nuclear and missile threats, including commitments to
    achieving the "complete and verifiable elimination" of North
    Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well
    as the ballistic missile program.  Korean officials continue
    to seek assurances that the United States will consult
    closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the
    United States will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear
    state.

    ¶20. (C) North Korea policy is almost always the most
    sensitive issue on the South Korean agenda.  Fifty-five years
    of alliance notwithstanding, the ROKG still fears being left
    out or surprised by Washington's initiatives or policy
    changes on North Korea.  Simply put, the ROKG must be seen by
    South Koreans as being informed and consulted on all USG
    moves on North Korea.  Korean officials see Washington and
    Seoul as partners in forming and implementing policies toward
    the North and consistently seek affirmation that Washington
    will not allow Pyongyang to drive a wedge between us.

    ¶21. (C) There is virtually no chance of early improvement in
    South-North relations; President Lee is determined to stick
    to principle and to insist on a more reciprocal relationship
    with the North, and Kim Jong-il will not give in for his own
    domestic reasons.  Importantly, South Koreans appear tired
    of, but not particularly bothered by, the continuing
    threatening rhetoric from the North, and therefore seem
    largely comfortable with their government's stance.
    Heightening tensions in the West Sea and missile launches
    have created less public anxiety than might be expected.  The
    ROKG will welcome the opportunity to present with you a
    united front of calm and determination toward the North,
    combined with a call to return to the Six- Party Talks.

    ¶22. (SBU) The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the only
    remaining joint economic project between North and South
    Korea.   (The other joint venture, Mt. Kumkang tours, was
    closed on July 11, 2008, after North Korean security forces
    shot a South Korean tourist to death.)  Located in North
    Korea, six miles north of the DMZ, the KIC opened in December
    2004 and is home to 106 ROK-owned factories employing
    approximately 40,000 North Korean workers (84 percent are
    women age 20-39).  Since late 2008, North-South tensions
    regarding the KIC have increased.  The DPRK closed the border
    temporarily on multiple occasions, and has placed limits on
    the number of South Korean employees allowed in the KIC.  The
    DPRK is demanding drastically higher wages for employees (up
    from USD 55 to USD 300 per month), construction of additional
    dormitories and an additional fee of USD 500 million for land
    usage.

    ¶23. (SBU) North Koreans detained a South Korean Hyundai Asan
    employee working at KIC on March 30, accusing him of defaming
    North Korea and attempting to suborn a North Korean female
    worker.  In addition to securing the release of the ROK
    citizen, South Korea's priorities at the KIC include
    guaranteeing employee safety, freedom of access and
    border-crossing, and increasing the number of North Korean
    workers brought in from outside the Kaesong area.  Although
    the South Korean firms at KIC are concerned about the current
    tension and complain of financial losses, only one company
    has withdrawn from KIC to date.

    ¶24. (SBU) The DPRK and the ROK have held four rounds of
    negotiations between April and July 2009 without any
    breakthrough, with the most recent session taking place on
    July 2.  Both sides appear to be committed to continuing KIC
    operations.  The United States has consistently supported
    North-South dialogue and expressed hope that the two sides
    will resolve their disputes over the KIC.

    --------
    VWP/WEST
    --------

    ¶25. (U)  The ROK was included in the the Visa Waiver Program
    (VWP) in October 2008. This step has been a success in
    facilitating travel and improving people-to-people ties
    between nations.  As of the beginning of July, approximately
    200,000 Koreans had applied for VWP approval using the ESTA
    (Electronic Approval for Travel Authorization).  More than 99
    percent of the ESTA applications have been approved and we
    continue to see an upward trend in ESTA usage.

    ¶26. (U)  The WEST (Work, English Study, and Travel) program,
    inaugurated in March 2009, allows qualifying college students
    and recent graduates to enter the U.S. for up to 18 months on
    J-1 exchange visitor visas that allow them to study English,
    participate in professional-level internships and travel
    independently.  A group of 185 Korean students have already
    travelled to the U.S. on the WEST program and a second wave
    of 159 is preparing to depart.  As of December 2008, there
    were 110,000 South Koreans studying in the U.S. at all
    levels, from elementary to graduate school.  According to
    Korean Ministry of Education data for 2007, 27% of all
    post-graduate students choosing to study abroad chose to
    study in the U.S.

    ---------------
    The Bottom Line
    ---------------

    ¶27. (C) South Korea is a like-minded, energetic partner that
    is ready, prepared, and wants to have a broader and deeper
    alliance with the United States.  Koreans would like the
    alliance to be a lot more than a security arrangement.  Yes,
    they want more say, even a more equal relationship, but this
    is only part of their motivation.  Rather, they see that
    their ties with the U.S. are deeper now than ever; witness,
    for example, the two million-strong Korean American
    community, and the enormous numbers of Koreans studying in
    the United States.  Above all, however, a very large majority
    of South Koreans are convinced that the ROK and the United
    States have shared values and shared strategic interests.
    It's time to take the relationship to a new level of global
    partnership, even as we deepen our cooperation on the Korean
    peninsula.

    -------------
    Your Meetings
    -------------

    ¶28. (C) You are scheduled to meet with President Lee
    Myung-bak, National security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan, Foreign
    Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, Speaker
    of the National Assembly Kim Hyong-o, and Chairman of the
    National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification
    Committee Park Jin.  Likely topics of discussion include:

    -- North Korea: Your interlocutors may seek assurances that
    the U.S. will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea
    policy and that the U.S. will not recognize North Korea as a
    nuclear state.

    -- U.S.-ROK Alliance: Your interlocutors may stress the
    importance of the U.S. commitment to the defense of the
    Korean peninsula.

    -- Global Partnership: Your interlocutors may gauge your
    level of interest in ROK contributions to reconstruction and
    stabilization of vital countries such as Afghanistan and
    Pakistan; ROK peacekeeping in Lebanon; and anti-piracy
    efforts off the coast of Somalia.

    -- FTA: Your interlocutors will seek your views on the
    prospects for Congressional approval of the agreement.  The
    Trade Minister will stress that the FTA represents a balance
    of American and Korean interests and that the ROKG cannot
    re-negotiate the text of the FTA.
    STEPHENS

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