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### Viewing cable 09SANAA2279, YEMENI TRIBAL LEADER: FOR SALEH, SAUDI INVOLVEMENT

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09SANAA2279 | 2009-12-28 10:10 | 2010-12-03 21:09 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Sanaa
Appears in these articles: http://www.spiegel.de

`

    VZCZCXRO6290
    RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHYN #2279/01 3621044
    ZNY CCCCC ZZH
    R 281044Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3462
    INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
    RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
    RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
    RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
    RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
    RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
    RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

` `

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 002279

    SIPDIS

    DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019
    TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SA IR YE
    SUBJECT: YEMENI TRIBAL LEADER: FOR SALEH, SAUDI INVOLVEMENT
    IN SA'ADA COMES NOT A MOMENT TOO SOON

    REF: A. RIYADH 1617
    ¶B. SANAA 2227
    ¶C. SANAA 1617
    ¶D. SANAA 1611

    Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

    ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh believes the Saudi
    Government's military actions in Sa'ada will alleviate
    mounting domestic political pressure on him to demonstrate
    progress against the Houthi rebels, according toxxxxx
    with close personal ties to
    Saleh and his inner circle. xxxxx told EconOff that Saleh
    views Saudi involvement in the war, and the concomitant
    increase in direct Saudi budget support to the ROYG, as an
    incentive to prolong the ROYG's campaign in Sa'ada. xxxxx
    also claimed that members of the Saudi Special Office for
    Yemen Affairs, in contrast to the Saudi Government's official
    support for the ROYG, are privately very skeptical of Saleh's
    claims regarding Iranian assistance for the Houthi rebels.
    The long absence from Saudi Arabia of Crown Prince Sultan, a
    Saleh skeptic who normally heads the Special Office, has
    meant that the Yemen file has largely been in the hands of
    King Abdullah, a firm supporter of Saleh, according to xxxxx
    End summary.

    Saleh relieved by saudi involvement, but still overwhelmed
    --------------------------------------------- -------------

    ¶2. (C) In the past month, President Saleh has told a number
    of his top advisors that continued direct Saudi involvement
    in the Houthi conflict will alleviate domestic political
    pressure on the ROYG to produce tangible gains against the
    Houthis, according to xxxxx with close
    personal ties to Saleh. Saleh also views continued Saudi
    involvement as the key to keeping the tap of Saudi budget
    support open (Saudi monetary support for ROYG military
    operations will be reported septel). The greater financial
    incentives attached to direct Saudi participation in the
    conflict mean Saleh now has an incentive to prolong the
    conflict rather than seek a mediated solution. (Comment:
    xxxxx comments on Saleh's thinking support similar accounts
    from other Post contacts reported in REF B. xxxxx speaks
    frequently with Saleh, xxxxx. The chummy relationship between
    xxxxx that EconOff also attended. End
    Comment.)

    ¶3. (C) Like other Saleh watchers (REF C), xxxxx characterizes
    the multitude of threats facing Saleh as qualitatively
    different and more threatening to the regime's stability than
    those during any other time in Yemen's history. "Saleh is
    overwhelmed, exhausted by the war, and more and more
    intolerant of internal criticism. Saudi involvement comes at
    just the right time for him" xxxxx said. Largely
    unprecedented criticism of Saleh's leadership within the
    rarified circle of Saleh's closest advisors has increased in
    recent months, even including longtime Saleh loyalists such
    as Office of the Presidency aides xxxxx, according to xxxxx
    These names add to the growing chorus of Saleh loyalists that have shed their
    traditional aversion to disparaging the man they call "The
    Boss" (REF D).

    Saudis divided on confidence in saleh's sa'ada claims
    --------------------------------------------- --------

    ¶4. (C) Members of the Saudi Government's Special Office for
    Yemen Affairs, a committee normally headed by Crown Prince
    Sultan, are privately skeptical of Saleh's claims of Iranian
    involvement and of his desire to regionalize the Sa'ada
    conflict, according to xxxxx told
    EconOff on December 14 xxxxx that Saleh was providing false or exaggerated
    information on Iranian assistance to the Houthis in order to
    enlist direct Saudi involvement and regionalize the conflict.
    xxxxx said that xxxxx told him that "we know
    Saleh is lying about Iran, but there's nothing we can do
    about it now."

    Sanaa 00002279 002 of 002

    ¶5. (C) The prolonged absence from Saudi Arabia of Special
    Office chairman Crown Prince Sultan (REF A), who xxxxx claims
    is also highly skeptical of Saleh, left the Yemen file in the
    hands of King Abdullah, who has greater confidence in Saleh's
    motives and leadership abilities. Committee members have
    kept their doubts about Saleh's leadership abilities private
    since the departure of Crown Prince Sultan, creating a vacuum
    of Yemen policy advice in the Saudi Government that resulted
    in the decision to intervene directly in the Houthi conflict,
    xxxxx. King Abdullah was much more receptive to
    Saleh's entreaties for direct Saudi involvement than Crown
    Prince Sultan ever would have been, xxxxx.

    ¶6. (C) RIYADH COMMENT: We agree with xxxxx observation that
    Saudi support is enabling Saleh to weather increased domestic
    political pressure and continue his campaign against the
    Houthis. However, xxxxx assumption that King Abdullah's
    "greater confidence" in Saleh is driving this support may be
    flawed. We have seen no evidence that the King has any
    particular regard for Saleh beyond exasperation that borders
    on disgust. Senior Saudi officials make no secret of their
    distaste for Saleh, but see him as the "devil they know."
    Aware of his growing weakness, they view their support as
    essential to keeping Yemen's problems contained. Further,
    contacts say Second Deputy PM and Minister of Interior Prince
    Nayif, widely believed to advocate a tougher approach to the
    Yemen problem, has been heavily involved in the Yemen file in
    Sultan,s absence. Some suggest that the border actions --
    while temporarily propping up Saleh -- may be indicative of
    Saudi plans to take a harder line towards Yemen in the longer
    term. END RIYADH COMMENT.

    ¶7. (U) Embassy Riyadh has cleared this cable.
    Bryan

`