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### Viewing cable 09KABUL3185, AFGHANS SEEK IMPROVED JUDICIAL SECURITY; CSTC-A AGREES TO

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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
09KABUL3185 | 2009-10-10 05:05 | 2011-01-23 19:07 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Kabul

`

    VZCZCXRO7388
    RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
    DE RUEHBUL #3185/01 2830528
    ZNR UUUUU ZZH
    R 100528Z OCT 09
    FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2024
    INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

` `

    UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

    UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003185

    SIPDIS
    SENSITIVE

    DEPARTMENT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/A, AND INL

    E.O. 12958: N/A
    TAGS: PGOV KJUS EAID AF
    SUBJECT: AFGHANS SEEK IMPROVED JUDICIAL SECURITY; CSTC-A AGREES TO
    SUPPORT TRAINING EFFORTS BUT MORE RESOURCES LIKELY NECESSARY

    ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. Afghan officials, including the Afghan Chief
    Justice, the Attorney General, the Minister of Interior, and the
    Minister of Justice agree 24-hour security for certain at-risk
    judges and prosecutors is needed to establish a judiciary capable of
    prosecuting the powerful criminals and corrupt officials who are
    destabilizing Afghanistan. The Afghan government has agreed to work
    with the United States, the UK (a strong supporter), and other
    partners to recruit, train, and equip a specialized judicial
    security unit (JSU) modeled on the U.S. Marshals Service. A
    technical committee has met several times to discuss how to stand up
    such a force. On September 28, CSTC-A agreed to help identify a
    training and billeting facility, and provide JSU officers from the
    build-up of ANP forces. Additional funding resources, however, will
    be required to proceed. End Summary.

    --------------------------------------
    BACKGROUND: NEED FOR JUDICIAL SECURITY
    --------------------------------------

    ¶2. (U) The fear of assassination prevents many (if not most) Afghan
    judges and prosecutors from carrying out their duties with
    objectivity, particularly in cases involving powerful criminals or
    well-connected corrupt officials. Their fear is well-founded: the
    justice minister in Kunduz province was killed by an IED attack in
    late August (the Taliban claimed credit). In the past six months,
    insurgents killed eight prosecutors and kidnapped four others. The
    Chief Appellate Judge of the Central Narcotics Tribunal was killed
    in September 2008. Hence, Afghan and international experts agree
    Afghan judges and prosecutors need increased protection in order to
    establish an independent judiciary capable of prosecuting criminal
    and corrupt actors.

    ¶3. (U) Since 2006, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) has been
    involved in the assessment and improvement of security for the
    Counter-Narcotics Justice Task Force (CJTF) in Kabul. However,
    because of lack of funding, the USMS mandate was limited to training
    a small unit of the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
    to provide courtroom security. Following the assassination of the
    Chief Appellate Judge of the Central Narcotics Tribunal, judicial
    security became an urgent priority, and the USMS modified its
    mission to include training in personal security for key personnel.
    In a meeting with CJTF personnel shortly after the assassination,
    the Ministry of Interior (MOI) promised to create a judicial
    security program. The MOI also promised to increase the number of
    slots allotted to the CNPA unit, now called the Afghan Marshals
    Service (AMS), and the tashkil was increased from 28 to 74.
    Currently, however, only 47 men and women are in the unit.

    ----------------------------------
    AFGHANS AGREE TO JUDICIAL SECURITY
    ----------------------------------

    ¶4. (U) Civilian and military elements have had a number of
    discussions in recent weeks on the need Afghan officials see to
    develop a better way to provide better judicial security.

    ¶5. (U) The Deputy Ambassador, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham of South
    Carolina, and the Rule of Law Coordinator met on August 23, 2009
    with Afghan Chief Justice Abdul Salaam Azimi, and separately with
    Afghan Attorney General Mohammed Shaq Aloko, to discuss expanding
    judicial security. When that U.S. delegation met with Afghan
    Interior Minister Mohammed Hanif Atmar August 25, the Afghan
    officials acknowledged the importance and urgency of the issue. On
    August 26, they jointly agreed to seek U.S. assistance to form a
    special unit to protect Afghan judges and prosecutors.

    ¶6. (U) On August 27, 2009, a Kabul-based team (including
    representatives from Rule of Law (ROL), Department of Justice (DOJ),
    Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), USMS, Bureau of International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), CSTC-A, USFOR-A, and CENTCOM),
    met with Afghan Justice Minister Sanwar Danish, MOI Deputy Minister
    Mangal, Supreme Court General Chief Administrator Halimi, and Deputy
    Attorney General Fatah to discuss the way forward. A technical
    committee composed of Afghan, U.S., and UK officials subsequently
    met to examine the details of the JSU plan. The committee agreed to
    draft a concept paper addressing recruiting, training, equipping,
    and funding a judicial security unit. The committee will also
    explore the possibility of creating secure housing compounds for
    judges and prosecutors, as was done in Baghdad.

    ¶7. (U) During the discussions, the Afghan side proposed a nationwide
    force of up to 7,411 personnel at an estimated cost of $43 million
    (the U.S. and international donors would need to provide this
    assistance). Deputy Interior Minister Mangal offered 100 police
    officers, starting in September 2009, to meet the short-term needs
    of the proposed Justice Security Unit (JSU). The JSU would protect
    judges at the Counter Narcotics Justice Center, the Supreme Court,
    and judges handling Anti-Corruption Unit and Major Crimes Task Force
    cases. In addition, the Afghan side proposed including protection

    KABUL 00003185 002 OF 002

    for ministry officials and juvenile detention centers.

    ¶8. (U) The U.S. delegation proposed to train the JSU to provide
    courtroom and personal security for judges and prosecutors, and to
    apprehend fugitives. They made clear that U.S. funding would need
    to be tied to compliance with the implementation plan. To support
    development of a plan, the USMS recently conducted a security
    assessment of the needs of the Supreme Court.

    ¶9. (U) At a meeting on September 26, DM Mangal, and DOJ and USMS
    officials discussed the need to replicate the training given to the
    security force at the CNJC for the entire proposed national JSU.
    Deputy Minister Mangal agreed to revise the structure of the MOI to
    place the JSU, now part of the CNPA, under the direct supervision of
    DM Mangal. This step would encourage use of the existing JSU as a
    model for the development of the larger, nationwide JSU envisioned
    by the Afghan government.

    ¶10. (U) Subsequently, Technical Operations Division Assistant
    Director William Snelson and Commander Special Operations Group
    David Robertson, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), met with COL Scott
    Jones, CSTC-A Deputy Assistant Commanding General for Police
    Development, and COL Louis Jordan, CSTC-A Senior Military Advisor to
    the Deputy Minister of the Interior for Counter-Narcotics, September
    28, 2009 to how the U.S. military can support standing up an Afghan
    Judicial Security Unit (JSU) modeled on the USMS. CSTC-A pledged to
    help locate a training facility for the JSU program. In addition,
    COL Jones said the JSU force will come from the over-all planned
    build-up of the Afghan National Police. CSTC-A asked the U.S.
    Marshal Service to provide subject matter expertise in developing
    the force structure of the unit, which USMS agreed to do. Both
    CSTC-A and USMS agreed the 7,411 person security element is
    excessive.

    -------
    COMMENT
    -------

    ¶11. (SBU) Post strongly supports the proposal to build the JSU into
    an effective security unit to protect judges and prosecutors.
    However, we note the difficulty of obtaining adequate funding and
    sufficient numbers of U.S. Marshals Service personnel to oversee
    training of the unit. We are encouraged by the support pledged by
    CSTC-A to locate and develop a training facility.

    ¶12. (SBU) Under the best of circumstances, providing security to
    judges in the provinces is years away. Our sense is that protection
    should first be provided to justices of the U.S.-funded Counter
    Narcotics Justice Center, then to Afghan Supreme Court Justices,
    then to at-risk judges in Kabul, and then to at-risk judges in key
    provinces. The JSU will only protect prosecutors under specific
    threat, as in the United States.

    ¶13. (SBU) Afghan government officials agree -- and we agree -- that
    the country's judiciary and progress on rule of law would benefit
    from creation of a judicial security unit. At the same time,
    discussion of key points, including the size of the program and the
    budget it would need, have yet to begin in a detailed way. Embassy
    and potential Afghan partners are meeting to develop the thinking
    further and will provide Washington with updates, and at the
    appropriate time requests for action, as the work here proceeds.

    EIKENBERRY

`