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### MTG - SECURITY

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description
Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial

Understanding the structure of the report

- The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
- The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
- Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
- Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
- TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
- Title contains the title of the message.
- Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
- Region contains the broader region of the event.
- AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
- ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
- ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
- Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA, FriendlyKIA, HostNationWIA, HostNationKIA, CivilianWIA, CivilianKIA, EnemyWIA, EnemyKIA
- Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
- The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
- The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
- OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
- CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
- If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
- Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
- DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
- Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret

Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude
--- | --- | --- | ---
AFG20061118n480 | RC CAPITAL | 34.55408859 | 69.32198334

Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
2006-11-18 00:12 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting - Security | NEUTRAL | 0

| Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0

`

    Executive Summary (EXSUM):  17-19 NOV 06 Daily ANP Update
    ICW:  TF Spartan, TF Gauntlet, CSTC-A PRD, RPAT-CENTRAL

    SUBJECT:  17-19 NOV 06 Daily ANP Update

    DISCUSSION:   18 NOV Nuristan Security/Support Conference Report:  Saturdays Nuristan support meetings were conducted in two locations in Kabul.  1st Meeting (ANP Pay/Finance Issues):  1300L in the 1st Floor Conference Room at the MoF.  GOV Nuristani attended with a number of Nuristan ANP and Provincial Council representatives, to include the Provincial CoP, Logistics Officer, Finance Officer, Personnel Officer, Chief of Police Intelligence, engineers/technical advisors, and prominent Provincial Council members.  MoF was represented by a number of department of heads, to include representatives from the Budget, Dispersing, and Administration sections.  COL Hooper, LTC Pruiett, and the Deputy RC Commanding General represented RC Central.  CSTC-A PRD Finance representatives also attended, as did the following CJTF-76 personnel:  LTC(P) Feagin, LTC Brown, MAJ Cleveland, MAJ Medina, and CPT Spirz.  Though highly contentious, the conference resulted in the following way ahead:  1) GOV Nuristani rejected outright any ANP pay plan designed around disbursement from outside Nuristan.  Previously, the Deputy Governor had agreed in concept to payment for the eastern districts through Konar and the western districts in Laghman.  2) Despite geographical challenges/difficulties, Nuristan ANP pay will be distributed through a trusted pay agent/committee through Parun on a quarterly basis.  RC Central will work to coordinate with the Provincial CoP to coordinate the specifics for future pay missions.  3) MoI Moqbil personally cut the rightful 3 million Afghani backpay to the militia-cum-ANP in Nuristan in half.  His authorization of 1.5 million Afghani met only half the requirement.  GOV Nuristani formally requested the assistance of both MG Freakley and MG Durbin in obtaining the remaining rightful back pay for his militia-cum-ANP personnel.  (NOTE:  Throughout the days meetings, GOV Nuristani expressed his disgust/displeasure with MoIs corruption, bureaucracy, ineptitude, and unwillingness to support Nuristan and its efforts to reform the ANP and provide for security within the province.)  4)  GOV Nuristani just received additional pay for the last two months for the militia-cum-ANP and will travel to Kamdesh this week to pay these personnel.  5) GOV Nuristani approved a 1000L, 19 NOV ISP implementation coordination meeting at MoI with CSTC-A PRD Finance personnel, MoI, and his Provincial ANP personnel and finance officers.  More information on ISP implementation in Nuristan as it becomes available.  2nd Meeting (All other Nuristan ANP issues):  1600-1730L in Jacks House, Camp Eggers.  The afternoons conference, introduced by BG OBrien and co-chaired by GOV Nuristani and COL Hooper addressed CSTC-A CJ4 (PRD Resources), CJ6, and CJ7 support to the Nuristan ANP.  COL Hooper, PMI (Heidi Meyer) and PRD CJ6/Communications addressed Nuristans CODAN and additional digital/internet network requirements.  Based upon discussion at the conference and subsequent coordination with PMI, the intent is for PMI to establish PCC communications at Parun, with nodes also at Kala Gush and Kamdesh.  PMI hopes to begin fielding and training o/a 27 DEC in Parun.  Notified Ms. Meyer of the mission requirements and security situation in Parun and directed her to coordinate more closely with the PRT CDR (LTC Brown) and TF Spartan.  MAJ Medina then briefed the ongoing and scheduled ANP construction projects for CY 06 and CY 07.  Though he was aware of the projects, GOV Nuristani noted the difficulty in using non-Nuristani contractors for projects in Nuristan.  A case in point is the Parun District Center.  The Kabul-based contractor began construction too late  and now, though barely begun  the project is delayed until APR/MAY because of winter weather.  He discussed a number of cases in which outside contractors either did not speak the language, understand the culture, or realize the extent to which weather/geography impacts construction projects.  When the basic details of each of the projects had been briefed, GOV Nuristani expressed his skepticism that the projects would actually be completed.  From here  he indicated that his power to administer/supervise the ANP has been stripped away by the recent change to the Afghan Constitution.  He is unable to replace corrupt district chiefs  he cannot replace his Provincial Chief of Police (though he has asked a number of times to do so  citing the current Chiefs age and inability to travel to his districts and actively engage in administering police operations throughout the province.  He said that, though he is charged with providing security for his province  his ability to supervise the ANP has been taken from him.  ABP in Nuristan:   GOV Nuristani formally requested the 4th BN/1st ABP BDE be removed from 1st ABP BDE and placed under Provincial C2.  The Governor insisted the ABP provide extremely little security coverage along the Nuristan/Pakistan border.  He has attempted to speak with BG Zahir (1st ABP BDE CDR) about improving ABP capacity and enforcement within the Nuristan ABSZ  but with no success.  He indicated he has no influence upon BG Zahir.  Though the GOVs proposal seems untenable  if implemented it could address two very significant concerns.  First  with the 4th BN  GOV Nuristani believes he can personally supervise improved security along the provinces border with Pakistan.  Second, CSTC-A has already ceased all resources support to 1st ABP BDE.  Removing the 4th BN from Zahirs C2 would serve to further isolate his command and undermine his power base.  Topics Still to be Resolved:  ANP Pay Embezzlement (COL Jalil/COL Khan) investigation by RC Central, adding JUL 06 recruits to the formal payroll, implementing ISP in Nuristan; establishing communications nodes (fielding CODAN/satellite communications package for Parun Provincial Center, Kamdesh, and Kala Gush ASAP; RTC Basic Course classes for the 200+ Nuristan militia-cum-ANP, and monitoring FY 07 Nuristan ANP infrastructure improvement projects.

    WAY AHEAD:  Nuristan militia-cum-ANP Basic Class dates at Jalalabad RTC   16 DEC 06: 70-80 personnel, 6 JAN 07: 70-80 personnel, 3 FEB 07:  Any remaining personnel  should be approximately 40-60).  Kapisa (28) and Parwan (60) ANP Basic Class at J-bad RTC  25 NOV.

` `

    Report key: 3D356939-497B-4173-B7D9-7A57728D1381
    Tracking number: 2007-033-010446-0396
    Attack on: NEUTRAL
    Complex atack: FALSE
    Reporting unit: CJTF-76
    Unit name: CJTF-76
    Type of unit: None Selected
    Originator group: UNKNOWN
    Updated by group: UNKNOWN
    MGRS: 42SWD2954023642
    CCIR:
    Sigact:
    DColor: GREEN

`