### Browse by Type

air mission (431) counter insurgency (4) counter-insurgency (39) criminal event (480) detainee operations (1208) enemy (13) enemy action (27078) explosive hazard (23082) friendly action (13734) friendly fire (148) non-combat event (7719) other (2752) suspicious incident (208) unknown initiated action (12)

### Browse by Category

accident (836) air assault (3) air movement (8) ambush (538) amf-on-ana (2) amnesty (1) ana-on-anp (6) anp training (283) arrest (50) arson (41) arty (77) assassination (48) attack (2283) black list (1) blue-blue (18) blue-green (10) blue-on-white (2) blue-white (6) border ops (11) breaching (2) cache found/cleared (2742) carjacking (33) cas (123) casevac (14) cca (5) checkpoint run (37) close air support (95) convoy (53) cordon/search (80) counter insurgency (8) counter mortar fire (41) counter mortar patrol (7) counter narcotic (6) counter terrorism (1) criminal activity (27) defecting (5) deliberate attack (69) demonstration (237) detain (185) detained (683) detainee release (60) detainee transfer (517) direct fire (16293) downed aircraft (13) drug operation (6) drug vehicle (2) elicitation (1) enemy action (13) equipment failure (81) erw recovered (24) erw/turn-in (58) escalation of force (2271) evidence turn-in/received (50) extortion (5) finance (3) food distribution (4) frago (404) graffiti (1) green-blue (16) green-green (72) green-white (6) hard landing (9) idf counter fire (5) idf interdiction (137) ied ambush (350) ied explosion (7202) ied false (550) ied found/cleared (8581) ied hoax (185) ied suspected (895) ied threat (10) indirect fire (7237) insurgent vehicle (9) interdiction (488) internal security forces (2) kidnapping (110) looting (11) medcap (160) medevac (3301) medevac (local national) (428) medevac (other) (64) medevac patient transfer (162) meeting (1405) meeting - development (988) meeting - security (753) mine found/cleared (396) mine strike (321) movement to contact (4) mugging (1) murder (100) narcotics (1) natural disaster (55) nbc (1) negligent discharge (19) none selected (2) other (4693) other (hostile action) (418) other defensive (30) other offensive (132) patrol (365) planned event (404) poisoning (1) police actions (24) police internal (3) premature detonation (259) project closeout (81) project start (88) propaganda (100) psyop (190) psyop (tv/radio) (2) psyop (written) (4) qa/qc project (400) raid (44) recon (33) reconnaissance (169) recruitment (willing) (1) refugees (12) released (110) repetitive activities (8) reported location (1) resupply (7) rpg (76) sabotage (6) safire (1697) search and attack (7) sectarian violence (30) security breach (1) sermon (5) show of force (2) small unit actions (32) smuggling (23) sniper ops (154) snow and ice removal (49) supporting aif (4) supporting cf (15) surrendering (4) surveillance (369) tcp (3) tests of security (22) theft (40) threat (1) transfer (399) tribal (7) tribal feud (12) turn in (840) uav (16) unexploded ordnance (2770) unknown explosion (156) vandalism (11) vehicle interdiction (11) vetcap (13) voge (29)

### Browse by Region

none selected (19) rc capital (3191) rc east (38003) rc north (2143) rc south (30234) rc west (2934) unknown (359)

### Browse by Affiliation

NATO (1342) enemy (50887) friend (13882) neutral (10471) unknown (1671)

### Browse by Date

2004-01 (138) 2004-02 (101) 2004-03 (105) 2004-04 (89) 2004-05 (194) 2004-06 (175) 2004-07 (189) 2004-08 (191) 2004-09 (192) 2004-10 (232) 2004-11 (203) 2004-12 (178) 2005-01 (136) 2005-02 (143) 2005-03 (201) 2005-04 (221) 2005-05 (387) 2005-06 (432) 2005-07 (451) 2005-08 (435) 2005-09 (558) 2005-10 (413) 2005-11 (279) 2005-12 (314) 2006-01 (305) 2006-02 (403) 2006-03 (494) 2006-04 (713) 2006-05 (700) 2006-06 (663) 2006-07 (759) 2006-08 (936) 2006-09 (1050) 2006-10 (1248) 2006-11 (1145) 2006-12 (1020) 2007-01 (1416) 2007-02 (1251) 2007-03 (1263) 2007-04 (1514) 2007-05 (1777) 2007-06 (1788) 2007-07 (1833) 2007-08 (1784) 2007-09 (1902) 2007-10 (1694) 2007-11 (1536) 2007-12 (1362) 2008-01 (1222) 2008-02 (1040) 2008-03 (1230) 2008-04 (864) 2008-05 (885) 2008-06 (869) 2008-07 (930) 2008-08 (1244) 2008-09 (1076) 2008-10 (1529) 2008-11 (1676) 2008-12 (1418) 2009-01 (1290) 2009-02 (1164) 2009-03 (1453) 2009-04 (1436) 2009-05 (2004) 2009-06 (2429) 2009-07 (3078) 2009-08 (3645) 2009-09 (3123) 2009-10 (3282) 2009-11 (2938) 2009-12 (2573)

### Browse by Severity

High (76911) Low (76911)

### Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

### MTG - SECURITY

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description
Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial

Understanding the structure of the report

- The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
- The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
- Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
- Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
- TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
- Title contains the title of the message.
- Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
- Region contains the broader region of the event.
- AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
- ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
- ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
- Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA, FriendlyKIA, HostNationWIA, HostNationKIA, CivilianWIA, CivilianKIA, EnemyWIA, EnemyKIA
- Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
- The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
- The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
- OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
- CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
- If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
- Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
- DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
- Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret

Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude
--- | --- | --- | ---
AFG20061115n471 | RC EAST | 33.62928391 | 69.39308167

Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
2006-11-15 00:12 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting - Security | NEUTRAL | 0

| Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0

`

    Meeting with LTC Eid Mohammed, Paktya ANP Techniques Chief to Establish relationship with LTC Eid Mohammed, Techniques chief. Discussion Items: LTC Eid Mohammed was one of the initial ANP officers after the time of the Taliban. He was the director of personnel for Paktya Province and hired over 200 ANP troopers, as well as the District Chiefs of Police. During that time, the Paktya Deputy Chief of Police demanded that he accept bribes for the District Chief appointments; he refused and was fired...sent to be the crime chief for Sayed Karam District.
    - While he worked at the Sayed Karam District, LTC Mohammed strengthened his ties supporting the &amp;amp;quot;little man&amp;amp;quot; in the ANP. He made sure they were properly equipped and paid. He was quickly returned to the headquarters in Gardez to assume the position of Techniques Chief.
    - LTC Eid Mohammed is the techniques chief for the Paktya ANP. His job includes maintenance and accountability for weapons and vehicles. He maintains a fleet of 106 vehicles and claims to have not lost a single vehicle, weapon, magazine, screws, nails, or even the smallest item since he assumed the job.
    - LTC Mohammed said he was concerned about the status of weapons for the ANP. He said he wanted the PRT to understand this was not a request for equipment, just a professional analysis of the next step for him. He said that RPK and RPG weapons, at least one for each checkpoint should be emplaced. He said that particularly for Zurmat and Gerda Serai this was an issue. He said all told for sustaining the ANP in Paktya Province 100 RPK and 100 RPG should be considered.
    - LTC Eid Mohammed is well liked by the common ANP trooper for his interest in their welfare. An ethnic Pashtun, he readily identifies with their issues and finds ways to support them. LTC Mohammed is worried
    because the ANP troopers in Paktya are disenchanted because the leadership is poor.
    - LTC Mohammed said that corruption is undermining the discipline of the ANP troopers. He said that they are no longer interested in their jobs and that their hearts have gone cold. LTC Mohammed said that these days the troopers do not even arrive at work in uniform, but that the ANP Headquarters looks like a Mosque because everyone is dressed like a Mullah. ((COMMENT: This is a sharp contrast with observations made while Gen Matiullah was still at the ANP Headquarters serving as the Deputy CoP for Security)).
    - LTC Mohammed said the ANP troopers are undersupported, that even their winter uniforms are being stolen  by the logistics officer.
    - LTC Mohammed said there are four officers responsible for the corruption and downfall of the ANP in Paktya. The Personnel Chief Sayed Rahman, the Logistics Officer Nur Ali, and the Anti-terrorism Officer Shaeste Gul, and the Provincial Chief of Police General Rahofi.
    -- Sayed Rahman is responsible for forging personnel statistics and rosters, in the effort to request pay for imaginary officers while taking money from the real officers.
    -- Nur Ali took 1000AFG from each officer in the province, money that was intended for the officers bonus. Nur Ali is stealing winter food and uniforms leaving the soldiers with inadequate support for winter.
    -- Shaeste Gul establishes illegal checkpoints and collects illegal tolls around the city of Gardez.
    -- Gen Rahofi is the axel of corruption. He makes every effort to openly and blatantly take money from the ANP troopers and the officers. LTC Mohammed said the former Chief of Police Hai Gul would find clever ways to steal money, such as spending money on his car, but Gen Rahofi openly asks for large sums of money without explanation.
    - LTC Eid Mohammed said that this summer he was given 90,000 AFG by MOI to pay for maintenance of ANP vehicles to local vendor. When the money arrived at the finance office, LTC Mohammed said the finance officer would not give him the money if he did not sign 70,000 AFG over to Gen Rahofi. LTC Mohammed said this was not possible because he owed 60,000 AFG to vendors. At this point he was threatened by another officer (NFI) and told he would provide 30,000 AFG.
    - LTC Mohammed said there is a voucher for 200,000 AFG at the finance office that he cannot claim because General Rahofi is demanding 100,000 for himself. The Finance officer is refusing disbursal until LTC Mohammed agrees to the bribe. When asked LTC Mohammed said it was not possible for him to provide a copy of the paperwork because only the finance officer is priveleged to see the paperwork. LTC Mohammed suspects the finance officer is taking some money for himself. LTC Mohammed refuses to pay the bribe, and so he is not able to get the money. Sinec LTC Mohammed is the officer who approved the vehicle maintenance with the vendors, the vendors see him as the culprit. LTC Mohammed is concerned that the vendors will attack him.
    - LTC Mohammed stated that the ANP were boycotting Gen Rahofi&amp;amp;amp;apos;s continued presence as Chief of Police. He said that not wearing uniforms was but one example, but they were also not performing their security duties. He said they were not interested in pulling or even reporting IEDs because they don&amp;amp;amp;apos;t even receive the 2000 AFG they should each month. He said several officers have come to him to quit and he has convinced them to stay, but even now he says he is not sure how long he can stay because the vendors are all against him. He said he does not enjoy his job and is ashamed to be associated with Rahofi.
     LTC MOhammed said security would continue to downspiral. He said that even now General Rahofi was doing nothing to respond to the Kidnapped IOM workers in Zurmat. He said that it was not even being considered to his knowledge. He suggested the PRT contact the Zurmat Chief of Police to get ANP action because General Rahofi&amp;amp;amp;apos;s action would likely get the engineers killed.
    - LTC Mohammed said that General Rahofi would receive a report on his visit to the PRT and he expected negative action as a result. He said that Gen Rahofi could not afford to fire him, but he was concerned nonetheless. He said he was thankful for PRT support and wanted nothing from the PRT because it was his country and he should be the responsible one. He asked that the PRT not leave him though when he is
    knocked to the ground.

    Problem Mitigation Before Next Meeting: Contact Col Qadam Gul, Zurmat CoP regarding kidnap of IOM engineers.

    Additional Meeting Attendees: Armand Lyons, Maj, USAF / PRT S2

    PRT Assessment:
    - CF should bolster LTC Eid Mohammed
    -- LTC Eid Mohammed is a grass roots, informal leader.
    -- LTC Eid Mohammed has strong influence with the ANP and the people.
    -- LTC Eid Mohammed&amp;amp;amp;apos;s methods are honest with a &amp;amp;quot;salt-of-the-earth&amp;amp;quot; appeal.
    - Consideration should be made to provide ANP with RPK and RPG; this is a valid request.
    - Gen Rahofi continues blatant corruption and should be removed soonest

` `

    Report key: 03FF07D8-61AA-484E-A748-4AFD25F95847
    Tracking number: 2007-033-010445-0567
    Attack on: NEUTRAL
    Complex atack: FALSE
    Reporting unit: -
    Unit name: -
    Type of unit: None Selected
    Originator group: UNKNOWN
    Updated by group: UNKNOWN
    MGRS:
    CCIR:
    Sigact:
    DColor: GREEN

`