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### MTG - SECURITY

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description
Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial

Understanding the structure of the report

- The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
- The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
- Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
- Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
- TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
- Title contains the title of the message.
- Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
- Region contains the broader region of the event.
- AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
- ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
- ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
- Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA, FriendlyKIA, HostNationWIA, HostNationKIA, CivilianWIA, CivilianKIA, EnemyWIA, EnemyKIA
- Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
- The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
- The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
- OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
- CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
- If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
- Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
- DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
- Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret

Help us extend and defend this work

Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude
--- | --- | --- | ---
AFG20061118n485 | RC EAST | 34.7609787 | 70.14582825

Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
2006-11-18 00:12 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting - Security | NEUTRAL | 0

| Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0

`

    Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF) Council

    PRT Comments:
    Meeting Attendees  Lieutenant General Abdul Kariem Omaryar, Laghman Provincial Chief of Police; Colonel Abdul Aziz, QarghahyI Chief of Police; Lieutenant Colonel Brad Bredenkamp, Mehtar Lam PRT Commander; Leutenant Colonel Robert Ricci, In-Bound (Apr 2007); Mehtar Lam PRT Commander; Captain Ahmad Shah, Alingar Chief of Police; Captain Ramkhda Mokhlies, Alishang Chief of Police; Captain Esmat Ullah, Dowlat Shah Chief of Police; Captain Joseph Lendo, Mehtar Lam PRT S-2; TSgt David Pacheco, Mehtar Lam PRT PTAT NCOIC; Mr. Mark Allen, DynCorp; Sherzai, Mehtar Lam PRT CAT I

    Items of Discussion  TSgt Pacheco was the facilitator for this ANSF Council (first ANSF council since mid May 2006). TSgt Pacheco introduced Laghman ANP leadership to Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ricci, in-coming PRT Commander (Apr 2007). After introductions, TSgt Pacheco gave a brief overview which covered the following:

    1. How Alingar, Alishang, and Dowlat Shah play an imporant role in the future success of Laghman Province
    2. Primary role of ANSF Council is to increase ANP operational readiness and capability

    The following is a summary of what personnel briefed / discussed during the meeting:

    Lieutenant General Omaryar:
    - 3 meetings about Dowlat Shah were held in the last 2 weeks
    - Today, at 0900 hours, there was a report of an IED on Alingar Road. ANP were securing the scene
    - MoI called General Omaryar to discuss security in Laghman Province. General Omaryar reported to MoI on the
    meetings he has had recently with the PRT
    o Recent meetings have focused mainly on establishing / improving ANP processes (Form 14s, training, etc.)
    - General Omaryar plans to have shuras at each district to gather and receive information
    o Goal is to mediate tribal feuding and make people become peaceful
    - General Omaryar and Captain Ahmad Shah attended a small shura in Alingar today
    o Villages of TAG (sp?), Salaw (sp?), Neazi (sp?), and Kau (sp?)
    o Shura covered drug production and smuggling
    o 6 villagers were present
    - General Omaryar would like to host a large shura next week (time not known)
    o Discuss Laghman Issues (Reconstruction, security, etc.)
    - General Omaryar would also like to have a shura for former Mujadeen (sp?) Commanders
    o Utilize village elders to inform former commanders about shura
    o Determine # of weapons
    o Persuade former commanders to surrender weapons to DIAG
    - General Omaryar asked PRT for fuel (for his vehicle) so he can travel to districts and spread word via shuras
    - General Omaryar said the reason there are ACMs is because they were not given positions in the new government
    - Districts need Motorola ICOMs (like the ones used in BAF)
    - If ANP pay system gets fixed, then the quality of ANP will improve

    Lieutenant Colonel Bredenkamp:
    - The importance of ANP having integrity while conducting their day-to-day missions
    - Continue working with PTAT and DynCorp to develop or refine processes that improve operational readiness and capability
    - Asked Colonel Aziz on the status of new QarghayI police station
    o Work is progressing slowly
    - Asked Captain Ahmad Shah on the status of the Alingar observation post (across from Alingar District Center; on top of mountain ridgeline)
    o Captain Ahmad Shah mentioned that TSgt Pacheco gave them wood and a used tent earlier this week
    - Asked if results of shura are documented
    o General Omaryar said not at the present time
    - Asked Captain Mokhlies where he would place a permanent patrol base (one that could support ANP and ANA forces)

    Captain Lendo:
    - Asked Colonel Aziz if the cobblestone road project has benefited the ANP
    o Colonel Aziz said villagers are happy and therefore crime is low
    - Asked Captain Ahmad Shah about the Nuralam (sp?) Valley
    o No issues at this time

    Each Laghman District Police Chief had the opportunity to provide a district security assessment:

    QarghahyI
    o Colonel Aziz has been the QarghahyI Police Chief for 3 months and 21 days
    o At this time, there are no large security issues
    o Small issues between villagers (not important)
    o Villagers in QarghayI are happy (mainly because reconstruction projects keep them employed)
    o Colonel Aziz visits mosques to discuss future shuras with village elders
    o Need stoves / heaters for ANP stations

    Alingar
    o Captain Ahmad Shah said security in Alingar is good
    o New road project and having electricity helps promote economy
    o Had shura in Ouswali, Alingar
    o 52 villagers attended
    o Need stoves / heaters for ANP stations
    o Security in Parawi (sp?) village is good
    o Enemy forces are known to be in Kalat (sp?)

    Alishang
    o Captain Mohklies said we need to develop a plan to prevent villagers from joining ACMs
    o More reconstruction projects are needed
    o Zarkamar (sp?), Gonopal (sp?), Gubin (sp?), and Mayl (sp?) Valley are where ACMs are located
    o Need big operation to clean out those areas
    o Suggests PRT contacts him prior to them heading north of the Alishang District Center
    o Collectively develop an operational plan
    o Captain Mohklies recommended a temporary patrol base, not a permanent one (response to Lieutenant Colonel
    Bredenkamps question)
    o Mayl Valley and Gonopal Valley (General Omaryar recommended)
    o 50 personnel in each location (General Omaryar recommended)
    o 20 QRF personnel (General Omaryar recommended)
    o Heavy weapons are required (PK, RPGs, etc.) (General Omaryar recommended)

    Dowlat Shah  Because of time constraints (2 &amp;#xbd; hour meeting), General Omaryar said that Dowlat Shah has the
    most important issues and requires too much attention. General Omaryar asked Captain Esmat Ullah to discuss only the most important issues.
    o Need PRT to notify ANP before they travel to Dowlat Shah
    o Dowlat Shah will identify Target Reference Points (TRPs)

    CJTF Goals - Ensure security within the province, enhance the credibility of the ANP, and provide guidance through appropriate channels.

    Meeting Assessment  As mentioned, this was the first ANSF Council meeting since mid May 2006. None of the ANP present today has attended an ANSF Council during my tenure (Apr 06). General Omaryar agreed that ANP and PRT need to assemble every 2 weeks to participate in future ANSF Council. He recommended that ANA and NDS attend. Next ANSF Council is scheduled for 30 Nov at the Mehtar Lam ANP compound. TSgt Pacheco asked each ANP commander to identify resource / equipment deficiencies that are preventing them from increasing their operational readiness and capability, and to bring a list to the next ANSF Council. General Omaryar appears committed to contributing to the security reform in Laghman Province. In the future, Lieutenant General Omaryar will be the ANSF Council facilitator. I think ANP leadership in Dowlat Shah and Alishang
    understand that reconstruction projects have directly contributed to a more stable security environment in
    Alingar,   ... Remarks are continued in the comments section ...

` `

    Report key: F7B582A5-A330-4C85-8370-29EC03CE6DD6
    Tracking number: 2007-033-010446-0583
    Attack on: NEUTRAL
    Complex atack: FALSE
    Reporting unit: -
    Unit name: -
    Type of unit: None Selected
    Originator group: UNKNOWN
    Updated by group: UNKNOWN
    MGRS:
    CCIR:
    Sigact:
    DColor: GREEN

`